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THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
1973
The Minnesota Supreme Court Note is intended to present
a comprehensive survey of significant decisions by the court
during 1973. The cases selected represent new developments
in Minnesota law and in some instances are of national impor-
tance. The organization of the cases is by topical headings ac-
cording to the most important issue in each case.
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I. ATTORNEYS
Judicial v. Legislative Regulation of the Legal Profession.-
During its 1973 session, the Minnesota Legislature adopted a
comprehensive act which sought to regulate the examination of
all professional groups practicing within the state.' The por-
tions of the act dealing with the legal profession altered the
rules concerning the number of members, compensation, terms
of office and method of selection of the State Board of Profes-
sional Responsibility. 2 The act also amended3 a prior statute4
which had created a special fund of the State Treasury to re-
ceive registration and other fees and disburse them as the su-
preme court directed. Under the new scheme, the monies col-
lected from attorneys by the Clerk of the Supreme Court were
to be transferred to the general fund in the State Treasury.5
Administrative control over the State Board of Law Examiners
and the State Board of Professional Responsibility was placed
in the Commissioner of Administration, who was also given au-
thority over the amount of the lawyers' annual registration fee.7
The operations of the State Board of Law Examiners were to
be financed from legislative appropriations.8 Finally, the act re-
quired that the Board of Law Examiners use certain standard-
ized tests for admission to the bar.9 Each of these provisions
conflicted with established rules of the supreme court regulat-
ing the legal profession.
The Minnesota State Bar Association, an attorney who was
a member of the Association and an attorney who was not a
member brought an original proceeding before the supreme
court challenging the validity of the portions of the act relat-
ing to the legal profession. Respondents were the State Audi-
1. Minn. Laws 1973, ch. 638.
2. AITNN. STAT. § 481.18 (Supp. 1973).
3. Id. § 481.01.
4. hMiNN. STAT. § 481.01 (1971).
5. MiNx. STAT. §§ 481.01, 481.18 (Supp. 1973).
6. Id. § 214.04.
7. Id. § 214.06.
8. Id. § 481.01.
9. Id. § 214.03.
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tor, the State Treasurer and the Commissioner of Administra-
tion. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the power to reg-
ulate the practice of law rests with the judiciary and that inso-
far as the act purported to regulate the practice of law, it was
an unconstitutional interference with the court's regulatory
powers. Sharood v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1973).
This decision raises issues of great importance to both the
public and the Minnesota Bar and points up serious questions
concerning the appropriate separation of powers between the
legislative and the judicial branches of state govenment. For
these reasons the case will be analyzed at length in a future
issue of the Minnesota Law Review.10
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE
1. Reopening of Default Judgment.-Plaintiff orally agreed
to purchase defendant's truck and made a down payment but
failed to complete the transaction when notified that the truck
was ready for delivery. After a lapse of 42 days, defendant
traded the truck to another party. One month after the trade,
plaintiff served a complaint on defendant seeking damages for
defendant's disposal of the truck. Defendant did not answer,
and plaintiff obtained a default judgment. Defendant then
moved to reopen the judgment on the ground that he had tele-
phoned plaintiff's attorney shortly after the complaint was
served and had obtained the impression that there was nothing
further for him to do at that time. The motion included a pro-
posed answer and counterclaim setting forth plaintiff's failure
to complete the transaction as a defense. On appeal from the
trial court's denial of the motion to reopen, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that courts should be liberal in
reopening default judgments, particularly where there is the
possibility of a valid defense and no substantial prejudice to the
plaintiff. Taylor v. Steinke, 295 Minn. 244, 203 N.W.2d 859
(1973).
In Minnesota, the established rule is that the courts will
be liberal in reopening default judgments if the party in default
shows: 1) that he possesses a reasonable defense on the merits;
10. See also 2 DuN. Mnw. Dic. § 664 (Supp. 1972).
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2) that he has a reasonable excuse for his failure to answer;
3) that he has acted with due diligence after notice of the en-
try of judgment; and 4) that no substantial prejudice will result
to the other party.' In the instant case the court concluded
that defendant's assertion that he had obtained the impression
from plaintiffs attorney that he need take no further action con-
stituted a reasonable excuse for the failure to answer. Although
the court admitted that a stronger evidentiary showing would
have been desirable,2 it did not remand for the taking of further
evidence. The reversal of the trial court on what was admit-
tedly weak evidence conflicts with the supreme court's previous
statement that the reopening of a default judgment is a matter
almost solely within the discretion of the trial court.3
The instant case is distinguishable from Standard Oil Co.
v. King4 in which the court held that a default judgment would
not be reopened despite defendant's testimony as to conversa-
tions and correspondence with plaintiff's attorney. The control-
ling fact was that plaintiff's attorney had followed the commu-
nications with a letter informing the defendant of his obligation
to answer the complaint. Given the holding in Taylor that a
defendant may reopen a default judgment on the mere showing
of an impression that an answer was unnecessary, Minnesota
attorneys would be well advised to follow the procedure used
in Standard Oil by including in any oral or written communica-
tions prior to an answer a reminder to the defendant that an
answer is necessary. The validity of a subsequent default judg-
ment would then be assured.
2. Validity of Notice Served by Leaving with Person Under
Age 14.-The defeated candidate in an election for the Minne-
sota House of Representatives filed a notice of election contest
alleging irregularity and mistake in the tabulation of votes. A
copy of the notice of contest was left by a deputy sheriff with
the 13 year old daughter of the successful candidate at the candi-
date's residence. Subsequently, the successful candidate moved
for dismissal of the contest on the ground, inter alia, that his
daughter was not a person of suitable age and discretion with
1. linz v. Northland Milk & Ice Cream Co, 237 Minn. 28, 30,
53 N.W.2d 454, 455-56 (1952). See also Sommers v. Thomas, 251 Minn.
461, 468, 88 N.W.2d 191, 196 (1958); 46 Am. JuR. 2d Judgments § 686
(1969).
2. 295 Minn. at 246, 203 N.W.2d at 860.
3. See Peterson v. W. Davis & Sons, 216 Minn. 60, 67, 11 N.W.2d
800, 804 (1943).
4. 238 Minn. 81, 55 N.W.2d 710 (1952).
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whom to leave the notice as required by rule 4.03 (a).5 The trial
court denied the motion, and the supreme court affirmed, hold-
ing that a person under the age of 14 was not, as a matter of
law, a person who lacked suitable age and discretion. One jus-
tice dissented. Holmen v. Miller, 206 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. 1973).
Previously the court had held that a person 14 years of age
or older was prima facie a person of suitable age and discretion."
As the majority noted, however, nothing in that decision re-
quired the conclusion that a person under 14 years of age could
not also qualify. In arguing for a contrary result, both the
appellant and the dissenting justice cited several statutes which
enumerate the special rights and obligations of minors who have
reached their fourteenth birthday. 7 They especially relied on
that part of rule 4.03(a) which provides that personal service
upon a defendant under age 14 can only be made by serving
a parent or guardian. The majority distinguished that situation
from the instant case on the basis of the minor's responsibility
in reacting to the summons. Where the minor is the defendant,
it is necessary that an adult be informed so that he can assist the
minor in making an appropriate response. In the instant case,
however, the minor was acting only as the means of transmitting
the process to an adult at his usual place of abode and was not
required to respond personally to the summons.
Ultimately, the disagreement between the majority and the
dissent stemmed from conflicting views concerning which party
can best bear the burden of proving that the minor was or was
not a person of suitable age and discretion. The majority con-
cluded that the moving party should have the burden of over-
coming the facts alleged in the sheriff's certificate of service
since it would be very difficult for the process server to deter-
mine close questions of suitability at the time of service. While
acknowledging this problem, the dissent concluded that the
server must inquire as to the age of the person served and
should bear the risk if he chooses to leave the process with a
person under age 14. From a practical viewpoint the majority
5. MUn,. R. Civ. P. 4.03 (a).
6. Temple v. Norris, 53 Minn. 286, 55 N.W. 133 (1893). Minnesota
may be a leader on this issue. The closest decision under the similar
federal rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1), appears to be De George v. Man-
data Poultry Co., 196 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1961), where service upon
a 16-year-old was upheld.
7. E.g., MmN. STAT. § 525.541 (1971) (right to nominate own




approach would appear to be preferable for two reasons.8 First,
it is likely that many defendants will concede the suitability
of the minor served. Requiring that the serving party prove
suitability would be a waste of the court's time in such cases.
Second, because it is likely that the minor will be related to
and under the control of the defendant, the latter will have
greater access to the evidence and therefore will be less bur-
dened if compelled to produce it. In any event, both the ma-
jority and the dissent acknowledged that service on a person
under age 14 can be valid in some circumstances.
3. Other Cases.-In Long v. Moore, 204 N.W.2d 641 (Minn.
1973), the supreme court held that the statute of limitations was
not tolled by a defendant's absence from the state when service
was possible under an appropriate "long-arm" statute. Plain-
tiff and defendant were involved in an automobile collision at
a time when both were residents of Minnesota. Defendant sub-
sequently left the state, but plaintiff did not commence the ac-
tion by serving process until more than seven years after the
accident. Minnesota has a six year statute of limitations for
such actions9 and provides for substitute service on non-resident
motorists10 but tolls the statute of limitations during a defend-
ant's absence from the state.11
The court noted that while the states are not uniform in
their approach to this problem, a majority are in accord with
the court's holding in the instant case.12 Those courts accepting
the minority view reason that tolling is necessary since the toll-
ing statute contains no specific exemption for cases in which
substitute service is available and the creation of such an exemp-
tion is for the legislature.13 In adopting the majority position,
the court observed that the instant case was analogous to its
previous holding that the statute of limitations was not tolled
where a corporation which had irrevocably designated certain
state officials as its agents for service of process in actions aris-
8. Accord, Republic Prods., Inc. v. American Fed'n of Musicians,
173 F. Supp. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (burden on defendant).
9. MmNx. STAT. § 541.05 (1971).
10. Mn . STAT. § 170.55 (1971). The use or operation of a vehi-
cle within the state by a nonresident results in the automatic appoint-
ment of the Commissioner of Public Safety as his agent for service of
process in any action arising out of such use or operation.
11. MINN. STAT. § 541.13 (1971).
12. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 502, 504 (1951); 51 AM. JuR. 2d Limi-
tation of Actions § 162 (1970).
13. See, e.g., Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohio 458,90 N.E.2d 139 (1950).
1974]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ing from its Minnesota business had formally withdrawn from
the state.14 These holdings suggest that the court is developing
a uniform rule in such cases regardless of the particular "long-
arm" statute involved.
In E-rickson v. Sorenson, 211 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. 1973), the
supreme court held that a new trial would not be granted where
all parties acquiesced in an incorrect jury instruction and the
correct instruction would probably not have changed the ver-
dict. At trial, the court and both parties had anticipated a su-
preme court ruling that assumption of risk was to be submitted
to the jury as an aspect of contributory negligence, and an in-
struction had been given accordingly. After the verdict, the su-
preme court announced its decision in Springrose v. Willmorel o
as expected but ruled that its decision was to be applied pro-
spectively only. The unsuccessful party, who had requested the
combined instruction, then moved for a new trial on the ground
that the instruction had been erroneous at the time of the origi-
nal trial.
In moving for a new trial under rule 51,10 a party may not
assign as error any erroneous jury instructions to which he did
not object before the jury retired, unless the error is one of
fundamental law or controlling principle. Although the error
in the instant case was clearly one of law, the court had ample
precedent for its holding that the "fundamental law" exception
is not available to a party who has requested the instruction
and knowingly acquiesced in its submission to the jury.1 7 The
controlling fact in this case was that both parties knew of the
current status of negligence law but voluntarily chose to rely
upon an incorrect prediction of a future supreme court ruling.1 8
14. Pomeroy v. National City Co., 209 Minn. 155, 296 N.W. 513
(1941).
15. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
16. MiNN. R. Civ. P. 51.
17. See Mineral Resources, Inc. v. Mahnomen Const. Co., 289 Minn.
412, 418, 184 N.W.2d 780, 784 (1971); Miller v. Tongen, 281 Minn. 427,
430, 161 N.W.2d 686, 688 (1968); Hemming v. Ald, Inc., 279 Minn. 38,
46, 155 N.W.2d 384, 390 (1967); Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros. Co., 275 Minn.
408, 415, 147 N.W.2d 561, 566 (1966); Donald v. Moses, 254 Minn. 186,
94 N.W.2d 255 (1959); Jablinske v. Eckstrom, 247 Minn. 140, 76 N.W.2d
654 (1956); Adelmann v. Elk River Lumber Co., 242 Minn. 388, 65 N.W.
2d 661 (1954).
18. 211 N.W.2d at 885. On this basis, the court distinguished Mjos
v. Village of Howard Lake, 287 Minn. 427, 178 N.W.2d 862 (1970), in
which an erroneous instruction was held to justify a new trial where




Constitutionality of Legislative Reduction of Judges' Retire-
ment Benefits.-Prior to 1967, the law providing retirement ben-
efits for state district court judges stated:
If, at the time of retirement, [a district judge] has attained the
age of at least 70 years and he has served for 15 years as suchjudge, or as such judge and as judge of a court of record, he
shall receive for the remainder of his life, one-half the compen-
sation allotted to the office.'
In 1967 this provision was amended to read in pertinent part:
"[H] e shall receive for the remainder of his life, one-half of the
compensation allotted for the office at the time of his re-
tirement."2
Six retired district court judges brought actions seeking de-
claratory judgments that the 1967 amendment, and a similar
amendment in 1969,s were unconstitutional as applied to them.
The actions were consolidated, and on appeal the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the 1967 and 1969 amendments were
laws "impairing the obligation of contracts" and therefore were
unconstitutional under article I, section 10 of the United States
Constitution and article I, section 11 of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion. Sylvestre v. State, 214 N.W.2d 658 (Minn. 1973).
Essential to the court's conclusion was its construction of
the original statute as an offer for a unilateral contract. The
court read the statute as saying to the plaintiffs: "If you will
stay on the job for at least 15 years and then retire after having
reached the specified retirement age, we will pay you a part
of your salary for the remainder of your life."'4 Although most
statutes should be interpreted as an expression of a legislative
policy which is subject to repeal or modification by a subsequent
legislature, the right of the state to contract through legislative
enactments has been recognized by the United States Supreme
Court.5 Such an enactment, when relied upon by an individual,
creates an obligation binding upon the state dnd subject to the
contracts clause of the Constitution. After recognizing the offer
for a unilateral contract, the court went on to find that the
terms of the offer were unambiguous, the judges relied on the
1. Minn. Laws 1965, ch. 762, §§ 3-5.
2. Minn. Laws 1967, ch. 382, § 1.
3. Minn. Laws 1969, ch. 987, § 1. The amended statute in its
present form is Alum. STAT. § 490.102(2) (a) (1971).
4. 214 N.W.2d at 665.
5, Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
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offer in performing their obligations under the contract, and the
1967 and 1969 amendments were clearly an attempt to alter the
state's obligations under the contract and were therefore an un-
constitutional impairment of contract obligations.6
By framing its holding in contract terms, the court commit-
ted itself to the Restatement view on the irrevocability of unilat-
eral contracts and thereby became vulnerable to the theoretical
difficulties that position entails.7 Such a commitment was not
necessary to reach the court's desired result. The court could
easily have protected those judges retiring after 1967 by relying
on article VI, section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution which pro-
vides that the compensation of judges "shall not be diminished
during their term of office." By construing the retirement ben-
efits as deferred compensation, the court could have concluded
that because the 1967 amendment froze retirement benefits, it
effectively diminished compensation and therefore became un-
constitutional as applied to all judges then in office.
The difficulty in the court's adoption of a contract rationale
to protect state judges' retirement benefits is that such a ration-
ale could logically extend to all state employees whose compen-
sation benefits are defined by statute. Heretofore it has been
the law in Minnesota that a statutory definition of a state posi-
tion does not confer upon a state employee any vested contrac-
tual rights to that position or its compensatory incidents.8 This
has been true regardless of the extent to which the employee
may have relied on the state's promise in accepting the position.
Thus the court's preferential interpretation of the judges' em-
ployment rights, as opposed to those of other state employees,
does not seem to derive from a difference in contractual equities
between the two classes. The difference in treatment must de-
rive instead from the fact that judges, unlike other state em-
ployees, hold their positions by virtue of the state constitution
and not by authority of the state legislature. The judiciary's
6. The court also applied this reasoning to cover district court
judges who had entered office before the passage of the 1967 amend-
ment but who had retired subsequent to its enactment. In such cases,
the court reasoned, the part performance by the judges prevented the
revocation of the offer by the state.
7. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1932) states: "If an offer
for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the consideration requested
in the offer is given or tendered by the offeree in response thereto, the
offeror is bound by a contract .... ." For a discussion of the theoreti-
cal difficulties with this position, see 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 60,
60A (3d ed. 1957).
8. Slezak v. Ousdigian, 260 Minn. 303, 110 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
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status as a separate and coequal branch of government provides
ample grounds for the court's extension of contractual protec-
tion to judges' employment rights. The court's concern with
preserving the integrity of an independently functioning judi-
ciary justifiably directed its decision.
IV. CONTRACTS
A. GaiALLY
1. Architect's Liability for Incorrect Cost Estimates.-
Plaintiffs contracted with an architect for the design of a house,
using the standard form contract which required that the archi-
tect furnish cost estimates with the design. Plaintiffs advised
the architect that they were prepared to spend $30,000 but ac-
cepted the architect's design which estimated costs at nearly
$40,000. Acting as their own contractor, plaintiffs spent over
$63,000 during piecemeal construction over a four year period.
At that time the cost of completion was estimated at approxi-
mately $20,000 and the market value of the unfinished house
was between $52,000 and $55,000. Plaintiffs brought an action
for recovery of their losses resulting from the cost underesti-
mates. The jury was instructed that the measure of damages
was the difference between the cost of construction to date and
the market value of the house in its present condition. The jury
awarded $7,000 damages for losses sustained because of the un-
derestimates. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding that the architect's duty to make an estimate
of probable costs was an inherent part of the contract and that
the architect was liable for damages for breach of contract when
a substantial underestimate of costs resulted from his negligence
in making the estimate. Kostohryz v. McGuire, 212 N.W.2d 850
(Minn. 1973).
In determining the architect's liability for underestimating
costs, it was necessary for the court to decide the legal effect
of an "estimate," a term which has been defined as "a mere
approximation."1 It had previously been determined that com-
pensation could be denied an architect whose estimate was so
inaccurate that the project had to be abandoned,2 but the award
of damages for a negligent estimate was without substantial
precedent in either Minnesota3 or other jurisdictions.4
1. 4 Dut. MINN. DiG. § 1843 (3d ed. 1952).
2. Wick v. Murphy, 237 Minn. 447, 54 N.W.2d 805 (1952). See
also Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 778 (1968).
3. The possibility of architects' liability for damages was not un-
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In the instant case, the court rejected the defendant's con-
tention that the estimate was merely an opinion and therefore
not actionable. Instead, the court relied on Durand Associates,
Inc. v. Guardian Investment Co.,5 a Nebraska case which held
that because the estimate was so important to the client, it was
a part of the contract. That case involved an architect's suit
for fees for a design submitted and accepted but abandoned
because the lowest bid for the work exceeded the estimates by
72 percent. The Durand court also affirmed the dismissal of
a cross-claim for damages caused by the negligent estimate be-
cause the builder had not met his burden of proof, implying
that damages would have been granted had the burden been
met.6 The Kostohryz court also cited 5 Am. JuR. 2d Architects
§ 23 (1962) as authority for the imposition of liability on an
architect for a negligent estimate. This is somewhat question-
able authority as the only case cited by that reference in sup-
port of this proposition is Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Wood-
ruff Co.,7 in which the underestimation was caused by the arch-
itect's fraud rather than his negligence. In the instant case, no
fraud was alleged. However, if, as the court concluded, the esti-
mate was an integral part of the contract because of its impor-
tance to the builder, recovery for breach of contract when sub-
stantial cost underestimates are caused by the architect's negli-
gence was proper despite the lack of precedent.8
The question of whether the remedy for the architect's neg-
ligent estimate should be grounded in contract or tort theory
was a source of confusion at trial and on appeal. The trial be-
gan as an action in malpractice but the issue was ultimately
submitted to the jury as a breach of contract question. Appar-
ently the supreme court's opinion held merely that the applica-
tion of contract theory to a case of negligent estimate was proper
without precluding reliance on malpractice actions in such cases.
Several implications arise from the court's conclusion that
foreseen, however. See Peerless Ins. Co. v. Cerny & Assoc., Inc., 199
F. Supp. 951 (D. Minn. 1961); Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn.
249, 72 N.W.2d 634 (1955) (quoted in Kostohryz). The issue of liability
for negligent estimate is new.
4. 5 AM. JuR. 2d Architects § 23 (1962) cites only one old case
awarding damages. See note 7 infra and accompanying text.
5. 186 Neb. 349, 183 N.W.2d 246 (1971).
6. Id. at 358, 183 N.W.2d at 252.
7. 163 Cal. 561, 126 P. 351 (1912).
8. The court cites Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 778 (1968) in a footnote.




the application of contract principles was proper. First, the con-
tract theory may lessen or even eliminate the need for expert
testimony on the issue of the prerequisite standard of care to
,be applied to architects making cost estimates." Second, a mal-
practice theory would have raised the issue of comparative neg-
ligence based on plaintiffs' decision to proceed with construction
on a piecemeal basis and without the services of an independent
contractor. The trial court may have introduced the concept
by instructing the jury that plaintiffs had a duty to mitigate
damages, but an instruction based on comparative negligence
might have been preferable from the architect's point of view.
The exposure of architects to damage suits could likely be tem-
pered by a more well-defined concept of the duty to mitigate.
The court quoted some language which appears to limit liability:
"However, one to whom an architect gives an estimate of cost
may not recklessly proceed to make contracts which made the
cost of construction far above that estimated and then hold the
architect responsible for the surplus expenditure."'10 Unfortu-
nately, the quoted language only raises further causation issues
where "surplus expenditures" are incurred by one who proceeds
to make construction contracts in the face of an impossibly low
estimate.
The court in Kostohryz also affirmed a jury instruction
measuring damages as the difference between the construction
costs to date and the market value of the property in its present
condition rather than as the excess of costs over estimate." The
measure of damages for breach of contract had been previously
stated -by the court to be limited to the pecuniary losses sus-
tained. 2 In future actions, suits for negligent estimation may
be prevented simply because no pecuniary losses will have re-
sulted. This problem may arise where the plaintiff who is un-
able to finance the completion of construction has an unfinished
house whose market value equals its cost.
2. Consideration Necessary to Support a Lien Waiver.-In
two cases, the court found that agreements purporting to waive
9. The court seems to imply that the services of an expert witness
will be eliminated only where, as here, the negligence results in a sub-
stantial underestimate of costs. The court does not hint at a dividing
line between substantial and insubstantial. 212 N.W.2d at 854.
10. 212 N.W.2d at 854 quoting 5 Am. JuR. 2d Architects § 23
(1962).
11. 212 N.W.2d at 855.




mechanic's liens were without consideration and therefore unen-
forceable. In the first case, a subcontractor executed a lien
waiver after substantial part performance of the contract but
without full payment of the amount then due. On the subcon-
tractor's appeal from the trial court's release of his lien, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lien waiver
lacked consideration when given without payment for work per-
formed and was neither executed pursuant to a prior agreement
nor detrimentally relied on by the prime contractor or the
owner.'3 Cook v. Metal Building Products, Inc., 211 N.W.2d 371
(Minn. 1973). In the second case, contractors sought to estab-
lish their mechanic's liens after the owner had obtained lien
waivers for work performed in the construction of an apartment
building. The trial court entered judgment against the owner
for the amount due but refused to enforce the lien. In reversing
in part, the supreme court held that the lien waiver lacked con-
sideration where it included work which had been completed
at the time of execution of the waiver but for which payment
had not yet been received. Project Plumbing Co. v. St. Croix
Properties, Inc., 211 N.W.2d 873 (Minn. 1973).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently refused to
enforce lien waivers in the absence of consideration. 1 4 These
decisions are also consistent with the weight of authority else-
where.15 Taken together, Cook and Project Plumbing clearly
indicate that the court will hold that lien waivers are void for
want of consideration in cases where debtors exact such waivers
as a condition for tendering payments which they are already
legally obligated to make. In such cases the requirement of con-
sideration operates as a valid limitation upon the use of im-
proper negotiating practices.
In Cook the court held that a lien waiver is valid if the
debtor detrimentally relies upon it. In this case the waiver was
valid as to all work performed and materials supplied after exe-
cution of the waiver because the debtor had detrimentally relied
upon it. The court also noted that a lien waiver will be valid
if it is executed pursuant to a prior agreement. Thus, the owner
or contractor can usually avoid difficulties with the lien waivers
it obtains from parties with whom it deals directly by providing
13. The court remanded the case for a retrial on the issue of det-
rimental reliance.
14. See, e.g., Abbott v. Nash, 35 Minn. 451, 29 N.W. 65 (1886); 12
DuN. mN. DIG. § 6072 (3d ed. 1954).
15. See Annot., 65 A.L.R. 282 (1930).
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for such waivers in the original contracts. However, one of the
problems in Cook arose from the fact that the subcontract did
not include such a clause, and the court's opinion suggests that
a clause in the main contract requiring lien waiver clauses in
all subcontracts will be insufficient to support a waiver for ob-
ligations incurred under the subcontract before the waiver is
actually procured.'
3. Submission of Second Bid by Successful Bidder as Ac-
ceptance of Ofer to Rescind First Contract.-In response to the
Hibbing Public Utility Commission's advertisement for bids on
a municipal project, Minnesota Limited, Inc. submitted the low
bid and was awarded the contract. Ten days later, Limited re-
fused to consent to the Commission's request that the contract
be cancelled. The Commission then unilaterally revoked the
contract, ignored Limited's warning of the consequences of the
cancellation and called for new bids under altered specifications.
Limited responded with a second bid which was unsuccessful.
In Limited's subsequent suit for damages for breach of the first
contract, the district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the Commission. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed,
holding that as a matter of law, Limited's submission of the sec-
ond bid was an acceptance of the Commission's offer to rescind
the contract.1 7 Minnesota Ltd. v. Public Utilities Commission,
208 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 1973).
While the court acknowledged the rule that the issue of
whether an offer to rescind has been accepted is a question of
fact in most cases,'8 it concluded as a matter of law that the
second bid in the instant case constituted an acceptance of the
offer of rescission. The reasons for the court's departure from
the general rule in this case are unclear since it discussed only
two cases, Tunny v. Hastings19 and Bromley v. McHugh,20
neither of which compels its conclusion.
In Tunny, a city and a successful bidder entered into nego-
tiations after the bid was discovered to be too low because of a
mistake. After negotiations, the bidder refused to accept the city's
offer of a contract at a higher price. The trial court then or-
dered the bid deposit returned to the bidder, and the supreme
16. 211 N.W.2d at 372.
17. Both parties had agreed that the Commission's second call for
bids was an offer to rescind.
18. 208 N.W.2d at 286-87. See Abdallah, Inc. v. Martin, 242 Minn.
416, 65 N.W.2d 641 (1954).
19. 121 -Minn. 212, 141 N.W. 168 (1913).
20. 122 Wash. 361, 210 P. 809 (1922).
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court affirmed, stating that once the mistake was discovered,
"the city at no time evinced any disposition to hold [the bidder]
to his bid."'21 The court in Minnesota Ltd. described the Tunny
holding as follows: "[T] he council's subsequent acts of negotiat-
ing and preparing another contract . . . evidenced an intent on
the part of the city to release the plaintiff from the original
contract. '22 Thus, the court's own interpretation of Tunny sug-
gests that the issue is one of fact. The court also failed to dis-
tinguish the procedural postures of the two cases. The Tunny
holding affirmed the decision of the trial court based on an evi-
dentiary hearing, while the summary judgment in Minnesota
Ltd. precluded any inquiry into the facts.
Bromley involved facts similar to Minnesota Ltd., except
that in Bromley there had been neither an offer to rescind nor
a request to cancel which had been rejected by the bidder.
Rather, the successful bidder in Bromley voluntarily submitted
a new bid under the changed specifications and made no attempt
to preserve his rights under the original contract until the sec-
ond bid was rejected. The instant case might have been dis-
tinguished on the ground that Limited resisted the Commission's
attempt to cancel the contract. Arguably this fact necessitated
an inquiry into the nature of the second bid to determine
whether it actually represented a change of position by Limited
which made its original refusal to cancel immaterial. However,
in affirming the summary judgment the court in Minnesota Ltd.
rejected Limited's characterization of the second bid as an offer
to settle the dispute or as an attempt to mitigate damages. This
rejection, coupled with the holding that the second bid in the
instant case constituted an acceptance of the cancellation as a
matter of law, allowed the court to avoid the factual issues
raised by Limited's expressions of refusal to acquiesce in the
cancellation.
Minnesota Ltd. might be read as holding that summary
judgment is proper whenever a second ,bid is submitted. Such
a rule would pose problems for both the bidder and the munici-
pal corporation. The bidder would be forced to either abandon
the first contract in the hope of presenting the low second bid
or not submit a second bid and institute a possibly expensive
damage suit. Such a choice could preclude the least expensive
means of mitigating damages. Although the municipality would
gain negotiating leverage and escape liability if the second bid
21. 121 Minn. at 215, 141 N.W. at 169.
22. 208 N.W.2d at 286 (emphasis added).
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were submitted, it would also risk both the loss of a potential
low bid on the new contract and exposure to the expenses of
litigation if the second bid were not made.
However, Minnesota Ltd. need not be read so broadly. The
decision may represent no more than a declaration by the court
that rejection of an offer of rescission must be clear and un-
ambiguous. Thus, where second bids are clearly and unambig-
uously made as offers to settle disputes or as offers to mitigate
damages, the adverse consequences of a rule that all second bids
constitute an acceptance of an offer of rescission would be
avoided. Further, the interests of judicial economy would be
advanced by entering summary judgments in cases where bid-
ders fail to clearly and unambiguously indicate their intent
when submitting second bids. These considerations suggest that
the instant case should not be read as imposing hardships on
both bidders and municipalities, but instead as furthering the
interests of judicial economy.
4. Other Cases.-In Holt v. First National Bank, 214 N.W.2d
698 (Minn. 1973), the supreme court considered the validity of
a clause in an installment contract for the purchase of an auto-
mobile which waived, as against any assignee, certain defenses
which could have been asserted against the seller. The seller,
who had agreed separately to satisfy a chattel mortgage on the
purchaser's trade-in automobile, later became insolvent without
satisfying the mortgage. The assignee then sued for the balance
due under the installment contract. The debtor-purchaser
sought to raise the seller's breach of the separate agreement as
a defense, arguing that the waiver-of-defense clause should be
voided as contrary to public policy. The supreme court held
that the clause was not contrary to public policy as applied to
this defense. As between the two innocent parties involved, the
court found that the purchaser, who knew of the risk and could
have acted to prevent it, was the appropriate party to bear the
loss.
Under the applicable sections of the Uniform Commercial
Code 2 3 such waivers are effective. However, the state courts
are divided on the effectiveness of such waivers in consumer
credit cases. 24 Numerous cases have held that waiver-of-defense
clauses in consumer sales contracts are contrary to public policy
23. Mnqi. STAT. § 336.9-206 (1) (1971).
24. See Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 518, 526-30 (1971).
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and unconscionable.2- Rather than adopting either position, the
court concluded that the validity of such waivers will be de-
cided on a case-by-case basis.
The dissenting opinion cited a number of recent statutes
which evince a strong legislative policy in favor of protecting
purchasers of consumer goods. 2 6 It also noted that the Minne-
sota Legislature had enacted a statute which invalidated all
waiver-of-defense clauses in consumer credit contracts after July
1, 1971.27 However, the court held that the plaintiff could not
be protected even by the new statute because the defense re-
lated to a separate agreement and not to a credit contract. In
light of the strong legislative expression in favor of consumer
protection, the court's refusal to hold the waiver contrary to
public policy is especially inappropriate considering the formal-
istic ground for its decision.
In Southgate, Inc. v. Ecklin, 207 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 1973),
the supreme court held that the plaintiff's tender of a valid per-
sonal check on the last day for avoiding the cancellation of a
contract for deed2 s satisfied the plaintiff's obligations tnder the
contract. The defendants had demanded a certified check which
was unavailable since tender was made on a Saturday. The
court affirmed an order of specific performance to compel de-
fendants to transfer title to the real estate involved.
While accepting the contention that the personal check was
not money, 29 the court concluded that tender in forms other
than money may be sufficient to satisfy an obligation. In the
court's opinion, it was necessary to show that the defendants
would have been prejudiced by the tender of the personal check
before the tender could be held invalid.30 Because the check
was good and the property was already in the hands of the plain-
tiff, it was clear that the tender caused no prejudice to defend-
ants' rights. The court found that defendants were urging
25. See, e.g., Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264
A.2d 547 (1969).
26. E.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 325.70-.80, .92 & .94 (1971). MINN. STAT.
§§ 145.43-.44, 149.09, 325.381-.391, .951-.954, .821-.824 & .933-.938 (Supp.
1973).
27. MINN. STAT. § 325.941(2) (a) (1971). The contract and sep-
arate agreement in the instant case were both completed prior to the
passage of this provision.
28. See MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (1971).
29. Laura Baker School v. Pflaum, 225 Minn. 181, 30 N.W.2d 290
(1947).
30. This holding is consistent with Henschke v. Young, 224 Minn.
339, 28 N.W.2d 766 (1947).
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"nothing more than adherence to out-of-date technicalities"
which have "often frustrated commercial transactions."31
In holding that any tender made in a manner that would
be acceptable in the ordinary course of business is proper and
that plaintiff was entitled to any reasonable time extension nec-
essary to comply with defendants' demand for a different form
of payment, the court has brought this aspect of the law of real
property transactions into conformity with the law of sales as
codified in the Uniform Commercial Code.32 The adoption of
the more reasonable UCC approach to the validity of a tender
of a personal check is especially appropriate to mitigate the
harsh result caused by the cancellation of a contract for deed.
B. INSURANCE
1. Insurer's Liability for Punitive Damages Assessed
Against Its Insured.-Defendant had misplaced his overcoat in
a restaurant at which plaintiff was employed as a hat check girl.
When plaintiff blocked defendant's entry into the checkroom
to search for his coat, he pushed past her, causing her to lose
her balance and strike her back against a metal fixture. In the
resulting damage action, defendant impleaded the company
which had issued his homeowner's insurance policy. The jury
'awarded plaintiff $29,510 compensatory damages and $4000 pu-
nitive damages. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that under the terms of the policy, the insurance company had
no liability for punitive damages assessed against its insured.'
Caspersen v. Webber, 213 N.W.2d 327 (Minn. 1973).
Judicial authority is divided on the question of an insurance
31. 207 N.W.2d at 730.
32. ' Tender of payment is sufficient when made by any means or
in any manner current in the ordinary course of business unless the
seller demands payment in legal tender and gives any extension of time
reasonably necessary to procure it." MINN. STAT. § 336.2-511(2) (1971).
1. The trial court had ordered judgment on the verdict but had
granted defendant a new trial unless plaintiff agreed to a reduction of
the verdict to $15,000 compensatory and $2000 punitive damages. This
order was upheld on discretionary review.
With respect to the liability of the insurer, the trial court had held
that there was no coverage under the policy, which was subject to an
exclusion for bodily injury intentionally caused by the insured. The
supreme court reversed as to the compensatory damages, holding that
the policy exclusion did not apply when the act itself was intentional
but the resulting injury was not, and citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.




carrier's liability for punitive damages assessed against its
insured for wilful or reckless conduct.2 In the leading case,
Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty,3 public policy
was held to invalidate an insurance contract to the extent that
it provided for insurer liability for punitive damages assessed
against the insured. The court said:
The policy considerations in a state where ... punitive
damages are awarded for punishment and deterrence, would
seem to require that the damages rest ultimately as well [as]
nominally on the party actually responsible for the wrong. If
that person were permitted to shift the burden to an insurance
company, punitive damages would serve no useful purpose.4
A contrary result was reached by the Tennessee Supreme Court
in Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.,5 where pu-
nitive damages had been assessed against the insured for injuries
arising from his drunken driving. While acknowledging Mc-
Nulty, the court in Lazenby permitted the transfer of liability
to the insurer, citing the public policy in favor of freedom of
contract."
In the instant case, the court had an opportunity to choose
between the McNulty and Lazenby rules. It chose instead to
deny the insurer's liability for punitive damages solely on the
basis of the language of the particular policy. While it might
be argued that judicial restraint prefers interpretation to invali-
dation, the Caspersen court strained to reach its decision. Cit-
ing Loftsgaarden v. Reiling,7 in which a jury verdict of "$0"
compensatory damages and $5000 exemplary/punitive damages
for libel per se had been upheld, the court observed that "puni-
tive damages are recoverable without proof of actual damages." 8
Therefore, punitive damages are entirely separate from actual
damages such as might be awarded for bodily injury. Since the
punitive damages in Caspersen were not awarded because of
bodily injury, which was covered by the insurance policy, the
court arrived at the exceedingly formalistic conclusion that the
2. See Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343 (1968).
3. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
4. Id. at 440. See also Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins.
Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. App. 1965); Kendrigan, Public Policy's Pro-
hibition Against Insuance Coverage For Punitive Damages, 36 INS.
CoUNsEL J. 622 (1969); Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343, 347 (1968).
5. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
6. Id. at 648-49, 383 S.W.2d at 5. See also Long, Insurance Protec-
tion Against Punitive Damages, 32 TENN. L. RIv. 573 (1965); Annot.,
20 A.L.R.3d 343, 350 (1968).
7. 267 Minn. 181, 126 N.W.2d 154, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964).
8. 213 N.W.2d at 331.
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terms of the policy did not apply and that the insurer was
not liable.9 The court cited no authority for the application of
such reasoning in a case of assault and battery.10 The pecu-
liarities of libel per se which distinguish it from most other
causes of action were well recognized in the Loftsgaarden opin-
ion itself.1
Even though lamenting "the confusion in trying this ac-
tion,"'1 2 the court itself further confused the issue of an insurer's
liability for punitive damages. Although there is no unanimity
on this issue,' 3 it can be predicted that the Minnesota court
will join the states which have forbidden such transfers of li-
ability. A federal court attempting to forecast state law on this
subject has stated that the factor on which to base such a pre-
diction is the view taken by that state toward punitive damages:
if used strictly for punishment and deterrence, liability should
not be transferred to an insurer; if viewed as a supplementary
form of compensation, transfer of liability would be appro-
priate.' 4 The Minnesota view on punitive damages can be traced
to dicta in Beaulieu v. Great Northern Railway,' where the
court said: "Exemplary damages are incapable of definite as-
certainment; and, though classed theoretically as compensatory,
they are, in fact, imposed in the nature of punishment for the
wrong complained of .... . 1 0
This view was confirmed in the instant case by the court's
statement that "[t]he punitive damages were awarded to plain-
tiff as punishment to the defendant and as a deterrence to oth-
ers."- 7 This is the very ground developed by the federal court
for its holding in McNulty,'8 which the Minnesota court cited
in support of its view.' 9 Accordingly, it seems inconceivable
that the court would refuse to embrace the McNulty rule, and
it is difficult to understand why the court dodged the McNulty
9. Under the policy, the insurance company agreed "to pay on
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury .... " Id. at
329 (emphasis added).
10. See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 527 (1951).
11. 267 Minn. at 183 n.6, 126 N.W.2d at 155 n.6 (1964).
12. 213 N.W.2d at 330 n.2.
13. See Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343 (1968).
14. American Surety Co. of N.Y. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir.
1966).
15. 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907).
16. Id. at 53, 114 N.W. at 355.
17. 213 N.W.2d at 331 (emphasis added).
18. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
19. 213 N.W.2d at 331.
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rule in the instant case in favor of an eccentric analogy to libel
per se.
2. Insurer's Duty to Defend Its Insured Against Claims
"Arguably" Covered by the Policy.-Defendant insurance com-
pany issued a policy which insured plaintiff against liability for
certain property damage and agreed to defend against any suit
alleging such injury. Plaintiff was sued by businessmen who
alleged that plaintiff's delayed construction of a sewer line had
obstructed access to their businesses. Defendant argued that the
alleged injuries were beyond the scope of the policy and refused
to defend plaintiff, who successfully defended the actions at its
own expense and sued defendant for reimbursement. The trial
court accepted defendant's view of the scope of its coverage and
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The su-
preme court reversed, rejecting defendant's claim of no cover-
age holding that the insurer was obligated to defend claims "ar-
guably" covered by the policy. Chapman Construction Co. v.
Glens Falls Insurance Co., 211 N.W.2d 871 (Minn. 1973).
The insurer of a liability insurance policy has a duty to de-
fend suits against the insured alleging injury covered by the
policy.20 This duty may be expressed in the policy2 l1 as in the
instant case or implied by law.22 It has been said that where
there is no coverage there is no duty to defend.28  However,
the instant case illustrates the proposition that "[w]hether an
insurer is under an obligation to defend is not always free from
doubt until the case is actually tried. '24 When doubtful situa-
tions have arisen in Minnesota, the insurer has generally been
held obligated to defend when resolution of the doubt must
await findings of fact but not when the doubt concerns matters
of law and interpretation of the policy in the light of substan-
tially undisputed facts.
Doubt based on a factual dispute is illustrated by Minnesota
Electric Distributing Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.,25 where the insurer denied its duty to defend on the grounds
20. Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court, 1962-1963, 48 MiNN. L.
REv. 119, 177-81 (1963); Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 458 (1956).
21. Klemmer v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 188 Minn. 209, 246 N.W. 890
(1933).
22. Christian v. Royal Ins. Co., 185 Minn. 180, 240 N.W. 365 (1932).
23. Weis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 242 Minn. 141, 64 N.W.
2d 366 (1954).
24. Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co., 264 Minn. 378, 390, 119 N.W.2d 703,
711 (1963).
25. 173 Minn. 114, 216 N.W. 784 (1927).
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that the "accident ... did not occur at or about the insured's
work nor from a cause within its control" and therefore was
not covered by the policy.2 6 Although this fact was subse-
quently established at trial, and there was found to be no cover-
age, the court still held the insurer liable for the expenses of
the defense. The court's stated test of the duty to defend where
a factual dispute existed was whether the insurer could have
successfully demurred to the complaint.2 7 This approach to fac-
tual disputes was followed in Crum v. Anchor Casualty Co.,28
where the insurer was held obligated to defend after it discov-
ered facts "in conflict with the complaint and [which], if estab-
lished, [would] present a potential liability ... covered by the
insurance contract .... "29
:The court's approach where only legal issues are involved
is illustrated by Bobich v. Oja30 and Lang v. General Insurance
Co. of America 31 Determination of the insurer's duty to defend
in Bobich turned on whether an automobile insurance policy is-
sued to a corporation covered a vehicle allegedly3 2 owned by
its president. In Lang the issue was whether a "motor scooter"
was an "automobile" within the meaning of an exclusionary
clause of the insurance policy. On the basis of undisputed facts,
both issues were resolved in favor of the respective insurance
companies, and no duty to defend was imposed.
Thus, prior to Chapman the court had been distinguishing
duty-to-defend cases according to whether they involved factual
disputes or questions of law. While the cases demonstrate that
it is no easier in advance of litigation to predict "the law" than
26. Id. at 116, 216 N.W. at 785.
27. Id.
28. 264 Minn. 378, 119 N.W.2d 703 (1963). See also Note, supra
note 20, at 177-81.
29. Id. at 392, 119 N.W.2d at 712 (emphasis added). But cf. Weis
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 242 Minn. 141, 64 N.W.2d 366 (1954),
where the insurer avoided its duty to defend in reliance on the insured's
own admissions that his series of automobile collisions had been inten-
tional and thus not covered by the policy.
30. 258 Minm. 287, 104 N.W.2d 19 (1960).
31. 268 Minn. 36, 127 N.W.2d 541 (1964).
32. In fact, the vehicle was owned by the corporation and was cov-
ered by the policy. Since plaintiffs in the action were employees of
the corporation, however, an action brought against the corporation
would have been limited by the workmen's compensation acts while
an action against the president personally required the allegation that
he was the owner of the vehicle. The court observed that "[i] n either
event, the third-party defendant insurer is not liable. It must follow
that it is under no obligation to defend the action." Bobich v. Oja,
258 Minn. 287, 295, 104 N.W.2d 19, 25 (1960).
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to predict "the facts," this distinction had some practical justifi-
cation on the basis of economy. Improper refusal to defend
could be overcome by impleading the insurer.3 3 Improper im-
pleader could be overcome by the insurer's motion for summary
judgment on its policy.3 4 If the only question was one of law
or contract interpretation, the issue could be resolved at that
point. On the basis of the ruling on its motion for summary
judgment, the insurer would either withdraw or take over the
defense. In either case, there would be maximum economy of
effort and expense "5 before the case proceeded to full discovery
and trial. On the other hand, if questions of fact determined
the merits of the insurer's denial of its duty to defend, the mo-
tion for summary judgment would be denied on the authority
of Minnesota Electric, and the case would likewise proceed to
trial most economically.
In the instant case, the court was faced with an insurer's
refusal to defend based on questions of law concerning the
meaning of the word "occurrence" and the elements of a cer-
tain "injury." The court determined that the questions of law
should be decided against the insurer.30 Hence, the court could
have followed Bobich and Lang and held the insurer obligated
to defend or, in the context of the instant case, to reimburse
the insured for his defense. Instead, without citing any author-
ity, the court reached the same result by asserting that the in-
surer had a "duty to defend a claim arguably covered by the
policy."3 7 Because the court did not define "arguably," the im-
pact of the case is uncertain.
If it is assumed that Chapman stands for no more than a
breakdown of the former distinction between questions of law
and questions of fact, the case should have no effect on the sum-
33. Mnn . R. Civ. P. 14.01.
34. Id. 56.02. Impleader and motion for summary judgment was
in fact the course of the litigation in Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 104
N.W.2d 19 (1960).
35. If coverage were found, the insurer would be expected to reim-
burse the insured for his expenses in the litigation thus far, probably
limited to the expenses of answering the complaint and contesting the
motion for summary judgment. If no coverage were found, the insurer
would lose only its expenses in moving for summary judgment, and
the insured would lose only the additional expense of the impleader
action.
36. The court had little difficulty with the meaning of the word
"occurrence." With respect to the second question, however, the court
acknowledged that "the issue is not free from doubt .... " 211 N.W.2d
at 872.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
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mary judgment determination procedure outlined above. An
"arguable" question of law can still be tested by a motion for
summary judgment on the policy, while "arguable" questions
of fact will still proceed to trial at the insurer's expense. An
effect will be felt, however, in cases similar to Chapman. In
recognition of the additional risk of refusing to defend, even on
the basis of "arguable" questions of law ultimately resolved in
the insurer's favor, it may be expected that insurers will be more
inclined to voluntarily enter the action, at least so far as to move
for summary judgment. In this way, the Chapman decision will
have the salutary effect presumably intended by the court. The
normal pattern in a doubtful case will be defense by the insurer
until permitted to withdraw rather than defense by the insured
until permitted to implead.3 8
3. Validity of "Other Insurance" Clauses.-In 1973, the
court decided four cases involving the construction of exclusion-
ary and limiting language inserted in uninsured motorist policies
by insurance companies. Broadly referred to as "other insur-
ance" clauses, such provisions were designed to limit compensa-
tion from all sources to the highest applicable single policy limit.
The restrictive provisions were of four types: (1) Pro rata.
When more than one policy applies to an accident, total recovery
is limited to the highest of the respective single policy limits,
with recovery prorated among the policies. (2) Excess es-
cape. When one policy covers the vehicle involved in the acci-
dent (primary coverage) while other policies cover persons out-
side their own vehicles (secondary coverage), the primary cov-
erage is augmented by secondary coverage only to the extent
that the limits of the secondary policy exceed the limits of the
primary policy. (3) Medical expense. When payments are re-
ceived under a "medical expense" provision of the automobile
policy or under a separate medical insurance policy, recovery
under the uninsured motorist provision of the automobile policy
is reduced accordingly. (4) Workmen's compensation. Recovery
under an uninsured motorist provision of a policy is reduced
by the amount paid or collectible pursuant to a workmen's com-
pensation or disability statute. In each case, the court held the
restrictive clauses invalid on the grounds that they purported
38. This result is consistent with the general rule that "the lan-
guage of a policy, being that selected by the insurer and for its benefit,
must be clear and unambiguous, and any reasonable doubt as to its
meaning must be resolved in favor of the insured." Klemrner v. Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co., 188 iAinr. 209, 212, 246 N.W. 896, 898 (1933), quoting 9
DUN. MiN. DIG. § 4659 (3d ed. 1968).
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to reduce coverage below the statutory minimums required for
each policy. Brunmeier v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 208
N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 1973) (workmen's compensation); Pleitgen v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 207 N.W.2d 535 (Minn. 1973) (ex-
cess escape, medical expense); Van Tassel v. Horace Mann In-
surance Co., 207 N.W.2d 348 (Minn. 1973) (pro rata medical ex-
pense); Ehlert v. Western National Mutual Insurance Co., 207
N.W.2d 334 (Minn. 1973) (pro rata).
Although these were cases of first impression in Minnesota,
the court's position is in accord with the majority view." In
previous cases the court had indicated a preference for the in-
sured over the insurer and for full compensation over partial
compensation. 40 These decisions reflect a continued commitment
to consumer protection in insurance matters.41
C. ARBITRATION
1. Appropriateness of Joint Arbitration.-During the con-
struction of an office building, plaintiff entered into separate
contracts with an architect and a general contractor. Each con-
tract provided for the arbitration of disputes. Plaintiff con-
tended that unauthorized expenses amounting to $1,476,759.09
were incurred by the architect and the contractor sought joint
arbitration to determine responsibility for these expenditures.
The trial court denied the architect's motion to prohibit joint
arbitration, and the architect appealed. The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that joint arbitration was proper under
the particular facts of the case. Grover-Dimond Associates v.
American Arbitration Association, 211 N.W.2d 787 (Minn. 1973).
Under MINNESOTA STATUTES § 572.09 (a), a court may order
parties to proceed with arbitration as authorized by their con-
tract; furthermore, under section 572.21 an order confirming an
arbitration award will have the same force as any other judg-
ment. However, the Minnesota statutes do not expressly deal
with the question of joint arbitration. The arbitration provi-
39. See Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 551 (1969).
40. See, e.g., Orren v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 288 Minn. 225, 179 N.W.2d
166 (1970); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nyquist, 286 Minn. 157,
175 N.W.2d 494 (1970); Quaderer v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 263 Minn.
383, 116 N.W.2d 605 (1962).
41. For a further discussion of the principles involved, and espe-
cially for a discussion of the implications of these holdings in light of
recent statutory changes permitting uninsured motorist coverage greater
than the statutory minimum and requiring the availability of under-
insured motorist coverage, see Comment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 677 (1974).
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sions in the contracts were also silent on the subject, and the
issue had not previously been considered by the Minnesota court.
In reaching its decision, the court acknowledged that a split
in authority existed among the jurisdictions which had consid-
ered the issue. Michigan' and New Jersey2 courts had refused
to allow joint arbitration among an owner, contractor and sub-
contractors in the absence of contract provisions or a statute
expressly authorizing consolidation. On the other hand, the
New York Court of Appeals had allowed the consolidation of
three arbitration proceedings in the absence of specific statutory
authority.3 It had reversed the decision of the appellate division
and had relied on that case's dissent which reasoned that since
a New York statute gave the courts jurisdiction to enforce an
agreement to arbitrate, such jurisdiction implied the power to
regulate the method of enforcement. 4 The Minnesota court con-
cluded that the New York position represented the better rule.
Since the Minnesota statutes confer jurisdiction upon the courts
in a manner similar to that of the New York statutes, the court
concluded that it had similar powers to enforce arbitration
clauses and that joint arbitration was an appropriate method
of enforcement.
However, the Grover-Dimond holding is not as broad as the
above reasoning may suggest. The court proceeded to consider
the facts of the particular case before it and concluded that they
warranted joint arbitration. The relevant factors were that the
parties had agreed to use the same arbitrators in both proceed-
ings, that Similar issues were involved in both claims and that
there had been no showing of prejudice to any party resulting
from joint arbitration.
The court pointed out that the contracts will be contr g
where they specify either joint or separate arbitration. But with
regard to the situation where the contracts are silent on the
subject, the court failed to clearly indicate which factual ele-
ments must be shown before an order for joint arbitration will
issue. For example, under a contract which provides that each
party has the right to participate in the selection of the arbi-
1. J. Brodie & Son, Inc. v. George A. Fuller Co., 16 Mich. App.
137, 167 N.W.2d 886 (1969).
2. Win. C. Blanchard Co. v. Beach Concrete Co., 121 N.J. Super.
418, 297 A.2d 587 (1972).
3. In re Chariot Textiles Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 793, 221 N.E.2d 913, 275
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1966).




trator, a party may be able to block joint arbitration simply
by refusing to agree to a common arbitrator. It is uncertain
whether the court would allow a party to overcome the advan-
tages of a single proceeding by the use of this tactic. This un-
certainty is, moreover, compounded by the fact that a party's
right to participate in the selection of the arbitrator is an im-
portant right, the denial of which would almost always be prej-
udicial. 5
The court also left unanswered the type of contractual rela-
tionship which must exist between the parties before joint arbi-
tration is appropriate. The Grover-Dimond situation, in which
one claimant pressed similar claims against two parties, pre-
sented an appealing case for joinder.0 It is not certain what
facts the court would consider relevant where, for example, the
respondent to the original proceeding is seeking to extend the
arbitration to cover his claim against a third party. As the con-
nection between the original claimant and the third party be-
comes more attenuated, it is predictable that the court will view
joint arbitration with less favor.
Although the court has not yet resolved all questions in this
area, its adoption of the rule favoring joint arbitration is certain
to have salutary effects. In the limited areas where joint arbi-
tration is appropriate, obvious benefits flow from the elimina-
tion of duplicative proceedings and wasteful expenses. It is to
be hoped that the court will not limit its holding to the particu-
lar facts of Grover-Dimond but rather will extend it to other
appropriate situations.
2. Admissibility of Arbitrator's Testimony as to a Mistake
in the Award.-A contractor and one of its subcontractors
agreed to arbitration of a dispute concerning their respective li-
abilities for certain work performed on a construction project.
After receiving testimony, the arbitration panel filed an award
in favor of the contractor. The subcontractor then filed a mo-
5. A more basic issue is, of course, whether a common arbitrator
is necessary for the effective resolution of the problem posed by multi-
ple contracts. Concurrent arbitration, that is, a single proceeding con-
ducted before two arbitrators, each representing a contract, may exist
as an alternative form of joint arbitration. While such a procedure
would avoid the time and expense of multiple proceedings, the possibi-
bility of inconsistent awards would remain. Nevertheless, the contracts
could certainly specify this type of joint arbitration, thereby rendering
a common arbitrator unnecessary.




tion in district court requesting vacation of the award7 and of-
fered the testimony of one of the arbitrators to establish that
the award mistakenly caused an unintended result. The district
courf excluded the arbitrator's testimony and confirmed the
award. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed, holding that an
arbitrator is not permitted to testify concerning a mistake in
the award which causes an unintended result.8 Grudem Broth-
ers Co. v. Great Western Piping Corp., 213 N.W.2d 920 (Minn.
1973).
While the issue of the admissibility of an arbitrator's testi-
mony had not been previously decided in Minnesota, the general
rule is that an arbitrator may not testify in an effort to vary
the terms of the award but is limited to testimony identifying
the matters which were submitted to the arbitration panel.,
The testimony offered in the instant case was intended to show
that a mistake in the award had led to a result not intended
by the arbitrators. Since the only effect of this testimony could
have been a revision of the award, it necessarily followed from
the majority rule adopted by the court that the testimony was
inadmissible.
From the point of view of the disappointed party to an arbi-
tration award, the majority rule will lead to an injustice when-
ever it is applied, since it operates to frustrate the intent of
the arbitrators. To avoid its harshness, it would be necessary
for both parties to agree to an alternative interpretation. This
is by definition impossible whenever the appeal is contested.
However, the justification for the rule is found in the protection
it offers to the arbitrators rather than in its effect on the par-
ties. If testimony by the arbitrators challenging the award were
permitted, arbitrators would be continually subject to subpoena
and examination by the disappointed party in an effort to over-
turn the result. Courts refuse to let the losing party engage
7. Pursuant to Mnmn. STAT. § 572.19 (1971).
8. The subcontractor had also challenged the award on the ground
that it had been procured by fraud in that the parties had agreed to
forego legal counsel during the arbitration hearing and the contractor
had violated this agreement by using attorneys to prepare for the hear-
ing. This contention was rejected because under MInNOTA STATurs
§ 572.13 (1971) a waiver of the right to an attorney prior to the hearing
is ineffective.
9. See Fukaya Trading Co. v. Eastern Marine Corp., 322 F. Supp.
278 (E.D. La. 1971); see also Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,




in such "fishing expeditions"'1 for much the same reason as they
limit the use of a juror's testimony to overturn a jury verdict.
The practical result of the rule is that the interpretation of the
award depends on the words which the arbitrators use in issuing
it rather than on what one of the arbitrators later says it was
intended to do."
On a related issue, the court determined that the arbitrators
were justified in accepting whatever evidence they found to be
most accurate. The court declined to review such decisions on
appeal since judicial reconsideration would cause arbitration pro-
ceedings to delay the final decision of controversies rather than
bring them to a speedy resolution. 1 2 In general, therefore, the
decision in the instant case suggests that the court is attempting
to give decisions by arbitration panels a degree of finality similar
to that given the findings of lower courts and juries.'3
V. CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE
1. Delegation of Wiretap Authority by County Attorney.-
Defendants were charged with possession of narcotics which po-
lice, pursuant to a search warrant, had discovered in their auto-
mobile. The warrant had issued on the basis of evidence ob-
tained by a wiretap on defendant's telephone. The application
for the wiretap was made by an assistant county attorney of
St. Louis County, the county attorney being wholly unaware
10. See Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Co., 151 F. Supp. 853,
861 (W.D.S.C. 1957).
11. At the same time, it should be noted that the plaintiff was
not absolutely precluded from seeking to remedy the arbitrators' mis-
take. According to the plaintiff, the arbitrators intended to allow offsets
in the award payment for other damages and claims against the defend-
ant. While the court held that an arbitrator's testimony as to this inten-
tion was inadmissible, it also pointed out that "Grudem Brothers is not
prevented from asserting and enforcing its other claims against Great
Western independent of this award." 213 N.W.2d at 923. On rehearing,
the cause was remanded to the district court, and the court was directed
to employ its equitable powers to set-off the plaintiff's claims against
the arbitration award if they were found to be meritorious. Id. at 925.
12. 213 N.W.2d at 922-23, citing Cournoyer v. American Television
& Radio Co., 249 Minn. 577, 580, 83 N.W.2d 409, 411 (1957).
13. At the same time, however, it is to be noted that the court
itself reviewed the record on the basis of which it disposed of all of
the subcontractor's contentions on the merits.
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of the application. Prior to arraignment the parties petitioned
the Minnesota Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition enjoining
the district court from proceeding until the validity of the wire-
tap could be determined. The court dissolved the writ after
holding that pursuant to MINNESOTA STATUTES § § 626A.05 (1) and
626A.11, the application by the assistant county attorney was
improper and the evidence inadmissible. State v. Frink, 206
N.W.2d 664 (Minn. 1973).
By the authority of a federal statute all state wiretap activ-
ities are forbidden unless a state acts pursuant to a law which
is at least as stringent in its controls on police activity as the
federal law.' In imitation of the federal provisions on the sub-
ject, section 626A.05 (1) provides in part:
[T] he attorney general or a county attorney of any county may
make application as provided in section 626A.06, to a judge of
the district court or of the supreme court for a warrant author-
izing or approving the interception of wire or oral communica-
tions by investigative or law enforcement officers ....
The Frink court held that "county attorney" does not include
an assistant county attorney, despite the provision in MNNESOTA
STATUTES § 388.10 which states: "The county attorney of any
county... who has no assistant is hereby authorized to appoint
. .. one or more attorneys to assist him in the performance
of his duties. Each assistant shall have the same duties and be
subject to the same liabilities as the county attorney .... "
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on fed-
eral interpretations of the congressional statute,2 apparently on
the theory that the Minnesota act was intended to parallel the
federal act and that therefore the Minnesota statute was to be
interpreted in the same manner as the federal statute. Indeed,
the parallelism was necessary in order to prevent the Minnesota
statute from conflicting with the federal statute. The theory
of the federal holdings which do not allow the attorney general
to delegate his authority to authorize wiretaps is that Congress
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970). For a discussion of this problem
see State v. Siegel, 13 Md. App. 444, 285 A.2d 671 (1971).
2. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
granted, 411 U.S. 905 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189
(5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107 (ED. Pa.
1972); United States v. Aquino, 338 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
Subsequent to the Minnesota decision in Frink, the United States Su-
preme Court upheld the federal interpretation of the statute. United




intended such authorizations to have the personal attention of
an individual whose circumspection would be reinforced by the
knowledge of personal responsibility for any abuse which might
develop.
The reasoning of the federal cases is clearly consistent with
the practice in Minnesota whereby the county attorneys them-
selves, not their assistants, are held to political account every
four years. It is difficult, however, to compare the effect of
the restriction of authorization to one man on the national level
upon the amount of wiretap activity undertaken nationwide
with the effect of the restriction of authorization to one man
on the county level upon the volume of wiretap activity under-
taken in the county. If the Attorney General of the United
States takes his authorization duties seriously, rather than
merely signing what comes across his desk, the volume of wire-
tap activity may well be restricted by his inability to devote
time to such projects. At the county level, on the other hand,
shifting responsibility to the county attorney himself is not
likely to significantly affect the volume of wiretap activity un-
dertaken. Thus, on the federal level the inability to delegate
may operate as a restriction on the amount of activity as well
as a guarantee of responsibility, while on the county level it
would appear to serve only to guarantee responsibility.
2. Pat Down During Misdemeanor Arrest Made With War-
rant.-On November 1, 1971, a warrant issued for defendant's
arrest for the misdemeanor theft of a five dollar wallet. On
November 22, while the warrant was outstanding, a reliable in-
former reported that the defendant was in possession of mari-
juana and a gun. This information was included in a memoran-
dum posted in the police department "day book," but no new
warrant was issued. On November 25, two officers recognized
defendant, stopped a car in which he was riding and and asked
the occupants to step out. After telling the defendant he was
under arrest, one of the officers ordered him to place his hands
on the trunk of the car and to spread his feet in order to enable
the officer to undertake a search of his outer garment. While
patting down defendant's coat, the officer found a marijuana cig-
arette, a plastic vial which proved to contain amphetamines and
a knife. On the basis of the evidence seized, the defendant was
charged with unlawful possession of narcotics. When the dis-
trict court suppressed the evidence, the state appealed pursuant
to MINNESOTA STATUTES § 632.111 (3). The supreme court re-
versed, holding that a warrantless search and seizure is not
[Vol. 58:773
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
constitutionally unreasonable where (1) the search of defend-
ant's outer garment is carried out incident to a lawful arrest
pursuant to a warrant for misdemeanor theft, and (2) such
search and seizure is based upon probable cause warranting the
belief that defendant is armed and in possession of marijuana.
State v. Cross, 206 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. 1973).
The issue litigated in the instant case has been mooted to
some extent by the most recent United States Supreme Court
decisions on the reasonableness of body searches made at the
time of arrests for non-felony violations. In United States v.
Robinson3 and Gustafson v. Florida4 the Supreme Court held
that a search incident to a valid custodial arrest, even for a traf-
fic violation, required no justification beyond the arrest itself.
Since the defendant in Cross was lawfully subjected to a cus-
todial arrest, he retained no significant fourth amendment inter-
est in the privacy of his person.5 The litigated issue in Cross,
whether the officer had probable cause to make a body search
incident to an arrest pursuant to a warrant for a misdemeanor
violation, is thus mooted.
The decisions in Robinson and Gustafson strike a death blow
to a system of case law developed in Minnesota to accommodate
the thoroughness of the search to the gravity of the offense for
which the defendant is arrested. It had been held that a po-
lice officer ordinarily has no authority to make an exploratory
search of a person arrested for a minor traffic offense.0 Thus,
in State v. Curtis7 the Minnesota Supreme Court required the
suppression of marijuana seized in the course of a search made
during a traffic arrest. The defendants argued in Cross that the
power of police searches ought similarly to be limited in an ar-
rest made pursuant to a warrant for petty theft. Defendant's
theory was frustrated in Cross both because the police had prob-
able cause to believe he was in possession of contraband and a
dangerous weapon, and because counsel neglected to object to
the police's failure to seek an arrest warrant on the basis of the
information given by the informant on November 22. Since
Robinson, moreover, defendant's theory can find no support in
3. 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973).
4. 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973).
5. See Mr. Justice Powell's concurrence in United States v. Robin-
son, 94 S. Ct. 467, 494 (1973).
6. State v. Harris, 265 Minn. 260, 121 N.W.2d 327, cert. denied,
375 U.S. 867 (1963).
7. 290 Mlinn. 429, 190 N.W.2d 631 (1971). See also State v. Gan-
naway, 291 Minn. 391, 191 N.W.2d 555 (1971).
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the fourth amendment. Yet the possibility remains open that
the Minnesota court will interpret article I, section 10 of the
Minnesota constitution so as to prohibit full-scale body searches
for trivial infractions regardless of a lawful custodial arrest.
As Mr. Justice Stewart appears to suggest in his concurring
opinion in Gustafson," the issue which remains unresolved after
Robinson and Gustafson is whether the custodial arrest for mi-
nor violations is itself a violation of fourth and fourteenth
amendment rights. More generally, the focus of fourth amend-
ment inquiry will now shift to the validity of arrest upon which
a warrantless search is premised. Thus, the court's reasoning
in Cross presents some further concerns. One concern is
whether the requisite probable cause survived the three days
it took police to act upon the informant's information. The court
suggests in part of its opinion that the arresting officers had
probable cause to believe the defendant was dangerous because
they knew of the informer's message that defendant was con-
cealing marijuana and was armed. The court refused to draw
any inference from the long delay between the arrival of the
information and the failure to seek a warrant, noting that coun-
sel had failed to object. Another concern, raised by Robinson,
is whether minor violations lending themselves to custodial ar-
rests at the officer's discretion facilitate arrests on pretext
solely to conduct an otherwise unauthorized searchY To the
extent that freedom from search by the police is now a function
only of the determination whether a valid arrest has been made,
the court and bar alike will have to begin demonstrating
a heightened sensitivity to the kind of police practice which al-
lows discretionary arrests for minor violations, and which allows
more than 48 hours to pass between the time when probable
cause is obtained and the time of the arrest with no effort to
obtain a warrant.
3. Waiver of Fifth Amendment Privilege by Juvenile Be-
fore Consultation With an Adult.-The Minneapolis police
stopped and questioned defendant-appellant and three other ju-
veniles to determine if they were in violation of the curfew ordi-
nance. While questioning the juveniles, the police received in-
8. 94 S. Ct. at 492 (Stewart, J., concurring).
9. See United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467, 482 (1973) (Mat-
shall, J., dissenting) ("There is always the possibility that a police offi-
cer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search warrant, will use a traffic
arrest as a pretext to conduct a search."). See also United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) ("An arrest may not be used as
a pretext to search for evidence.").
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formation that three of the bicycles on which the juveniles were
riding had been stolen. The police arrested the juveniles on
grounds of receiving or concealing stolen property. At trial the
defendant testified that the bicycle had been loaned to him and
that he did not know it was stolen. To substantiate his testi-
mony, the defendant called two juvenile witnesses who were
not-parties to the action at bar and who had allegedly loaned
the bicycles. Although the juvenile defense witnesses were will-
ing to testify, the trial court judge prevented them from doing
so on the ground that they were incapable of waiving the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Absent their testimony, the trial
court judge held that the defendant knew or should have known
that the bicycle was stolen. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the applicable intent standard re-
quires that the defendant actually know that the bicycle was
stolen and that a juvenile witness' privilege against self-incrim-
ination cannot be interposed by the court. State v. Melina, 210
N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1973).
With respect to the procedural issue of the assertion of the
privilege, the court followed Wigmore in holding that while the
trial court may warn a witness of his privilege against self-in-
crimination, it may not assert it for him.10 To allow the trial
court to interpose the fifth amendment privilege, the court rea-
soned, would be to convert the privilege from an option to re-
fuse to testify into a complete bar to the testimony. The status
of the witnesses as juveniles does not change the result, since
the duty of the trial judge to a juvenile witness is to see that
independent counsel, a parent, or another competent adult be
allowed to advise the juvenile concerning the constitutional priv-
ilege against self-incrimination.' Further, as in the case of
adults, the trial court may interrogate the witness to determine
whether the right was intelligently waiveCL 2  The court
stressed, however, that the trial court had no power to exclude
relevant evidence, even though potentially incriminating, if the
juvenile witness had been properly advised and had intelligently
waived the privilege.
Unclear in the opinion, however, is the duty of the trial
judge to point out to a juvenile witness that the answer to a
10. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVMENCE §§ 2268-70 (3d ed. 1961).
11. The premise underlying the concept of forced consultation is
that a juvenile cannot understand the ramifications of a waiver. Haley
v. Ohio, 33 U.S. 596, 601 (1946).
12. Inre Gault, 387 U.S. 155 (1967).
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question may involve incrimination. Since the decision does not
create a right to counsel or an advisor, the juvenile witness ap-
parently must rely on pre-testimony consultation in deciding
whether to answer any particular question during examination.
In effect the witness must determine whether to answer any
questions at all. Absent any right to continuing consultation,
or any duty in the trial judge to suggest that the answers to
certain questions may be incriminating, the juvenile's only re-
course for protection of fifth amendment privileges is silence.
4. Standards for Determining Voluntariness of a Confes-
sion.-At trial on a charge that defendant was driving after
revocation of his license,13 police officers testified that they ob.
served defendant enter the car on the driver's side and observed
his companion enter on the passenger's side, but that because
of darkness they had not seen into the car as it was moving.
Although one of the officers also testified that defendant had
confessed to driving the car, defendant and his friend testified
that they had changed places after entering the car. On appeal
from a subsequent conviction, the supreme court held that in
determining the admissibility of a confession the trial judge need
only be convinced of its voluntariness by a preponderance of
the evidence. State v. Wajda, 206 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1973).
In Minnesota the trial judge alone determines the voluntari-
ness of a confession. 14 Until Wajda the standard for determin-
ing admissibility had been a requirement that the state show
voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. 15 The shift to the less
rigorous preponderance of the evidence test appears to have been
occasioned by a recent United States Supreme Court decision
adopting that test as the minimum constitutionally required
safeguard.' 6 In determining the sufficiency of the preponder-
ance of the evidence test, the Supreme Court rejected two theo-
ries which would have required a higher standard. First, it de-
termined that the purpose of a separate determination of volun-
tariness of a confession was not to insure the credibility of the
confession, which would require proof beyond a reasonable
13. MiNNEAPOLls, lUNN., CODE OF ORDiNANcEs § 402.080 (1968).
14. This is the so called "orthodox procedure" under which the
trial judge alone determines admissibility. Under the "Massachusetts
procedure" the trial court makes the same preliminary determination;
if he admits the confession, he also invites the jury to deliberate on
the issue of admissibility. See Developments in the Law-Confessions,
79 HARv. L. REv. 935 (1966).
15. State v. Keiser, 274 Minn. 265, 143 N.W.2d 75 (1966).
16. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
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doubt,17 but rather to deter the state from coercing confessions
from arrested persons. Second, the Court rejected the argument
that the higher standard was required in order to effectively
deter police misconduct in obtaining confessions.
The preponderance of the evidence standard, however, has
been strongly criticized.' The judicial determination that a
confession is voluntary and admissible is bound to have a strong
impact on the jury. Although the force of the confession may
be mitigated by evidence which affects the weight or credibility
of the confession,'2 such mitigating evidence may be all but im-
possible to supply because defendant will ordinarily have been
in custody at the time of the confession, thus confining rebuttal
evidence to defendant himself or to the police officers who took
the confession. The testimony of the police will only infre-
quently be of any use to the defendant. In order to challenge
the state's description of the circumstances surrounding the con-
fession, the defendant will in effect be forced to testify.
Moreover, the preponderance standard was developed in
civil litigation where an erroneous verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff is not viewed as more harmful to society than an erroneous
verdict in favor of the defendant. It is difficult to argue, how-
ever, that the admission of an involuntary confession in the
criminal case is no more harmful to society than the exclusion
of a voluntary confession.20  In the latter case guilty persons
may still be convicted even without the confession; in the for-
mer case persons may frequently be convicted on the basis of
the confession alone, although it was obtained in violation of
a principle which is fundamental to our system of criminal jus-
tice.
Regrettably the Minnesota court has abandoned the reason-
able doubt standard in the determination of the voluntariness
17. Where the issue is the credibility of the confession the standard
must be that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970).
18. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1071; Comment, 7 HAnv.
Civ. Rins-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 651 (1972); Comment, 42 Tsiw. L.Q. 60
(1968).
19. Under both the "orthodox" and the "Massachusetts" procedures,
the trial court must permit the jury to hear evidence on the circum-
stances surrounding the confession. Under the orthodox rule the evi-
dence is presented to allow the jury to determine the weight or credi-
bility of the confession. Under the Massachusetts rule the evidence is
presented with regard to the admissibility of the confession as well as
with regard to its weight and credibility.




of confessions. Although it is true, as the court points out, that
the same standard will now apply in both state and federal
courts in Minnesota, it is difficult to determine just why this
fact should be persuasive to the court. An independent exami-
nation of the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in this
matter might well have led the court to greater reluctance in
abandoning its stricter rule of evidence.
5. Use of Allen Charge in Criminal Trials.-After 50 hours
of deliberation, the jury in defendant's robbery trial was given
an "Allen charge." The judge instructed the jury that the case
must at some time be decided and asked those jurors in the
minority to carefully consider the reasoning behind their refusal
to join the majority. Apparently counsel for the defendant did
not object to the charge. Two hours and 20 minutes later, the
jury found defendant guilty on one count and not guilty on an-
other. On appeal, defendant argued that the verdict was a mere
compromise induced by the Allen charge. The supreme court
reversed the conviction, holding that it was improper to give
deadlocked jurors an Allen charge because its potential for inter-
fering with the function of the jury outweighed its usefulness
in reducing court congestion. State v. Martin, 212 N.W.2d 847
(Minn. 1973).
Although a majority of jurisidictions have continued to al-
low the "dynamite" charge since its approval in Allen v. United
States,'2 1 Minnesota's long-standing adherence to the majority
rule22 has finally given way under a rising tide of objection to
the charge by both the commentators2 3 and the courts. 24  Two
of the principal criticisms of the Allen charge which the Martin
court specifically noted were the arguments that coercive lan-
guage has no place in the jury system and that courts vary
widely as to how long they will wait after the jury retires be-
fore giving the Allen charge. The court then directed the thrust
21. 164 U.S. 492 (1896). See Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 177 (1964); An-
not., 85 A.L.R. 1420 (1933).
22. State v. Doan, 225 Minn. 193, 30 N.W.2d 539 (1947); State v.
Siebke, 216 Minn. 181, 12 N.W.2d 186 (1943); State v. Friend, 154 Minn.
428, 191 N.W. 926 (1923).
23. See Note, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look
at the "Allen Charge," 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 386 (1964); Note, On Instruct-
ing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J. 100 (1969).
24. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United
States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1969); Fields v. State, 487
P.2d 831 (Alas. 1971); State v. Marsh, 260 Ore. 416, 490 P.2d 491 (1971).
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of its disapproval of the charge at the language of the instruction
which informs the jury that the "case must eventually be de-
cided." Such a statement is patently untrue,23 and the court
added that prosecutors will often decline to relitigate a case after
the jury deadlocks. Since there can be no conviction until guilt
is found by a unanimous jury, it is error to instruct the jury
that a case must eventually be decided. In addition, the court
found that a charge to the minority jurors to carefully consider
their convictions in light of the majority's opinion, without a
similar charge to the majority, is an undue pressure to termi-
nate litigation.26 Finally, the court noted that the variety of
language used by different courts in giving the charge has led
to a burdensome number of appeals.
In rejecting the Allen charge, the Minnesota court adopted
the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Trial by
Jury.27 The Standards provide for instructions before delibera-
tion relating to the jurors' duties and specifically prohibit forc-
ing the jury to cut short the length of their deliberations. Al-
though the ABA Standards have been adopted by a growing
number of jurisdictions in recent years,2 8 they are not entirely
free from problems. It is still possible that the rereading of
the charge may in some cases be coercive of the jury's right
to decide the case, and it is probable that the new charge will
not end the duty of the appellate court to study all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the rereading of the charge to
the jury.29 However, by utilizing the mandate that the entire
25. United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir. 1971);
United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Huffman
v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 755 (5th Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion);
Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831 (Alas. 1971).
26. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
27. Approved Draft, 1968.
28. United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United
States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969); Fields v. State, 487 P.2d
831 (Alas. 1971); State v. White, 285 A.2d 832 (Me. 1972); State v.
March, 260 Ore. 416, 490 P.2d 491 (1971). For an analysis of the A.B.A.
proposals see Note, The Allen Charge: Recurring Problems and Recent
Developments, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 296, 310 (1972).
29. The commonly discussed test in reviewing the effect of supple-
mental charges on the jury is whether the charge starts a new train
of deliberation. This test appears to have been first articulated in State
v. Peirce, 178 Iowa 417, 424, 159 N.W. 1050, 1054-55 (1916). In the ma-
jority of cases, however, the test is a fiction since the court will have
no way of determining what went on in the jury room. In fact, the
appellate court is probably reduced to independently weighing the evi-
dence to determine whether the possibility of coercion can be ignored
as harmless error. This test appears to have been articulated at the
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charge be reread to the jury when it appears that advice is
sought on the danger of deadlock, the courts will substantially
reduce the number of improper charges.
6. Unprofessional Conduct by Prosecutor as Grounds for
a New Trial.-In a trial for murder the prosecutor attempted
to introduce evidence of defendant's prior convictions through
leading questions directed to the state's witness. Through ques-
tions repeated to two witnesses, the prosecutor also attempted
to give the jury the impression that defendant was a pimp. The
defense attorney's objections to the improper questions were sus-
tained. In his final argument the prosecutor accused the defense
attorney of refusing to call an important witness and thus will-
fully withholding pertinent information. Following a verdict of
second degree murder, the trial judge dismissed a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The
supreme court reversed and granted a new trial, holding that
the asking of improper questions for the purpose of bringing in-
admissible matter to the attention of the judge or jury was un-
professional conduct and was prejudicial. State v. White, 203
N.W.2d 852 (Minn. 1973).
In White the court adopted three definitions of unprofes-
sional conduct from ABA Standards Relating to The Prosecution
Function and The Defense Function.30  The court found it to
be unprofessional conduct for either the prosecutor or defense
counsel to knowingly offer inadmissible evidence, ask legally ob-
jectionable questions or make other impermissible comments or
arguments in the presence of the judge or jury for the purpose
of bringing inadmissible matter to the attention of the judge
or jury. The court further held that it is unprofessional conduct
to ask a question which implies a factual predicate which the
examiner cannot support by evidence, or to intentionally mislead
the jury in argument as to inferences it may draw.
federal level in Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965). Nothing
in the new charge should be considered to have magically removed the
possibility that its misuse in the wrong circumstances may have created
a distraction in the jury's work prejudicial to the defendant's right to
a fair trial. For a more general treatment of this issue see Note, Sup-
plemental Jury Charges Urging A Verdict-The Answer is Yet to be
Found, 56 MINN. L. REv. 1199, 1224-28 (1972).
30. Approved Draft, 1971. The court adopted the language of
sections 5.6(b), 5.7(d) and 5.8(a) of THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION. It
likewise adopted sections 7.5(b), 7.6(d) and 7.8(a) of Ts DsFENSE
FUNCTION. 203 N.W.2d at 857. (Although the court cited the Approved
Draft for sections 5.7 (d) and 7.6(d), it quoted the slightly different lan-
guage of the Tentative Draft of March 1970.)
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The ABA Standards were drawn primarily for the guidance
of prosecutors and defense counsel.31 The determination of
whether a violation of the Standards is such that a conviction
should be overturned belongs to the court. It appears that the
court in White has accepted the Standards as a bellwether which
leads to scrutiny as to whether the jury has been prejudiced.
Thus, a violation of the Standards by itself cannot be considered
a prima facie case for overturning the conviction. The funda-
mental inquiry remains whether in view of all the facts and
circumstances the actions of the prosecutor in the particular case
at bar prejudiced the jury.32
It is apparent, however, that in actual trial practice the
Standards may be reinforced by a higher probability that their
violation will lead to reversals on appeal. Thus, the court noted
that it was reversing the conviction "not alone in the interest
of this defendant, but in the interest of other defendants in fu-
ture trials."33 Likewise, the holding is worded so as to present
a virtual presumption that a new trial will be required if the
prosecutor introduces a defendant's criminal record by declara-
tion in open court or by testimony which does not serve to im-
peach the credibility of the defendant as a witness.34
This use of the ABA Standards may well introduce some
certainty into the court's hitherto contradictory treatment of in-
discretions by counsel during the course of criminal trials. In
the past the variable considerations which might have led to
a new trial have included an analysis of the impact of the vio-
lations according to their seriousness, 35 the overall context of
the trial proceedings36 and the intentions and knowledge of the
attorney.3 7 The use of the Standards will both lessen the pos-
31. ABA STANDARDs, supra note 30, at 11.
32. State v. White, 203 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Minn. 1973).
33. Id. at 855.
34- Id. at 858-59.
35. Thus questions probing a defendant's wife-beating habits were
deemed prejudicial, State v. Flowers, 262 Minn. 164, 114 N.W.2d 78
(1962), as was questioning about prior criminal offenses or charges,
State v. Silvers, 230 Minn. 12, 40 N.W.2d 630 (1950); but evidence of
an angry temper on the part of a witness was not deemed prejudicial,
State v. Hyleck, 286 Minn. 126, 175 N.W.2d 163, cert. denied, 399 U.S.
932 (1970), nor was the reading of a United States Senator's statement
praising informers in the trial of an alleged communist, State v. Forich-
ette, 279 Minn. 76, 156 N.W.2d 93 (1968).
36. Thus the short length of the improper question meant that no
reversal was necessary. State v. Hyleck, 286 Minn. 126, 175 N.W.2d 163,
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 932 (1970).
37. Annot., 109 A.L.R, 1089 (1937).
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sibility of inadvertent error and sharpen the focus of the inquiry
with respect to the actual prejudice created in the trial.
7. Use of FBI Rap Sheet for Impeachment.-Defendant, on
trial for aggravated assault and two counts of attempted mur-
der, took the stand on his own behalf. The prosecutor cross-
examined him regarding prior convictions using data from an
FBI "rap sheet." Defendant was confused about the exact
charge to which he had once pleaded guilty but finally testified
that it was assault with intent to kill. Defendant's motion for
a mistrial was denied, and he appealed the subsequent convic-
tion claiming prosecutorial misconduct. The supreme court re-
versed, holding in part that the "questions concerning nonex-
istent convictions were both improper and prejudicial." State
v. Williams, 210 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1973). In a similar situation
another defendant was cross-examined about a prior conviction
which he denied. In response to questions based upon informa-
tion in a rap sheet, he testified over counsel's objection that he
had been charged wth illegal transfer of firearms. On appeal
from the subsequent conviction, the Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that in light of defendant's admission of sev-
eral other crimes the jury's knowledge of the firearms charge,
which had been dismissed, was not likely to have affected their
deliberations. Citing Williams, however, the court cautioned
against the use of rap sheets as evidence of prior offenses. State
v. Michaelson, 214 N.W.2d 356 (Minn. 1973).
When the accused in a criminal trial waives his privilege
against self-incrimination in order to testify, he is subject to
cross-examination like any other witness.88 His testimony is
thus subject to impeachment by proof of prior convictions.8 This
is the majority rule and has long been true in Minnesota." Be-
cause of the danger of abuse of such evidence, the use of prior
38. 21 AM. JUR. 2d Judgment and Sentence § 358 (1965); 98 C.J.S.
Witnesses §§ 369, 494 (1957).
39. C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 43 (1972); 20 DUN. MINN. DIa. §
10349 (3d ed. 1956); Annot., 161 A.L.R. 233 (1946); Annot., 103 A.L.R.
350 (1936); Annot., 25 A.L.R. 339 (1923); Annot., 6 A.L.R. 1608 (1920).
40. MINN. STAT. § 595.07 (1971) provides:
Every person convicted of crime shall be a competent wit-
ness in any civil or criminal proceeding, but his conviction may
be proved for the purpose of affecting the weight of his testi-
mony, either by the record or by his cross-examination, upon
which he shall answer any proper question relevant to that in-
quiry; and the party cross-examining shall not be concluded
by his answer thereto.
See also State v. Markuson, 261 Minn. 515, 113 N.W.2d 346 (1962); State
v. Dale, 159 Minn. 455, 199 N.W. 99 (1924); State v. Curtis, 39 Minn.
357, 40 N.W. 263 (1888).
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convictions has recently come under strong attack.4 1 The court
in Williams limited the use of such evidence to instances where
on cross-examination the defendant denies allegations of prior
convictions and the prosecution is prepared to show by documen-
tary evidence that the witness has in fact been convicted.42
The use of FBI rap sheets is a patently unacceptable form
of proof of prior convictions. The rap sheet is merely an inves-
tigatory tool and should not be taken as proof of previous con-
viction. It may contain evidence of arrests or indictments,
which in Minnesota is not admissible for impeachment,43 and
which may not, as in the present case, be distinguished from
criminal charges in which convictions were obtained." Further-
more, it is clear that the evidence in the rap sheet may serve
not only to prejudice the jury's decision but also to confuse and
intimidate the defendant to the extent that he admits to con-
victions of crimes for which he was not in fact convicted.
8. Constitutionality of Unlawful Assembly Statute.-To
protest the erection of a new Red Barn restaurant near the Uni-
versity of Minnesota, defendant Linda Hipp and six others alleg-
edly participated in a May, 1970, demonstration before an exist-
ing Red Barn establishment. After police had persuaded 100
to 150 demonstrators to cease their occupation of the restau-
rant's dining area, approximately 20 persons began picketing on
the sidewalk in front of the building. When their number had
increased to about 40, the Deputy Chief of Police encouraged
them to limit their protest to 10 to 14 persons in a single line.
Despite the Deputy's exhortations, the demonstrators formed a
double line and, shouting obscenities, urged bystanders to partic-
ipate. At this time someone hurled a carton of milk at the res-
41. See Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. Rv.
166, 174-91 (1940); Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defend-
ant, 78 HARv. L. REv. 426 (1964); Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial:
of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 Y.Arx L.J. 763 (1961).
42. This is in effect the position of the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECTION FUNCTION § 5.7(d) (Approved Draft,
1971), which provides: "It is unprofessional conduct to ask a question
which implies the existence of a factual predicate which the examiner
knows he cannot support by evidence." See also People v. Perez, 58
Cal. 2d 229, 23 Cal. Rep. 569, 373 P.2d 617 (1962); People v. DiPaolo,
366 Mich. 394, 115 N.W.2d 78 (1962) (reference to police records not
offered in evidence may have prejudiced jury); People v. Sanza, 37 App.
Div. 2d 632, 323 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1971) (error where no reasonable basis
for question); cf. Ciravolo v. United States, 384 F.2d 54 (1st air. 1967)
(defendant questioned about crime from another state which proved to
be a misdemeanor in that state).
43. State v. Currie, 267 Minn. 294, 126 N.W.2d 389 (1964).
44. State v. Norgaard, 272 Minn. 48, 136 N.W.2d 628 (1965).
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taurant's front window. Within the next 45 minutes the number
of protestors grew to about 80, -and the din caused by the congre-
gation rose considerably. About 60 policemen were called in,
and, after further attempts to persuade the picketers to limit
their number failed, the Deputy Chief declared the demonstra-
tion an unlawful assembly because
"the street was blocked; crowd was getting noisier; the emo-
tions were running high; the sidewalk was completely blocked;
the private property of the Red Barn was completely filled; the
profanities and the shouting, as I said before, in the street.' 45
Defendants were subsequently arrested and charged with
unlawful assembly in violation of MINNESOTA STATUTES § 609.705
(3) .46 Instructing the jury that defendants could not be con-
victed for lawfully exercising their rights of free speech and
assembly, even if their speech was unsettling or their assembly
caused unrest or the threat of disturbance from nonparticipants,
the trial judge stated:
[I]f you decide that the evidence established that the defend-
ants unreasonably denied or interfered with the rights of others
to peacefully use the streets and sidewalks without obstruction,
interference or disturbance, their conduct is not protected by
the Constitution.47
On appeal from the subsequent convictions, the supreme court,
construing the evidence most favorably to sustain the convic-
tions, affirmed, holding that section 609.705(3) is neither uncon-
stitutionally vague nor overbroad and that it was not unconsti-
tutionally applied to the defendants. Because of insufficient evi-
dence, however, the convictions of defendant Hipp and two oth-
ers were reversed. State v. Hipp, 213 N.W.2d 610 (Minn. 1973).
While laws are often deemed both vague and overbroad,
the two adjectives refer to different constitutional doctrines.
Laws are vague if their terms do not "give the person of ordi-
nary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is pro-
hibited, so that he may act accordingly. ' 48 The United States
Supreme Court has given three reasons for declaring such un-
intelligible statutes violative of due process: 1) they "trap the
45. State v. Hipp, 213 N.W.2d 610, 613 (Minn. 1973).
46. Section 609.705 states in pertinent part:
When three or more persons assemble, each participant is guilty
of unlawful assembly, which is a misdemeanor, if the assembly
is:
(3) Without unlawful purpose, but the participants so conduct
themselves in a disorderly manner as to disturb or
threaten the public peace.
47. State v. Hipp, 213 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Minn. 1973).
48. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
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innocent by not providing fair warning"; 2) they lend them-
selves to discriminatory enforcement; and 3) "where [they]
'abut upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,'
[they operate] 'to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.' ,9
Even where the activities forbidden by a statute are clear, how-
ever, the law may be invalidated as overbroad if it includes
within its prohibitions constitutionally protected activities.
If a law challenged for vagueness or overbreadth is a direct
regulation of speech, a defendant has standing to challenge it,
whether or not the particular application to him would be con-
stitutional under a clear or narrowly-drawn statute.5 0 The Court
allows this "exception to the usual rules governing standing"51
because, under a case-by-case method of effecting any requisite
narrowing, "persons whose expression is constitutionally pro-
tected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of
criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of applica-
tion to protected expression." 52  Such challenges are not per-
nitted, however, in regard to laws regulating constitutionally
controllable conduct. Thus, in Hipp the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that overbreadth is no defense "[w] hen a defendant
is charged under such a statute and the charge is based upon
conduct which the statute clearly prohibits and which the state
may constitutionally subject to proscription.153
The propriety of this holding hinges upon the court's char-
acterization of the activity regulated in Hipp as constitutionally
controllable rather than constitutionally protected. Breach of
the peace statutes like section 609.705(3) seem to fall somewhere
in the gray area between the regulation of speech and the regu-
lation of conduct constitutionally subject to control" In Ed-
wards v. South Carolina,"5 Cox v. Louisiana" and Coates v. Cin-
49. Id. at 109.
50. At least when statutes regulate or proscribe speech ... the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing "attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated
by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity."
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972).
51. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). See United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960).
52. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972).
53. 213 N.W.2d at 614.
54. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968). See generally
T. EwmsoN, TbE SYSTEM OF FEmDom OF ExPREsSION (1970).
55. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
56. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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cinnati57 the United States Supreme Court held statutes similar
to section 609.705(3) unconstitutionally vague. In Edwards,
however, the South Carolina Supreme Court had described the
offense as "not susceptible of exact definition' "58; in Cox the
Louisiana Supreme Court had given the statute an unconstitu-
tionally broad construction; and in Coates the Court, in the ab-
sence of a sufficient record or an authoritative construction by
the Ohio Supreme Court, was forced to limit its examination
to the terms of the statute.
The Minnesota Supreme Court proceeded on the assump-
tion that Coates implied that an authoritative limitation or ap-
plication of the statute to constitutionally controllable activities
might have redeemed it and immunized it from general attack
in that case.50 Thus, the Minnesota court upheld section
609.705(3) against the charge of vagueness and overbreadth by
applying it to the facts and construing it as being
limited to prohibiting three or more assembled persons from
conducting themselves in such a disorderly manner as to
threaten or disturb the public peace by unreasonably denying
or interfering with the rights of others to peacefully use their
property or public facilities without obstruction, interference, or
disturbance. Such disorderly conduct or activity may also take
the form of uttering fighting words having an immediate tend-
ency to provoke retaliatory violence or tumultuous conduct by
those to whom such words are addressed.6 0
This construction of the statute saves the constitutionality of
the act only because it creates a judicial definition which is at
once wide enough to include the actions of petitioners and spe-
cific enough to have been understood by petitioners at the time
of the incident. The construction will not, however, save the
act from all constitutional attack because some conduct on the
street, even though the jury finds it to have been an unreason-
able obstruction, interference or disturbance, will nevertheless
be protected by the constitution.
9. Other Cases.-In State v. Hodgson, 204 N.W.2d 199
(Minn. 1973), the supreme court reversed the conviction of Doc-
tor Jane E. Hodgson for violation of the state criminal abortion
statute.61 The court declared the statute unconstitutional in its
entirety, citing the authority of Roe v. Wade02 and Doe v. Bol-
57. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
58. 372 U.S. at 237.
59. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
60. 213 N.W.2d at 614.
61. MNN. STAT. § 617.18 (1971).
62. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The court held unconstitutional state
criminal abortion laws which exempt from criminality only a life-saving
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ton.63 Noting that the statute made no attempt to distinguish
between abortions performed by physicians and those performed
by laymen, the court also reversed the criminal conviction of
an unlicensed layman. State v. Hultgren, 204 N.W.2d 197 (Minn.
1973).
In State v. Scroggins, 210 N.W.2d 55 (Minn. 1973), the court
held that persons who are about to be jailed incident to a law-
ful arrest may be searched and that any evidence thus found
may not be suppressed as the fruit of an unreasonable search.
The court noted that such a search is reasonable because it ob-
tains accurate identification for the booking process, prevents
the introduction of obnoxious material into jail, protects other
prisoners, attendants and defendant himself and prevents a pos-
sible escape. 4 The issue has been mooted by the United States
Supreme Court decision in Robinson v. United States.0 5
In State v. Roberts, 208 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 1973), the Min-
nesota Supreme Court reversed a conviction of aggravated as-
sault, hofding that it was prejudicial error to admit testimony
that defendant had exercised his Miranda right in the middle
of police interrogation. The court rejected the argument that
because defendant chose to answer questions after the Miranda
warning had been given he was not free at a later point to re-
frain from answering questions. The fundamental danger of tes-
timony concerning the exercise of the fifth amendment rights
to silence and counsel, the court reasoned, is a jury inference
of guilt, a consequence which would impermissibly penalize the
exercise of that right.66
procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her
pregnancy and other interests involved. Such laws were held to violate
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because they in-
volved state action which infringed upon the right to privacy, which
includes a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy.
63. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The court held that interposition of a hos-
pital committee on abortion is unduly restrictive of the patient's rights
and that the requirement that the performing physician's judgment be
confirmed by two copractitioners has no rational connection with a pa-
tient's needs and unduly infringes on her physician's right to practice.
64. The court echoed similar conclusions by other state courts.
See, e.g, State v. Darabcsek, 412 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1967); Commonwealth
v. Bowlen, 351 Mass. 655, 23 N.E.2d 391 (1967).
65. 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973); see notes 3-9 supra and accompanying
text.
66. In State v. Beck, 289 Minn. 287, 292, 183 N.W.2d 781, 784 (1971),
the court noted:
The potential prejudicial effect, whatever the intent, was to en-
courage the jury to speculate that defendant had remained si-
lent at the time of his arrest and that he did so because he
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In Village of Vadnais Heights v. Beardsley, 207 N.W.2d 339
(Minn. 1973), the court issued a writ of prohibition preventing
the village from trying petitioner at the municipal level without
a jury. The court held that MINNESOTA STATUTES § 169.0307
demonstrated a legislative intent to apply uniform penalties and
procedures, including the right to jury trial, to the prosecution
of traffic violations throughout the state.
Since 1959 a person charged with violating a misdemeanor
ordinance in Minnesota has, with certain exceptions, 8 had a
right to jury trial at any level. As a result of State v. Hoben0
and subsequent legislation," most traffic offenders charged with
misdemeanor offenses for which a sentence of imprisonment is
authorized are afforded a choice between jury trial at the mu-
nicipal court or justice of the peace level and, if the jury trial
is waived at that stage, a jury trial de novo upon subsequent
appeal to the district court. The court in Beardsley reaffirmed
the rationale of Hoben that where state statutes specify the pen-
alty for certain violations and also require that any municipal
ordinance on the same subject carry an identical penalty, the
municipal court is required to employ state criminal procedure
in prosecutions under such an ordinance.7'1
In LeClaire v. Hoaglund, 208 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 1973), the
court held that a statutory ambiguity with respect to the grad-
ing of an offense must be interpreted in favor of the accused.
A violation of MINNESOTA STATUTES § 169.121 (1) (d),72 while
apparently similar to other traffic offenses designated as mis-
demeanors, was not itself specifically so designated. Since the
legislative scheme of chapter 169 made every violation of the
chapter a petty misdemeanor unless otherwise specifically desig-
nated, the court held a violation of the section to be a petty misde-
was guilty; and, additionally, to encourage an adverse inference
of guilt from defendant's failure to testify at the trial.
67. Section 169.03 provides: "[W]hen any local ordinance regu-
lating traffic covers the same subject for which a penalty is provided
in this chapter [e.g., driving while under the influence of alcohol], then
the penalty provided for violation of said local ordinance shall be iden-
tical . .. .
68. See notes 74-77 infra and accompanying text.
69. 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959). See Comment, 44 MINN.
L. REv. 755 (1960).
70. MINN. STAT. § 484.63 (Supp. 1973).
71. See generally, Note, Right to a Jury Trial for Persons Accused
of an Ordinance Violation, 47 MnN. L. REv. 93, 99-105 (1962).
72. The section provided that it shall be unlawful for any person
whose blood contains 0.10 percent or more of alcohol by weight to drive
or operate a motor vehicle.
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meanor. As a result of this decision, the legislature amended
the chapter to make the violation of the section a full misde-
meanor thereby filling an apparently unintentional gap in the
statutory framework. 73
In St. Paul v. Hitzmann, 204 N.W.2d 417 (Minn. 1973), the
court upheld against an equal protection challenge the legisla-
tive scheme of trial by jury in the first instance for ordinance
violations in all but three counties of the state.7 4 After noting
that various statutes show a consistent pattern of treating the
metropolitan counties differently from the other 84 counties in
Minnesota,7 5 the court held that the discrimination was a rea-
sonable solution to the problem of overcrowded metropolitan
court dockets. As in an earlier case,7 6 the court concluded also
that the right to a de novo trial by jury in the district court
defeated the due process objection to statutes denying trial by
jury for ordinance violations at the municipal level. The court
explained that dicta in various United States Supreme Court
decisions lent support to the validity of the procedural distinc-
tion between the counties.77
VI. EVIDENCE
1. Admissibility of Accident Reconstruction Expert's Testi-
mony.-Plaintiff's decedent was killed in a nighttime collision
between an automobile he was driving and one driven by de-
fendant. In determining liability, a pivotal issue was the speed
73. Minn. Laws 1973, ch. 421, § 1.
74. The case was a challenge to the constitutionality of the County
Court Act of 1971, Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 951, in which the legislature
affirmed the right to jury trials at the municipal or justice of the peace
level for ordinance violations in all counties except Hennepin, Ramsey
and St. Louis. 204 N.W.2d at 418.
75. Other statutes which deny the right to jury trial in the metro-
politan municipal courts for ordinance violations are Mn. STAT. §§
488.04(5), 488A.10 (6), 488A.27 (6) (1971).
76. State v. Leininger, 286 Minn. 555, 176 N.W.2d 629 (1970).
77. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 71 n.17 (1970), the United
States Supreme Court noted that it was "unnecessary to consider ...
[the] argument that New York has violated the Equal Protection Clause
by denying ... a jury trial, while granting a six-man-jury trial to de-
fendants charged with the identical offense elsewhere in the State."
Earlier, in Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954), the Court held
that state governments might well find reason to prescribe variations
in procedure that would differ from those elsewhere in the state.
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of defendant's automobile prior to impact. Because the only sur-
viving eyewitnesses were the defendant and his passenger, plain-
tiff hired an accident reconstruction expert who investigated the
collision and determined the coefficient of friction of the road
surface. This permitted him to deduce defendant's speed from
the skid marks and the final position of the cars after impact.
Over objection the court received into evidence the expert's
testimony as to defendant's excessive speed, and the jury sub-
sequently returned a verdict for plaintiff. On appeal the Minne-
sota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where eyewitness
testimony as to speed is either nonexistent or unsatisfactory, the
testimony of an accident reconstruction expert may properly be
received if it is based on solid factual foundation and if the trial
court determines that it will assist the jury. LeMieux v. Bishop,
209 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1973).
Although the issue has been litigated on a number of occa-
sions,' LeMieux is the first Minnesota case to permit testimony
of an accident reconstruction expert concerning the speed of an
automobile at the time of an accident. While the court has
stated that a "witness qualified as an expert may give his opin-
ion, based upon the length of skid marks, as to the speed of
a motor vehicle involved in an accident,"' 2 it has tended to
exclude the testimony due to inadequate foundation. In Gra-
pentin v. Harvey3 the court held it reversible error to permit
expert testimony on the coefficient of friction, and thus on
speed, where the foundation was simply "a regular, concrete
highway, '4 a given length of skidmarks and the relative posi-
tions of the vehicles after impact. The court found this was
erroneous because of the "variance depending upon the type of
the concrete-to say nothing of the presence or absence of
gravel-the mere assumption of a 'regular concrete highway'
seems to us too vague to permit an expert opinion on
speed. .... -5
1. See Sanchez v. Waldrup, 271 Minn. 419, 136 N.W.2d 61 (1965);
Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222, 114 N.W.2d 578 (1962); Storbak-
ken v. Soderberg, 246 Minn. 434, 75 N.W.2d 496 (1956); Moeller v. St.
Paul City Ry. Co., 218 Minn. 353, 16 N.W.2d 289 (1944). See also Note;
The Minnesota Supreme Court: 1964-65, 50 MINN. L. REV. 479, 492
(1966).
2. Grapentin v. Harvey, 262 Minn. 222, 226, 114 N.W.2d 578, 581
(1962).
3. Id.




Grapentin was followed by Sanchez v. Waldrup,c in which
there was no foundation as to the road surface other than evi-
dence that it was "very icy." In Sanchez the court also held
that expeft testimony was highly undesirable where there was
available impartial eyewitness testimony as to speed. 7 Although
the LeMieux court reiterated this preference for eyewitness tes-
timony and a distrust for the secondary nature of expert testi-
mony,s in a case such as this where there was no impartial eye-
witness,9 the court found it proper to seek the aid of an expert.
According to the court, admissibility of the testimony depended
upon:
(1) whether there exist sufficient factual data to assure a rea-
sonably complete and accurate reconstruction of the accident
without indulging in speculation; and (2) more importantly,
whether such opinion testimony will assist the triers of fact.10
In LeMieux the foundation included evidence that shortly af-
ter the accident a deputy noted the precise position of the ve-
hicles; as soon as possible (the morning after the accident) the
deputy carefully measured the skidmarks; and most importantly,
the expert conducted his own independent investigation of the
facts. This investigation included "a comprehensive inspection
of the asphalt surface at the scene of the accident and of the
two automobiles involved in the collision" and "six test runs
at the scene of the accident in order to lay down skid marks
at varying speeds," "under conditions substantially similar to
those that existed at the time of the collision."'1 The court con-
cluded:
In short, [the expert], by carrying out his own independent ex-
perimentation, did precisely that which in the Sanchez and
Grapentin cases this court implied an expert ought to do to ob-
6. 271 Minn. 419, 136 N.W.2d 61 (1965).
7. Id. at 426, 136 N.W.2d at 65-66.
8. The court stated:
In contrast, expert opinion testimony as to speed based on skid
marks is foundationally based for the most part on a partisan
assumption of facts, unrelated to the witness' perception and
often difficult of meaningful contradiction by cross-exanina-
tion...°
209 N.W.2d at 383.
9. Defendant testified that he was driving about 50 miles an hour
at the time he applied his brakes. The passenger in defendant's vehicle
testified that he was not "going fast." The only other witness was one
Gordon Bauer who was following the LeMieux vehicle. Bauer testified
that the LeMieux vehicle "flew into the air" when struck by the Bishop
vehicle, but had no testimony as to the speed of the Bishop vehicle.
Id. at 381.
10. Id. at 383.
11. Id. at 382, 384.
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tain the most accurate coefficient of friction and thereby avoid
a speculative or unreliable opinion.12
The court limited its ruling of admissibility to the situation
''where eyewitness testimony as to speed is either nonexistent
or unsatisfactory as to one or the other of the adversaries."' 8
Had there been an impartial witness available to plaintiff, the
court's preference for eyewitness testimony as to speed ex-
pressed in Sanchez and Grapentin as well as its recognition of
the propensity for bias in the expert opinion 4 would probably
have required holding the expert testimony inadmissible.
2. "Battered Child" and "Battering Person" Syndromes as
Circumstantial Evidence.-Defendant was indicted for third de-
gree murder and first degree manslaughter for the death of
his infant son. The prosecution introduced evidence that the
child had been in good health before being placed in defendant's
exclusive control, that the child was near death when removed
from defendant's exclusive control a few hours later, and that
defendant had in the past beaten the child. Over defendant's
objection, the prosecution also introduced expert medical testi-
mony that the child's fatal injuries were symptomatic of the
"battered child" syndrome and could only have resulted from
battering, and that "battering persons" usually fit one of four
psychological types which were enumerated and explained.' 5
On appeal from the defendant's conviction of first degree man-
slaughter, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
proof of battering together with a reasonable inference that de-
fendant is a battering person is sufficient to sustain a convic-
tion. State v. Loss, 295 Minn. 271, 204 N.W.2d 404 (1973).
The battered child syndrome is a medically-defined set of
symptoms characteristic of injury intentionally inflicted on in-
fants and young children. A physician detecting certain of these
symptoms in a child can unequivocally conclude that the child
has been subjected to physical violence.'6 Use of the battered
child syndrome in a child abuse prosecution raises the difficult
12. Id. at 384-85.
13. Id. at 383.
14. Id.; Sanchez v. Waldrup, 271 Minn. 419, 427, 136 N.W.2d 61,
67 (1965).
15. One pattern explained by the medical expert "involves parents
who are hostile, abusive, impetuous, and who lash out at insignificant
things frequently and react in a hair-triggered manner." State v. Loss,
295 Minn. 271, 278, 204 N.W.2d 404, 408 (1973).
16. See generally Silverman, Unrecognized Trauma in Infants, the
Battered Child Syndrome, and the Syndrome of Ambroise Tardieu, RA-
DIOLOGY 337 (Aug. 1972).
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issue of the amount of evidence necessary to connect the known
fact of battery with the unwitnessed acts of the defendant. In
Loss the defendant maintained that the state must present direct
evidence identifying the batterer, which had not been done. The
court concluded that it was sufficient to prove that the injuries
occurred while the child was in the exclusive control of the de-
fendant, that the defendant had beaten the child in the past
and that the defendant was shown to fit one of the "battering
person" psychological patterns.17
The court was aware that direct proof is rare in child abuse
cases' but was also aware of the emotion that such prosecu-
tions can arouse in juries. As a result, the court was strict in
its consideration of the circumstantial evidence and added the
requirement that the defendant be a "battering person" type.
Although the prosecution in Loss presented no expert testimony
that the defendant himself fit within one of the battering per-
son categories, the court avoided this issue on the ground that
the prosecutor had "presented to the jury the psychological
framework" together with "sufficient evidence from which the
jury could reasonably conclude that defendant fit one of the
psychological patterns of a battering parent." 19  The thrust of
the ruling is to limit child abuse convictions based solely on
circumstantial evidence to cases where there is evidence of a
"battering person" pattern of behavior.
On balance, Loss represents a commendable approach to the
problems raised by use of the battered child and battering per-
sons syndromes in child abuse prosecutions. If the state can
establish the standard circumstantial case, proof of defendant's
psychological disposition towards battering should not present
an insurmountable bar to conviction. If the state cannot estab-
lish the standard circumstantial case, defendant's psychological
condition will be irrelevant.
3. Admissibility of Juvenile Confession in Subsequent
Criminal Proceedings.-Defendant, a 16 year old boy, had been
suspected of robbery. The police secured a warrant and at-
17. The court found:
[A]dequate evidence was introduced regarding defendant's
temperament and past experiences with the child to raise ques-
tions regarding his conduct, and the evidence was sufficient to
enable the jury to find that defendant was a battering parent
of the type described in the fourth category presented by
[the expert].
295 Minn. at 279-80, 204 N.W.2d at 409.




tempted to arrest defendant at his home but could not find him.
On the same morning, defendant's parents telephoned the school
liaison officer who had been investigating this and other robber-
ies and told him that they would bring the defendant to the
police station for questioning. The officer had been previously
acquainted with defendant, had once offered to aid him in find-
ing a job and knew that he was on juvenile parole. When de-
fendant and his parents appeared at the police station, the offi-
cer told them that he was investigating a certain robbery and
that defendant was a suspect. Defendant, who was given a
standard Miranda warning but was not told that he might be
prosecuted as an adult, confessed to involvement in the robbery
and, after another Miranda warning, signed a statement to that
effect. Less than two months later, the juvenile court waived
jurisdiction and referred him for prosecution as an adult.2 0 On
defendant's appeal from a conviction of aggravated robbery af-
ter his motion to suppress the confession had been denied, the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed holding that *a confession
made by a juvenile before waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile
court is admissible as evidence in the later criminal proceeding,
provided that the juvenile was apprised of his constitutional
rights and voluntarily and intelligently waived them and that
the statement was made in an adversary setting as opposed to
the confidential atmosphere of juvenile court proceedings. State
v. Loyd, 212 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1973).
The seminal case in the area of pre-referral confessions of
juveniles was Harling v. United States,21 which held that state-
ments made by a juvenile during police questioning before
waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court were inadmissible,
thereby establishing a per se exclusionary rule. The court rea-
soned that allowing admissions made by a child in the non-puni-
tive atmosphere of juvenile proceedings to be used later to ob-
tain his conviction and punishment would offend principles of
"fundamental fairness". The court in Harling was also con-
cerned that the proceedings of the juvenile court not become
an adjunct to the adult criminal process, thereby destroying the
parens patriae relation between the juvenile court and the child.
Harling was followed and discussed extensively in Harrison v.
United States22 which stressed the prohibition of testimony
taken by the police, since the juvenile court's exclusive juris-
20. Pursuant to MAtNN. STAT. § 260.125 (1971).
21. 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
22. 359 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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diction attaches from the moment of the offense. 23 The United
States Supreme Court cited Harting with apparent approval in
In re Gault.2" Although Gault did not deal specifically with
the admissibility of a juvenile's confession in post-waiver pro-
ceedings, the Court emphasized the seriousness of the possibility
of waiver 25 and held that "the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is
with respect to adults."26
State courts have not adhered to the per se exclusionary
rule of Harting. Tennessee has rejected Harting entirely and
requires only a proper Miranda warning and a valid waiver to
make a juvenile confession admissible. - After Gault the Ari-
zona Supreme Court in State v. Maloney,2 held that confessions
made by a juvenile while still under the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court could be admitted in evidence in an adult criminal
proceeding where there was parental presence, consent of coun-
sel for waiver of constitutional rights and a warning that any
information obtained might be used to prosecute the juvenile
as an adult. The Oregon Supreme Court, in State v. Gullings-9
held that a juvenile's confession was admissible where he was
afforded his fifth and sixth amendment rights and it was "made
clear" to him that criminal responsibility could result and that
the questioning authorities were his adversaries. Gullings dif-
fers from Maloney in that under the former holding the juve-
nile does not have to be specifically informed that adult pros-
ecution may result. The Minnesota court chose to adopt the
Oregon rule in the instant case.
In reaching its holding the court narrowly interpreted MINE-
SOTA STATUTES § 260.211(1) which provides that "[t]he dis-
position of the child or any evidence given by child in the
juvenile court shall not be admissible as evidence against him
in any case or proceeding in any other court.. . ." The court
held that the statute prohibits admission in other proceedings
of "evidence given in juvenile court"3 0 but does not prohibit sim-
ilar admissions of police investigatory activities.
The court noted that "the safest method the interrogating
23. Id. at 224, 228.
24. 387 U.S. 1, 51 n.88 (1967).
25. Id. at 50-51.
26. Id. at 55.
27. Mitchell v. State, 3 Tenn. Crim. 494, 464 S.W.2d 307 (1971).
28. 102 Ariz. 495, 433 P.2d 625 (1967).
29. 244 Ore. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966).
30. 212 N.W.2d at 677.
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authority can pursue is to specifically advise a juvenile that
criminal prosecution as an adult could result whenever such
prosecution is possible.' 3 1 In the instant case, defendant's ex-
tensive record of juvenile delinquency was used to impute spe-
cial awareness of his rights to him. Absent these special circum-
stances it is hoped that the court will insist that a juvenile de-
fendant be specifically informed that he may be tried as an adult
before his confession can be admitted in the subsequent trial.
4. Other cases.-In State v. Stewart, 209 N.W.2d 913 (Minn.
1973), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that use of a nine
year old burglary conviction to impeach the defendant in a first
degree murder trial was improper, even though the Minnesota
statutes provide that a prior felony conviction of any witness
"may be proved for the purpose of affecting the weight of his
testimony, either by the record or by his cross-examination
.... -2 The court had previously held in State v. West 3 that
the prosecutor and not the court was endowed with the author-
ity to determine whether or not to impeach the defendant in
this manner.34 In Stewart, the court expressly declined to over-
rule West,85 but the severity of the charge, the remoteness of
the conviction and the marginal sufficiency of the evidence " led
the court to restrain the prosecutor's discretion. The exceptional
nature of Stewart and the vitality of the West holding are dem-
onstrated by the fact that in State v. Stevenson, 209 N.W.2d 915
(Minn. 1973), decided the same day as Stewart, prior convictions
were held to be admissible. The court found that the "compell-
ing interests of justice"3 7 in Stewart were not present in Steven-
son. However, the court made no attempt to formulate a work-
able standard which would discourage appeals in similar cases.
In another significant case the court indicated that it would
join a growing minority of jurisdictions in which declarations
against penal interest are admissible if proven trustworthy by
independent and reliable corroborating evidence. State v. Hig-
ginbotham, 212 N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1973). While there was no
31. Id.
32. MwN. STAT. § 595.07 (1971).
33. 285 Minn. 188, 173 N.W.2d 468 (1969).
34. Id. at 194, 173 N.W.2d at 472.
35. 209 N.W.2d at 915.
36. The case before the supreme court was actually an appeal from
Stewart's second trial. The first trial ended in a hung jury, and in
the second trial the jury deliberated twenty hours before returning a
guilty verdict on the lesser included offense of first degree man-
slaughter.
37. 209 N.W.2d at 916.
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corroborating evidence and the declaration was held to be inad-
missible, the court recognized the need for a flexible rule simi-
lar to proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (4).38 The court
cited with apparent approval the recent Supreme Court decision
of Chambers v. Mississippi,9 which apparently allowed admis-
sion of a declaration against interest even though the declarant
was available. It is unclear whether the Minnesota court in-
tends to relax even further the availability requirement for this
exception to the hearsay rule.
VII. LAND USE
A. CONDEmNATION
1. Attack on Condemnation Proceedings Through Environ-
mental Litigation.-Freeborn County initiated condemnation
proceedings to acquire land for the construction of a county
highway. The landowners owned and operated a 120 acre farm,
including 19 acres which had been designed by them as a "wild-
life area." Of the 19 acres, seven and one-half acres consisted
of natural marsh or wetlands that had been developed as a wild-
life habitat. The highway plans called for the acquisition of
a strip of the farm which would would have avoided unnecessary
curves in the highway but would also have eliminated seven-
tenths of an acre of the marsh. The landowners filed an answer
in the condemnation proceedings and brought an action under
the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA),1 alleging
that the proposed condemnation would materially and adversely
affect the marsh area. The trial court dismissed the injunction
action for failure to establish a prima facie case as required by
MImEOTA STATUTES § 116B.04. The Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, holding that MERA is a broadly worded
statute under which the county's power of eminent domain may
be limited for the protection of the state's natural resources and
38. (Proposed Nov. 1973). Congress has indefinitely postponed the
effective date of these rules. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12,
87 Stat. 9.
39. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). For a compilation of other courts and
legislatures which have adopted this progressive approach see C. Mc-
CoRMIcK, EvIDENcE § 278, at 674 nn. 36-38 (2d ed. 1972).
1. MINN. STAT. § 116B.01 et seq. (1971).
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that the landowners had established a prima facie case by show-
ing that there would be potential environmental harm to a
protectible natural resource. County of Freeborn v. Bryson,
210 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1973).
Bryson is a case of first impression. Prior to MERA, pri-
vate individuals lacked standing to successfully challenge envi-
ronmentally harmful actions through judicial suit. An individ-
ual could bring a private nuisance action if his property was
affected or if his enjoyment of the land was diminished by the
alleged nuisance,2 but recovery was permitted only if he could
show that the injury suffered was "special or peculiar to him-
self" and was not "common to the general public."'3 Following
the enactment of MERA, "any person" has the right to main-
tain a civil action for declaratory or equitable relief to protect
the state's natural resources from pollution, impairment or de-
struction.4
At the same time, however, MINNESOTA STATUTES § 116B.02 (2)
specifically excludes "a family farm, a family farm corporation,
or a bona fide farmer corporation" from suit under MERA. The
trial court concluded that since the landowners were exempt
from suit and could thus alter the marsh as they desired, they
could not preclude the county from condemning their land.
However, the supreme court found it "illogical to believe that
the legislature intended that an individual be precluded from
bringing an action ... merely because he is engaged in the
occupation of farming." 5 There is little doubt that by expanding
the class of private individuals entitled to bring civil actions to
include farmers, the decision advances a public interest in con-
serving natural resources.6
Although the power of eminent domain is an essential attri-
bute of sovereignty, the court concluded that MERA could be
used to limit environmentally harmful effects arising from con-
demnation. The court interpreted "any conduct" that was ac-
tionable under MINNESOTA STATUTES § 116B.03 (1) as a com-
prehensive term encompassing any appropriate situation
2. MINN. STAT. § 561.01 (1947).
3. Hill v. Stokely-Van Camp, 260 Minn. 315, 321, 109 N.W.2d 749,
753 (1961).
4. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03(1) (1971).
5. 210 N.W.2d at 295.
6. See MINN. STAT. § 116B.Ol (1971). The legislative policy indi-
cates a genuine concern for the preservation of natural resources




wherein IERA could be invoked. This is the most logical inter-
pretation, since the statute contains no exceptions. This con-
struction apparently allows any person to challenge any conduct
which is or could be detrimental to the environment. Nonethe-
less, several questions remain which can be resolved only by
further litigation. First, it is not clear whether conduct or ac-
tion under another statute which includes standards for consid-
ering environmental factors would be subject to suit under
MERA' Second, the court stated that it would not engraft ex-
ceptions to "any conduct," but it is not clear whether an action
could be brought against a person acting within a specific ex-
emption contained in a statute generally subject to limitation
by MERA.8
The court defined the prima facie case under MERA as con-
sisting of two elements: (1) a protectible natural resource and
(2) pollution, impairment or destruction of that resource.0 Us-
ing these criteria, the landowners were able to present a mini-
mal prima facie case by showing that the construction of the
highway would divide the marsh, eliminate some of the marsh's
physical assets, increase wildlife fatalities by reason of the prox-
imity of the traffic and generally disturb the ecological balance
of the marsh.'0 Because the prima facie case was limited to
these two criteria, private individuals have definitely been given
a greater opportunity to challenge harm to the state's natural
resources. Furthermore, the court, in remanding, indicated that
the prima facie case can be rebutted only by showing that no
other "feasible and prudent alternative" exists or that the "con-
duct at issue is consistent with and reasonably required for the
promotion of the public health, safety and welfare.""1 Signifi-
cantly, an affirmative defense cannot be predicated on economic
considerations alone.'-
2. Valuation Based on Inconsistent Uses of Condemned
Property.-Plaintiffs operated an automobile salvage business on
7. For example, the recently amended Drainage Code includes a
strong emphasis on the consideration of environmental factors in deter-
mining whether a drainage system should be established. MAmN-. STAT.
§ 106.111-.673 (1971), as amended (Supp. 1973). Reconciliation of these
provisions with IERA could present problems.
8. See, e.g., Mum. STAT. § 117.011 (1971). Drainage proceedings
are specifically excluded from the provisions governing condemnation
proceedings where the Drainage Code provides for the taking of private
property.
9. 210 N.W.2d at 297.
10. Id. at 297.
11. Id. at 297-98, quoting MrN'. STAT. § 116B.04 (1971).
12. MAiNN. STAT. § 116B.04 (1971).
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the condemned property. On appeal to the district court from
the original condemnation award, plaintiffs offered evidence that
the highest and best use of their property was as a residential
site. They subsequently offered evidence that the relocation of
their business was not economically feasible and that by virtue
of its location, the property taken had value in terms of the
automobile salvage business. The trial court disallowed this lat-
ter offer of evidence as to the value of the ongoing business,'
and the supreme court affirmed, holding that the owner cannot
claim inconsistent uses for land taken by condemnation in es-
tablishing the market value of such land. Frantz v. Board of
County Commissioners, 210 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 1973).
The rule that inconsistent concurrent uses may not be con-
sidered in a condemnation proceeding is well established in
Minnesota. 14 However, it has also been established that incon-
sistent deferred uses can be offered and proved in determining
the market value of the condemned property if the uses are such
that a willing buyer on the open market would reasonably con-
sider the possible deferred uses in purchasing the property.",
The instant case did not place the issue of a deferred use be-
fore the court because no evidence was offered to establish the
value of the property if used as an automobile salvage lot for
a specified number of years and thereafter as residential prop-
erty.
The obvious limitation of this method of valuation is the
requirement that the inconsistent deferred uses be ones which
would be "reasonably considered" by a potential buyer. This
limitation would certainly exclude uses which are of a purely
speculative nature. 6 Thus, while property might well have a
speculative value to the owner or a potential buyer, it ordinarily
will not be recognized by the government. The ability of a spec-
ulator or developer to have a portion of the speculative value
of his property included in the condemnation award will depend
13. Recovery for loss of "going-concern value" has been permitted
in Minnesota only in a case where the condemnee's liquor license was
tied to the condemned location. State v. Saugen, 283 Minn. 402, 169
N.W.2d 37 (1969). However, in the instant case the court found it un-
necessary to reach this issue. Frantz v. Board of County Comm'rs, 210
N.W.2d 51, 53 (Minn. 1973).
14. State v. Gannons Inc., 275 Minn. 14, 18, 145 N.W.2d 321, 326
(1966); Cameron v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 51 Minn. 153, 161, 53 N.W.
199, 202 (1892).
15. State v. Casey, 263 Minn. 47, 54, 115 N.W.2d 749, 754 (1962).
16. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist. v. Fitzpatrick, 201 Minn.
442, 462, 277 N.W. 394, 404 (1937).
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upon the degree of probability that it would be recognized in
the open market.
3. Valuation of Condemned Property as Separate Parcels.-
Pursuant to its power of eminent domain, the St. Paul Housing
and Redevelopment Authority condemned plaintiff's property
consisting of five attached dwelling units, each of which was
a self-contained, separately rented residential unit. Plaintiff ap-
pealed to the district court for a determination of the value of
the property taken. Evidence offered as to the value of each
unit as a separate and complete parcel was disallowed by the
trial court. The supreme court reversed, holding that evidence
as to the value of these separate improved real estate parcels
was admissible. Housing & Redevelopment Authority of St.
Paul v. Anderson, 211 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1973).
The court had previously held that the fair market value
of condemned property "is not to be determined by a myriad
of separate transactions where there are numerous buyers nego-
tiating for the purpose of individual lots over a long period
of time."17 In those earlier cases, however, the property in-
volved was virtually undeveloped, having been little more
than platted. The court had focused on the difficulty which
would accompany any ascertainment of the fair market value
of the property based on what the value of individual lots would
be if the property were subdivided. Using that method, all costs
associated with the required improvements would have to be
calculated against the ultimate projected value of the property.
While the court had not denied that the present value of prop-
erty to be subdivided in the future might well be greater than
the present value of the property treated as a whole, it had
been unwilling to become involved in the speculations and un-
certainties accompanying the ascertainment of the present value
of future subdivision.
These prior cases were distinguished in Anderson on the
basis that a determination of the fair market value of the five
existing units which were being rented separately was not sub-
ject to the uncertainties inherent in the valuation of undevel-
oped land.18 Under this holding, the constitutional require-
17. State v. Malecker, 265 Minn. 1, 7, 120 N.W.2d 36, 40 (1963);
accord, State v. Larsen, 275 Minn. 142, 146-47, 145 N.W.2d 430, 433-34(1966).
18. The court also distinguished the earlier cases by pointing out
that valuing the five attached units with reference to a single sale would
greatly limit the number of potential buyers and thus reduce the market
value. 211 N.W.2d at 792. However, this distinction is without sub-
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ment 9 that the government compensate individuals for property
taken by way of eminent domain apparently involves a question
of the degree of certainty with which the value of the property
can be ascertained.
It can be argued that the prohibition against considering the
present value of property to be subdivided in the future is in-
equitable as applied to property owners who hold or acquire
land with the intent of realizing a profit if and when the land
becomes desirable for development. In the case of two specu-
lators owning adjoining land, one parcel may be taken by the
government for a public project whereupon the owner will re-
ceive no compensation for its speculative value. At the same
time, the adjoining parcel's speculative value not only will re-
main, but may be increased by the existence of the public proj-
ect. On the other hand, speculative values are by definition un-
certain and subject to great risk-factors which, along with the
difficulty of ascertainment, appear to justify ignoring such val-
ues in compensating the owner of condemned property.
B. DRAINAGE
1. Consideration of Conservation and Environmental Fac-
tors by a Drainage Authority.-In 1973, the Minnesota Supreme
Court decided two cases involving the duty of a drainage au-
thority to consider conservation and environmental factors as
part of its decision to either grant or deny a petition for a drain-
age ditch. In the first case, objectors appealed from an order
of the Nicollet County Board establishing a four mile drainage
ditch which would have drained approximately 2,700 acres, in-
cluding over 100 acres of marshlands. The district court dis-
missed the drainage proceeding, stating that the petitioning
landowners had failed to show the requisite public benefit and
utility.1 In arriving at this conclusion, the district court found
that while the proposed ditch represented a practical and feasi-
ble method of controlling the flow from the watershed, it would
harm the wildlife-producing marsh areas of the county, increase
tillable acreage at a time when the federal crop stabilization pro-
stance since precisely the same point is valid with respect to undevel-
oped property.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V; MWN. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
1. Such a showing is required by MlINN. STAT. § 106.201(2)
(1971). For the 1971 Drainage Code's definition of public benefit see
MrNN. STAT. § 106.011(14) (1971). See also State ex rel. Utick v, Board
of County Comm'rs, 87 Minn. 325, 92 N.W. 216 (1902),
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gram had removed 30,000 acres in the county from production
and increase the flow of the Minnesota River. On appeal by
the petitioning landowners, the supreme court affirmed the au-
thority of the district court to enter such an order if supported
by the evidence but reversed the order of dismissal and re-
manded the case to the district court, holding that the district
court had abused its discretion in relying on conservation factors
as a basis for dismissal.2 Schwermann v. Reinhart, 210 N.W.2d
33 (Minn. 1973).
Pursuant to section 106.631(4) of the 1971 Drainage Code,3
a district court is authorized to examine an appealed matter in
its entirety and to "receive evidence to determine whether the
findings made by the county board can be sustained." As noted
in Schwermann, the supreme court had consistently held, with
the exception of In re Petition for Improvement of County Ditch
No. 13,4 that under section 106.631(4) the scope of review of a
district court considering appeals from actions of county boards
was de novo. The court stated that its reliance in County Ditch
No. 13 on language from In re Petition of Black5 to limit the
district court's scope of review had been erroneous because Black
had held only that the scope of review of the supreme court
was limited in regard to drainage proceedings. To eliminate this
inconsistency, the court in Schwermann overruled County Ditch
No. 13.
Although the authority of a district court to treat appeals
challenging actions of county boards of de novo hearings was
thus affirmed, the court held that in the instant case the dis-
trict court had exceeded its authority by basing its order of dis-
missal on conservation considerations. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court stated that MINNESOTA STATUTES § 97.481 provided
the only appropriate procedure whereby the state could acquire
marshlands for conservation purposes. Section 97.481 provides
in part:
The commissioner [of natural resources] in the purchase of...
wetlands must recognize that when a majority of land owners,
2. The court dismissed out of hand the contention that the irrec-
oncilable purposes of the Drainage Code and the federal crop stabili-
zation program constituted proper grounds for the dismissal of a drain-
age proceeding. The court also concluded that the proposed ditch would
have only an insignificant effect on flooding conditions in the Minnesota
River. Schwermann v. Reinhart, 210 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Minn. 1973).
3. Mhm. STAT. § 106.011-.673 (1971), as amended (Supp. 1973),
is known as the Drainage Code.
4. 289 Minn. 108, 182 N.W.2d 715 (1971).
5. 283 Minn. 86, 167 N.W.2d 147 (1969).
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or owners of a majority of the land in the watershed, petition
for a drainage outlet, that [sic] the state should not interfere,
or unnecessarily delay such drainage proceedings when such
proceedings are conducted according to the Minnesota Drainage
Code.
In relying on the acquisition procedure contained in section
97.481, the court reasoned that a dismissal based on the public
interest in conservation was tantamount to a taking without just
compensation because the landowners who petitioned for the
drainage system would be effectively deprived of the use of their
land. While such an interpretation of the effect of section 97.481
may be applicable to the state as an objecting party, it certainly
cannot explain the court's refusal to recognize the right of pri-
vate parties to oppose a proposed ditch on the basis of conserva-
tion considerations. In effect, objecting landowners would be
estopped from raising conservation issues simply because they
would be without power to compensate the petitioning landown-
ers under section 97.481. Moreover, even if the state did inter-
vene to object to a proposed ditch, there would be no assurance
that the available funding of the acquisition program would al-
low the Commissioner of Natural Resources to authorize pur-
chase of the disputed marshlands.0
Furthermore, the court, in relying on section 97.481, over-
looked section 106.671 of the 1971 Drainage Code 7 which pro-
vides:
[T]he authority having jurisdiction of the proceeding, in de-
termining whether or not the project will be in furtherance of
present or future public utility, benefit, or welfare, shall give
due consideration to conservation of soil, water, forests, wild
animals, and related natural resources, and to other public in-
terests affected. . . . (emphasis added)
This section clearly indicates that consideration of conservation
factors is appropriate in the determination of whether the es-
tablishment of a proposed ditch is of public benefit and utility.
Thus, based on its ability to review cases on appeal de novo
pursuant to section 106.631(4), the district court can and must
include the public interest in conservation of natural resources
as a relevant factor in its examination of the adequacy
of a county board's findings. However, the effect of the court's
6. It is possible, however, that objecting landowners would have
a right to challenge a drainage proceeding under the Minnesota Envi-
ronmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 116B.01 et seq. (1971). This Act
provides that any person has a right to challenge conduct which could
pollute, impair or destroy natural resources. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03(1)
(1971); cf. County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1973).
7. Mnn. STAT. § 106.671 (1971).
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reading of section 97.481 is to nullify section 106.671 sub silentio.
The court's interpretation of the district court's authority to re-
view findings of a county board clearly contravenes the intent
of the legislature to include environmental impact as an appro-
priate consideration.8
In the second case, the district court ordered a ditch to be
established in Wright County pursuant to MINNESOTA STATUTFS
§ 106.201(2). The proposed ditch was to follow the course
of Sucker Creek, a watercourse which averaged two to two and
one-half feet in depth and was a main tributary of Cokato Lake.
The ditch was to have bottom widths from four to 30 feet and
depths up to 13 feet and would serve a watershed area of 29
square miles. On appeal, Cokato Township and several individ-
ual objectors claimed that the statutory requirement that the
proposed ditch be of public benefit and utility had not been sat-
isfied. The state and Wright County intervened, claiming that
because the proposed ditch would affect public waters, a permit
from the Commissioner of Natural Resources was required pur-
suant to section 106.201(2). The supreme court affirmed, hold-
ing that the findings of the district court supported the public
benefit of the proposed ditch and that Sucker Creek was not
a public water because it was incapable of substantial beneficial
public use.9 Titrud v. Achterkirch, 213 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1973).
The validity of the establishment of a drainage ditch is
8. This legislative intent was further manifested by the 1973
amendments to the Drainage Code. See, e.g., Mnw. STAT. §§ 106.021(6)
(h) (criteria for proposed drainage systems), 106.081 (preliminary sur-
vey and report), 106.091(2) (commissioner's report), 106.101(4) (dis-
missal) (Supp. 1973).
9. The court decided two other issues consistently with prior law.
First, it held that reconsideration of specific assessments of benefits or
damages must be determined by a jury pursuant to MINN. STAT.
§ 106.631(2) (c) (1971) before appeal can be taken to the supreme court.
See In -re Petition of Winter, 208 N.W.2d 725 (Minn. 1973); In re Peti-
tion of Black, 283 Minn. 86, 167 N.W.2d 147 (1969). Second, the court
held that the finding of practicality in the final order establishing the
ditch included a determination of the adequacy of the outlet. See
.nnm. STAT. § 106.201 (1971); State ex rel. Mosloski v. County of Mar-
tin, 248 Minn. 503, 510, 80 N.W.2d 637, 641 (1957).
In addition, the court affirmed the finding that Sucker Creek did
not constitute a public water because it was incapable of substantial
beneficial public use. The four public uses cited by the opponents of
the ditch were held to be insufficient to outweigh the public benefit
to be derived from increased cropland. See In re Petition of Stevens,
291 Minn. 263, 190 N.W.2d 482 (1971); State v. Kuluvar, 266 Minn. 408,
123 N.W.2d 699 (1963). However, a 1973 amendment indicates that wet-
land areas such as Sucker Creek may now qualify as public waters.
MINN. STAT. § 105.37(6) (Supp. 1973).
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premised on the power of eminent domain which requires that
a public purpose be served by the proposed drainage.1 0 Under
a traditional analysis of public benefit, increased tillable land
constitutes a primary justification for drainage.1 While the
court in Titrud affirmed the drainage project as consistent with
the public benefit to be derived from increased cropland, it failed
to adequately answer the objectors' contention that the proposed
drainage would result in only a private benefit. If this conten-
tion were true, the proposed action would be an unconstitutional
taking of private property for a private purpose.12 The court
recognized that a purely private benefit could well result from
the taking at issue, but stated simply that only a legislative
amendment could correct any infirmity in the Drainage Code's
definition of public benefit.' 3 However, inasmuch as a public
benefit could thus be claimed on the basis of a mere increase
in cropland, the court's rationale would seem to represent an
abdication of judicial responsibility because the legislature
rather than the court would -be determining the constitutional
validity of the taking. It is the court's role to engage in a thor-
ough consideration of whether the public purpose limitation on
the exercise of the power of eminent domain has been satisfied
in any particular case.
Furthermore, the court stated that the determination of the
public benefit question should reflect a "due consideration" of
conservation of natural resources.14 The court observed that a
drainage authority must balance the "public benefit and utility
derived from reclaiming wetlands for agricultural pursuits ...
against the harm which . ..a drainage project would cause to
the state's natural resources."' 5 This standard of "due consider-
ation" is entirely inconsistent, however, with Schwermann v.
Reinhart,6 decided earlier in the same term. In that case, the
10. Lien v. Board of County Comm'rs, 80 Minn. 58, 62-63, 82 N.W.
1094, 1095-96 (1900).
11. The benefits of drainage and reclamation of wetlands include
the increased value of crops, betterment of public highways and the
promotion of the public health. B. PALMER, SWAMP LAND DRAINAGE
WI SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MINNESOTA 98 (University of Minnesota
Studies in Social Sciences No. 5, 1915).
12. The fact that incidental private benefit will accrue to some in-
dividuals over others should not nullify the validity of the taking. Id.
at 98-99.
13. 213 N.W.2d at 412. For the Drainage Code's definition of pub-
lic benefit see MINN. STAT. § 106.011(14) (1971).
14. 213 N.W.2d at 412. See MINN. STAT. § 106.671 (1971).
15. 213 N.W.2d at 412.




court held that conservation of natural resources could be ef-
fected only through acquisition by the state pursuant to Min-
'EOTA STATUTEs § 97.481. Schwermann appeared to implicitly
nullify the effect of section 106.671 as a basis for dismissing
drainage proceedings because of overriding conservation con-
siderations.
In contrast, the court in Titrud set forth a standard of re-
view which provided that a finding by a drainage authority that
a proposed ditch is of public benefit or utility is a fact deter-
mination which will not be disturbed on appeal unless unsup-
ported by the record.17 In effect, this standard of review allows
section 106.671 to be used affirmatively to support the establish-
ment of a drainage system whenever the reviewing court finds
that a drainage authority has given due consideration to conser-
vation factors in reaching its conclusion that establishment of
the ditch would be of public benefit and utility. In light of
the Schwermann rationale, however, a drainage authority cannot
rely on conservation factors to dismiss drainage proceedings.
Thus, the court has articulated a dual standard of review which
is dependent upon whether the drainage authority has granted
or denied the petition for the drainage system.
2. Assessment of State Lands for Benefits from Drainage
Project.-In 1906, a drainage ditch was established near Lake
Elysian which subsequently reduced the ordinary high-water
level of the lake approximately 94 feet. As a result, a water
control dam was constructed near the south end of the lake in
1942. Below the dam, the water level continued to fluctuate
at an artificially lower level. Petitioners initiated drainage pro-
ceedings to stabilize water level conditions on their property
south of the lake. Pursuant to section 106.021(2) of the Drain-
age Code, a permit was obtained from the Commissioner of Na-
tural Resources because a "meandered" lake would be affected
by the proposed ditch.'8 The Commissioner attached several
conditions, including the construction of a variable dam which
would allow the state to draw down impounded water and drain
the land between the two dams. The state was assessed for
benefits from the establishment of the project and appealed,
claiming that it should not be assessed because public waters
17. 213 N.W.2d at 412.
18. Prior to its amendment in 1973, MINN. STAT. § 106.021(2)
(1971) required a permit whenever drainage would affect a '"mean-
dered" lake. A '"meandered" lake is one so designated on plats pre-
pared by the United States Government Survey. See Op. ATT'Y GEN.
MAN. No. 602-E (June 25, 1957).
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were merely being restored to their natural level as required
by the condition attached to the permit. The supreme court
affirmed the assessment, holding that MINNESOTA STATUTES §§
106.151 and 106.672 authorized assessment of state lands or water
areas for benefits derived from the proposed drainage project.
In re Petition of Winter, 208 N.W.2d 725 (Minn. 1973).
Pursuant to section 106.151, viewers 19 are authorized to as-
sess benefits or damages to "all lands and properties affected"
by proposed drainage systems. Section 106.672 provides for the
assessment of state conservation lands. By relying on these
two sections, the court was able to reconcile the authority of
the Commissioner of Natural Resources to grant permits when-
ever meandered lakes are affected by proposed drainage with
the duty of the district court and appointed viewers to assess
benefits and damages.
In so deciding, the court utilized the following rationale.
First, the court stated that the conditions which could be im-
posed in the permit granted by the Commissioner of Natural
Resources were limited to "appropriation or use of state waters
and the construction or operation of controls as are reasonably
necessary for safety and welfare. ' 20 Thus, no statutory author-
ity enabled the Commissioner to preclude assessment of benefits
to state land because such a condition would constitute a usurpa-
tion of the power vested in the district court and appointed
viewers who are specifically charged with the duty of assess-
ment of benefits and damages by sections 106.151 and 106.672.
The court further reasoned that since the construction of the
dam could have been approved by the district court had the
dam been initially included in the proposed drainage plans,
assessments were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court and the appointed viewers.
In reaching its conclusion, the court assumed that benefits
and damages resulting from the restoration of public waters to
their natural levels can be properly assessed under the Drainage
Code. However, this assumption was inconsistent with the
court's holding in In re Lake Elysian High-Water Level, 21 an
earlier case involving the same lake. There, because erosion and
19. The viewers are "three disinterested resident freeholders of the
county or counties affected," who are ordered appointed by the court
or board following the order for a detailed survey. MINN. STAT. §
106.141(1) (1971).
20. 208 N.W.2d at 729.
21. 208 Minn. 158, 293 N.W. 140 (1940).
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unauthorized enlargements of the original drainage ditch of 1906
had reduced the level of the lake, the Commissioner of Natural
Resources had successfully obtained an order in 1940 establish-
ing a dam to restore the lake to its natural water level. In
that action, the court rejected the contention that the landown-
ers who had benefited from the unauthorized reduction of the
lake level had acquired a property right which could only be
divested by just compensation. This conclusion was based on
the rationale that the Commissioner was merely restoring the
lake to its natural level.22 Similarly, the state was not being
benefited in Winter because the dam required by the permit
would restore the level of the water below the 1942 dam to its
"natural and usual height and level."' ' .Thus, the state should
not have been assessed.
Based on its determination that the district court and view-
ers had sole authority to assess benefits to the state, the court
also concluded that the state's appeal was premature. In so
deciding, the court relied on In re Petition of Black 4 which held
that a reconsideration of benefits or damages must be under-
taken through a jury determination pursuant to MInmOTA
STATUTES § 106.631 (2) (c). This reasoning is premised on the fac-
tual nature of assessments which can best be considered through
jury findings before appeal to the supreme court
C. ZONMnG
Arbitrary Denial of Applications for Conditional and Spe-
cial-Use Permits.-In two decisions during 1973, the Minnesota
Supreme Court further elaborated upon the factors which a zon-
ing authority may consider in determining whether to grant or
deny conditional and special-use permits. In the first case,
plaintiffs sought a conditional-use permit to construct a gasoline
station on a portion of their property. The property was zoned
industrial but included plaintiffs' home, a motel and a trailer
court, all valid non-conforming uses. The Bloomington zoning
ordinance provided that if an owner desiring to build a service
station on property in an industrial zone could satisfy certain
conditions, the city council would have to grant the conditional-
use permit.' Based on adverse recommendations from the city
22. Id. at 163-65, 293 N.W. at 143.
23. Id. at 165, 293 N.W. at 143.
24. 283 Minn. 86, 167 N.W.2d 147 (1969).
1. BLOOivIGTON~GM, 1m.ICrrN CODE § 11.13c.
19741
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
traffic engineer, the city planner and the city planning depart-
ment, the city planning commission recommended that the city
council deny the permit for plaintiffs' failure to satisfy three
conditions required by the ordinance 2 and on the additional
ground that the continuation of the non-conforming uses should
not be encouraged by the addition of another such use. The
city council adopted the planning commission's findings and de-
nied the permit. The trial court granted plaintiffs' petition for
mandamus, and the supreme court affirmed, holding that the
denial was arbitrary because the proposed use was consistent
with existing uses, the council had deferred to the findings of
the planning commission and the council's apparent motive in
denying the permit was to end the non-conforming uses. Two
justices dissented, arguing that the council did not defer to the
planning commission merely by making identical findings and
that any one of the three other reasons given for denying the
permit was sufficient regardless of the inclusion of the improper
reason. Enright v. City of Bloomington, 295 Minn. 186, 203 N.W.
2d 396 (1973).
In the second case, plaintiff sought a special-use permit for
the construction of a gasoline station on its commercially zoned
property. The Brooklyn Park ordinance allowed the city coun-
cil to grant the permit if the proposed use would be in harmony
with the zoning code, would not be detrimental to health, safety
or general welfare, would cause no serious traffic hazards and
would not seriously depreciate surrounding property values.
Despite approval by the building inspector and a favorable rec-
ommendation by the city planning commission, the city council
denied the permit. The primary reason given by the council
for the denial was the abundance of filling stations in the area
and the need for other types of commercial development. In
denying plaintiff's suit for injunctive relief, the trial court found
that, in addition to supporting the council's conclusion that too
many filling stations already existed, the evidence before the
council established that the proposed use would depreciate prop-
erty values and cause traffic congestion. On appeal, the su-
preme court reversed, holding that the council had given no rea-
2. The commission found that the development would have an
adverse effect on existing and future development, that the proposed
use would not provide an economic return to the community equal to
other industrial uses and that the traffic generated would interfere with
normal patterns of traffic circulation. Enright v. City of Bloomington.
295 Minn. 186, 189, 203 N.W.2d 396, 398 (1973).
3. BRooK.Lyw PARK, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 34.12.
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sons contemporaneously with its decision other than the number
of existing stations and that this reason was not a proper ground
for denial of the permit. One justice dissented, arguing that
when the council fails to state legally sufficient reasons for its
decision, the trial court should still be able to uphold the deci-
sion on the basis of sufficient reasons established by the evi-
dence. Metro 500, Inc. v. City of Brooklyn Park, 211 N.W.2d
358 (Minn. 1973).
Previously, the court had held that the denial of a permit
was arbitrary where the applicant satisfied all standards speci-
fied in the zoning ordinance.4 Where no standards were speci-
fied or where final authority was retained by the city council,
the court had held the denial to be arbitrary when the requested
use was compatible with the basic use authorized in the zone
and did not endanger public health, safety or welfare.5 The
court had also held that the denial of a permit could not be
upheld on the basis of reasons not articulated by the council
at the time of its decision.0 The instant cases represent a fur-
ther step in the court's development of safeguards against arbi-
trary action on the part of the permit-granting authority.
In Metro 500 the court indicated that the council's reasons
for denying the permit must fall within one of the categories
contained in the ordinance. Because the court found that a lim-
itation of the number of one type of use in a particular area
was not sufficiently related to the considerations of health,
safety or general welfare contained in the ordinance, it necessar-
ily followed that the denial was arbitrary.7 At the same time,
however, the court carefully reserved its decision as to whether
the denial would have been proper if the zoning ordinance had
authorized denial based on a finding that such a limitation had
been reached." Thus, the decision was grounded not upon the
use of a reason unlawful in itself but rather upon the council's
failure to give a reason authorized by the ordinance.
Even if the city council complies with Metro 500 by provid-
ing a legally sufficient reason at the time it denies the permit,
4. Inland Constr. Co. v. City of Bloomington, 292 Minn. 374, 195
N.W.2d 558 (1972).
5. Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 167 N.W.2d 45 (1969).
6. Inland Constr. Co. v. City of Bloomington, 292 Minn. 374. 391-
92, 195 N.W.2d 558, 569 (1972); see also Main Realty, Inc. v. Pagel, 208
N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1973).
7. See Olson v. Minneapolis, 263 Minn. 1, 13, 115 N.W.2d 734, 742
(1962), regarding the ability of a zoning authority to resist the opera-
tion of economic laws.
8. 211 N.W.2d at 364.
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Enright imposes an additional burden. The council must now
either convince the court that its stated reasons represented its
sincere and dominant motivation in denying the permit or else
submit to the court's determination that its real motives were
unacceptable. Even if the council avoids the mistake of includ-
ing both accptable and unacceptable reasons in its findings, the
decision in Enright appears broad enough to allow the court to
go behind the council's formal recitation of reasons should the
circumstances indicate that the denial was actually based on rea-
sons not stated.
Taken together, these decisions indicate the need for the city
council to exercise great care in perparing the record necessary
to support its denial of a permit. Regardless of the care exer-
cised, however, the council will be in a difficult position. If
the trial court decides in favor of the council (Metro 500), the
supreme court may reverse if it finds the statements in the writ-
ten record to be insufficient. If the trial court decides against
the council (Enright), the supreme court may decline to find
the decision below clearly erroneous even when provided with
a substantial record. In any event, an amendment to the zon-
ing ordinance appears to be necessary before the council can
safely introduce new considerations, either stated or unstated,
into the permit process.
VIII. REAL PROPERTY
1. Effect of Violation of Statutory Covenants of Habitabil-
ity on Covenants to Pay Rent.-In August of 1971, defendants
rented an apartment from plaintiff for $85 a month. During
the month-to-month tenancy, repair and maintenance problems
arose. Plaintiff-landlord was given notice of the defects and was
asked to correct them, but no repairs were made. Consequently,
defendants withheld $35 of the rent for February, 1972, but con-
tinued to remain on the premises. That month plaintiff com-
menced an unlawful detainer action for a writ of restitution on
grounds of nonpayment of rent. Defendants argued that no ad-
ditional rent was presently owed because the repair and main-
tenance problems, which were violations of the St. Paul Housing
Code and the covenants of habitability contained in MINNESOTA
STATUTES § 504.18 (1), had deprived them of part of the value
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of the apartment. The municipal court held that the uninhabit-
ability of residential premises cannot be asserted as a defense
to an unlawful detainer action. The Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed, holding that although the renters must abandon the
premises in order to assert constructive eviction as a defense
to an unlawful detainer action, renters may assert breach of the
covenants of habitability imposed by section 504.18 as a defense
to an unlawful detainer action for nonpayment of rent. Fritz
v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. 1973).
At common law the tenant's covenant to pay rent was in-
dependent of the landlord's covenant to repair and maintain the
premises. The court in Fritz did not consider whether there
is a continued justification for the common law rule of independ-
ent covenants in leases of modern urban dwellings. However,
the court reasoned that when covenants of habitability are im-
posed by statute, the covenant to pay rent is made dependent
upon the landlord abiding by the covenants to maintain habit-
able premises. This position is in keeping with the directive
of the statute that the covenants of habitability be liberally con-
strued' and is consistent with recent decisions in other jurisdic-
tions which have given protection to the tenant's legitimate ex-
pectations of quality.2
By virtue of section 504.18, a landlord covenants to keep
leased residential premises in reasonable repair, fit for their in-
tended use and maintained in compliance with applicable health
and safety laws. Although the statute imposes a duty on the
landlord, it does not provide a remedy for the tenant. Conse-
quently, the holding in Fritz is a logical and appropriate way
to give effect to the statute. Since the statutory covenants of
habitability are a part of every residential lease agreement and
are mutual with the covenant to pay rent, the rent, or at least
a part of it, is not due under the terms of the lease when the
landlord has breached the statutory covenants.
Although this defense is helpful to the tenant in defending
his lawsuit, it will not remedy the objectionable condition of
the premises. Clearly, the legislative objective in enacting the
covenants of habitability was to assure adequate and habitable
housing. Withholding rent and remaining on the premises does
1. MnN. STAT. § 504.18 (3) (1971).
2. See Javins v. First Nat'1 Realty Corp., 138 App. D.C. 369, 428
F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Rome v. Walker,
38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash.
2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
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not assist the landlord in rectifying the deficiencies. Moving
to another apartment would only perpetuate the inequality in
bargaining power between landlord and tenant. Recognizing
these potential problems, the court in Fritz concluded that once
the trial court has determined that a question of fact exists as
to the breach of the covenants of habitability, it should order
the tenant to pay the rent into court. Until there is a final
resolution of the controversy, the trial court can disperse the
rent funds to enable the landlord to make the necessary repairs
or meet obligations on the property. Thus, the tenant will have
an adequate remedy, the premises will be made habitable and
the legislative objective will be satisfied.
Because of its choice of remedies, the court held that there
was no need to change its previous position that abandonment
is a prerequisite to the defense of constructive eviction or partial
constructive eviction. This holding leads to an anomaly. Con-
structive eviction means that the premises are not fit for the
intended use as required by one of the covenants of habitability
under section 504.18. Breach of the covenant can be used as
a defense to an unlawful detainer action,3 and the tenant need
not abandon the premises. However, if the defense is charac-
terized as constructive eviction, the tenant must abandon the
premises in order to succeed. By paying undue attention to the
outmoded concept of abandonment, the court has made tenants'
relief dependent not upon the condition of the premises but
rather upon the label given to the defense.
Recent legislative action has somewhat diminished the sig-
nificance of the Fritz decision.4 Under the amended Minnesota
statutes, if a housing code violation has not been corrected by
the landlord within the time given by the local authority
charged with enforcement of the code, the tenant can bring an
action requesting the court to (1) order the landlord to remedy
the violation, (2) order the tenant to remedy the violation and
deduct the cost thereof from the tenant's rent or (3) appoint
an administrator to collect the rent and use the rent to remedy
the violations. The amendments also provide that the trial court
now has jurisdiction to hear actions brought by the tenant for
a housing code violation as part of an unlawful detainer action.
Thus, Fritz will have little impact when the tenant brings an
action for housing code violations and the landlord subsequently
brings an unlawful detainer action.
3. iVNN. STAT. § 566.03(1) (1971).
4. MINN. STAT. § 566.18-.33 (Supp. 1973).
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However, the effect of Fritz has not been completely super-
seded by the amendments. According to the new statute, a ten-
ant cannot bring an action until the time granted by the housing
code authority for correction of the violations has expired.5
Therefore, before the housing code authority has checked the
premises or before the time for repair has expired, the landlord
could bring an unlawful detainer action which the court would
have jurisdiction to hear, but the tenant could not commence
an action to correct the code violation. In such a situation, the
tenant must rely on Fritz as a basis of defense. Moreover, since
the statute provides remedies only for housing code violations,
Fritz will also continue to have an impact in the rare but pos-
sible instance where the premises are unfit for the use intended
but there are no housing code violations.
2. Apportionment of Condemnation Award Between Lessor
and Lessee.-Lessor and lessee had entered into an agreement
which allowed either party to cancel the lease within thirty days
of a public taking. Lessee waived all claims against the lessor
on account of such taking but reserved his claims against the
condemner for damages to the leasehold estate and to leasehold
improvements. Hennepin County initiated condemnation pro-
ceedings against the real property. The condemnation commis-
sioners made a gross award of $200,000 of which $170,000 was
apportioned to the lessor and $30,000 to the lessee with the lessee
paying current real estate taxes and the lessor paying any un-
paid special assessments. The lessor appealed, claiming that the
award was inadequate and that the apportionment of $30,000 to
the lessee(and the requirement that the lessor pay the special
assessments were contrary to the provisions of the lease. The
district court held that the lessee was required to pay the special
assessments, that the lessee's recovery for the leasehold interest
was limited to the lessee's advantage for a thirty-day period as
determined by the difference between the rent specified in the
lease and the market rental value for that period, and that the
lessee could additionally recover out of the gross award only
the reasonable value of the use of the leasehold improvements
from the date of the taking to the time at which the lease would
have expired without a taking rather than the value of the im-
provements. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding that the district court did have jurisdiction over
the part of the award originally made to the lessee. County
of Hennepin v. Holt, 207 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 1973).
5. Id. § 566.19(3).
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The supreme court has consistently followed the "unit rule"
in determining the value of real property subject to separate
estates. 6 Under this rule, the gross award must be apportioned
to each interested party in the ratio that the party's actual dam-
age bears to the total actual damage even though the gross
award may be more or less than the total actual damages. Thus,
when several persons have separate estates or interests in a sin-
gle parcel of land, the proper mode of reaching a fair valuation
of the property is to treat the property as though one individual
owned the entire estate and all interests therein and find the
value and damages in gross, leaving the apportionment to be
made thereafter. When there are separate estates in one parcel
of land, there is a "community of interest." A corollary of the
''unit rule" is that the appeal of a gross award brings all who
have a share in the "community of interest" and their appor-
tioned awards under the jurisdiction of the court. Lessors and
lessees share a community of interest because they have separate
estates in the same land. Therefore, the supreme court was cor-
rect in holding that the lessor's appeal challenging both the gross
award and the apportionment thereof gives the district court
jurisdiction over the gross award and all parts of the gross
award, including the part apportioned to the lessee.
However, it is not clear that the court was correct in af-
firming the district court's reapportionment of the award. The
disputed lease contained a clause providing:
[R]egardless of the amount of taking, the Lessee specifi-
cally waives any and all claims and demands on account of
any such taking, save and except abatement of rent, as against
the Lessors, but not as against the condemner. Lessee's rights
as against the condemner shall be limited to damages, if any,
to its leasehold estate by reason of such taking and to damages,
if any, to leasehold improvements and trade fixtures belonging
to and installed by Lessee at its expense. 7
The court in Holt relied heavily on State v. Oregon Investment
Co." even though the lease in that case contained no express
provision reserving the lessee's claim for damages to leasehold
improvements. The only claims reserved against the condemner
in the Oregon case were for damages to the "business and to
the personal effects" of the lessee.9 Consequently, the Oregon
6. See Hockman v. Lindgren, 212 Minn. 321, 3 N.W.2d 492 (1942);
Smith v. St. Paul, 65 Minn. 295, 68 N.W. 32 (1896).
7. 207 N.W.2d at 728 (emphasis added).
8. 227 Ore. 106, 361 P.2d 71 (1961).
9. In Oregon Investment Co. the lease in pertinent part stated:
It is further understood and agreed that if the whole or any
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court held that the agreement showed no intention that the les-
see should recover for damages to leasehold improvements. That
holding was merely an interpretation of the agreement before
the court rather than a general statement of the rights of lessors
and lessees in condemnation proceedings. Consequently, the
Holt court's reliance on Oregon Investment Co. seems misplaced.
The court did, however, offer an alternate rationale for lim-
iting the lessee to that portion of the gross award representing
the reasonable value of the use of the leasehold improvements
rather than the value of the improvements themselves. An un-
disputed affadavit established that both the lessor and the lessee
had agreed that the lessor would be entitled to all leasehold
improvement upon expiration of the lease. The court reasoned
that since the lessee would not receive the value of the improve-
ments upon the expiration of the lease, the lessee cannot receive
their value upon cancellation of the lease due to condemnation.
If the lessor is entitled to the improvements, the obvious ques-
tion is why the lease contained a clause reserving the lessee's
claim for damages to leasehold improvements. A logical expla-
nation would be that the agreement outlined in the affidavit
was made with reference to expiration only and not in contem-
plation of condemnation, but the court does not discuss this
possible interpretation. It is not clear that the lessee intended
to waive or did in fact waive his claim for damages to leasehold
improvements, and the court might well have construed this am-
biguity against the lessor.10
IY. STATE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
A. AD msRATrE LAW
1. Agency Class Action Suits. - After investigating a
charge of discrimination filed by a former teacher, the Minne-
part of the demised premises shall be taken by any Governmen-
tal authority for any public purpose, then the Lessee shall not
receive any portion of any award made to the Lessor, but the
sole right of the Lessee shall be limited to a separate claim
against said Governmental authority for damages to its business
and personal effects, and the Lessee hereby waives any claim
or claims against the Lessor ....
227 Ore. 106, 108, 361 P.2d 71, 72 (1961).
10. See United States v. 21 Acres of Land, 61 F. Supp. 268, 271-
73 (SMD. CaL 1945).
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sota Commissioner of Human Rights issued a complaint against
Independent School District No. 271, charging that the district's
policy of requiring a pregnant teacher to resign at the fifth
month of her pregnancy violated Commission guidelines which
made maternity leave for pregnant females mandatory. The
complaint was issued on behalf of the charging party and two
classes of persons: (1) teachers who had been denied maternity
leave since June 6, 1969,1 and (2) teachers who had been denied
maternity leave before that date but who had thereafter sought
to return to work. Seeking to prohibit the Commissioner from
alleging discrimination against the two classes of persons, the
school district sought a writ of prohibition on the ground that
the Minnesota Human Rights Act 2 does not allow the Commis-
sioner to bring class action suits. The Minnesota Supreme Court
denied the writ in part, holding that the Human Rights Act en-
titles the Commissioner to bring class action suits against per-
sons engaged in discriminatory practices.3 Richardson v. School
Board of Independent School District No. 271, 210 N.W.2d 911
(Minn. 1973).
The instant case is the first in the United States to hold
that a governmental civil rights agency can bring an action
on behalf of a class of injured persons who have not filed com-
plaints with the agency. Although the Federal Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission has recently been empowered to
maintain actions in its own name on behalf of private individ-
uals, 4 it has not attempted to, and probably cannot, bring a class
action because the plaintiff in a federal class action must be
able to show personal injury.5 Nor have class suits been at-
tempted in any of the few states other than Minnesota which
allow a state agency to sue on behalf of individuals who have
complained of discrimination. 6
In holding that the Commissioner of Human Rights could
1. June 6, 1969, was the effective date of the amendments to the
Human Rights Act which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex.
2. MINN. STAT. § 363 (1971), as amended (Supp. 1973).
3. However, the court held that the six month statute of limita-
tions contained in the Human Rights Act barred suit on behalf of teach-
ers forced to resign more than six months before the commencement
of the suit.
4. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (1974).
5. See, e.g., Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc., 463 F.2d 495 (7th Cir.
1972).
6. See generally Dyson, Commission Enforcement of State Laws
Against Discrimination: A Comparative Analysis of the Kansas Act, 14
U. KAN. L. REV. 29 (1965).
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properly maintain a class action, the court first noted that one
of the primary reasons for the historic ineffectiveness of state
antidiscrimination agencies was that they did little more than
take complaints.7 It concluded that because the Human Rights
Act allowed the Commissioner to initiate proceedings on behalf
of private individuals, the Act was intended to enable him to
formulate a coherent program against discrimination as a means
of overcoming this historic weakness. The court pointed out
that the Commissioner would be better able to fulfill his duties
if he could maintain class suits instead of waiting for individual
complaints and then proceeding on a case by case basis.8
However, a vigorous dissent disagreed with the basic prem-
ise of the majority opinion. It argued that the Commissioner
was empowered to maintain actions on behalf of charging parties
solely as a means of sparing individuals the costs and risks in-
herent in private suits. Since the Commissioner had the author-
ity to seek cease and desist orders, the dissent did not feel that
the Commissioner needed to be able to bring damage actions
on behalf of all injured individuals in order to mount a coherent
program against discrimination.
Although the language of the Human Rights Act does not
specifically authorize class actions, the view of the majority is
clearly preferable. The ability to initiate class suits is impor-
tant to the Commissioner because it gives him a means of exer-
cising a substantial degree of control over the timing and direc-
tion of the antidiscrimination effort. In addition, the size of the
potential damages liability inherent in class actions may well
be a more powerful deterrent to discrimination than is the pos-
sibility of individual damage awards and cease and desist orders.
2. Agency Suits for Declaratory Judgments.-In State
Board of Medical Examiners v. Olson, 295 Minn. 379, 296 N.W.2d
12 (1973), the supreme court held that under the Uniform Dec-
laratory Judgment Act9 the State Board of Medical Examiners
could properly seek a judgment declaring that the use of four
therapeutic devices by a chiropractor constituted an illegal
practice of medicine. The action was opposed by the State
Board of Chiropractic Examiners which alleged that the deter-
mination sought by the Board of Medical Examiners was prop-
7. 210 N.W.2d at 914.
8. 210 N.W.2d at 915.
9. The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act has been codified as
MimN. STAT. § 555.01 et seq. (1971).
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erly within its competence and that it had ruled that the use
of the devices was not unlawful.
The issue of whether an administrative agency can seek a
declaratory judgment under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act is a novel one because an agency usually has no reason to
seek declaratory relief. In the normal course of events, the
party who believes that he has been wronged by administrative
action is obligated to seek judicial review. Thus, a declaratory
judgment is of use to an administrative agency primarily where
each of two or more agencies alleges that it alone has jurisdic-
tion over the matter in question. In this situation, however,
the right to declaratory relief is a valuable one because it allows
any of the competing agencies to force a decision on the merits
of the case.
Although the instant case appears to be one of first impres-
sion in the states which have adopted the Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act, the court's broad reading of the Act is in accord
with the view of several leading administrative law commen-
tators.10 The court summarily rejected the argument that the
Board of Medical Examiners was not an interested party in the
dispute and held that inasmuch as the Act declares that it is
to be liberally construed," the realm of persons who can bring
a declaratory action is virtually unlimited.
B. ELECTIONS
Age Requirement for the Office of State Representative.-
Applicants Jude and Rafferty, both aged 20, sought to file for
the office of state representative from their respective districts.
Jude was to become 21 years of age after the 1972 general elec-
tion but before he would take office. Rafferty would not -turn
21 until several months after his term would begin. Pursuant
to MINNESOTA STATUTES § 202.04(1) (e), the Minnesota Secretary
of State refused to permit them to file because neither could
affiance that he would be 21 years of age on the day of the
general election. The applicants then commenced proceedings
before the Minnesota Supreme Court in order to force the Sec-
retary of State and the Auditor of Hennepin County to allow
them to file. The court granted the application of Jude but de-
10. See 2 F. CooPER, STATE ADIvmIsTRATVE LAw 548-51 (1965); K.
DAvis, AimNsNTS ATmvE LAW § 24.05 (1972). See also Borchard, The Uni-
form Declaratory Judgments Act, 18 MINN. L. REv. 239 (1934).
11. MINN. STAT. § 555.12-.13 (1971).
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nied that of Rafferty, holding that section 202.04(1) (e) was con-
trary to the Minnesota State Constitution insofar as it required
any candidate for public office to be 21 years old on or before
the day of the election. However, the court held, over a vig-
orous dissent, that the constitution did require a candidate for
state representative to be 21 years of age before the date on
which he would take office. Jude v. Erdahi, 207 N.W.2d 715
(Minn. 1973).
Article 7, section 7, of the Minnesota State Constitution pro-
vides that:
Every person who by the provisions of this article shall be en-
titled to vote at any election and is twenty-one years of age
shall be eligible to any office which now is, or hereafter shall
be, elective by the people in the district wherein he shall have
resided thirty days previous to such election, except as other-
wise provided in this Constitution, or the Constitution and law
of the United States.1
With regard to the application of Jude, the court held that
the age requirement contained in article 7, section 7, pertained
only to the age of a person at the time he would take office.
Because section 202.04(1) (e), as interpreted by the Secretary of
State, required any candidate for public office to be more than
21 years old at the time of election,2 the statute as so interpreted
was unconstitutional because it created a requirement for hold-
ing public office not authorized by the constitution. At the same
time, the court interpreted article 7, section 7, as requiring a
candidate for the office of state representative to be 21 years
old before the date on which his term of office would begin.
The age requirement contained in article 7, section 7, was
added to the constitution as part of the amendments of 1970
which were adopted when the required majority of voters an-
swered "yes" to the question:
Shall the Constitution of the State be amended to reduce the
age requirement for voting from 21 to 19 [now 18] years and
provide an age requirement of 21 years to hold elective public
office?3
Applicant Rafferty, who would not turn 21 until several
1. MnN . CONST. art. 7, § 7.
2. Terms of office in Minnesota begin approximately two months
after the general election. The court noted that Mnw. STAT. § 202.04
(1) (f)-(h) (1971), which set out the age requirements for United States
Senator, United States Representative, Governor and Lieutenant Gover-
nor, specify age at the beginning of the term of office. The court could
find no rational basis for distinguishing these offices from the office
of state representative. 207 N.W.2d at 717.
3. 207 N.W.2d at 718.
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months after his term of office would begin, argued that the
"except as otherwise provided in this Constitution" clause of ar-
ticle 7, section 7, exempted the office of state representative from
the age requirement because article 4, section 25, merely re-
quired a state representative to be a qualified voter who met
certain residency requirements.4  The court, while conceding
that article 7, section 7, could not be totally reconciled with arti-
cle 4, section 25, held that the "except as otherwise provided
by this Constitution" clause pertained only to the explicit age
requirements provided for the offices of governor and lieutenant
governor by article 5, section 3.5
Although it is difficult to believe that the court really in-
tended to limit the effect of the "except as otherwise provided
by this Constitution" clause to incorporating into article 7, sec-
tion 7,6 the specific age requirements of article 5, section 3, the
court quite properly assumed that the 1970 amendment had only
a single purpose:
namely, to change the voting age from 21 years to 19. The
amendment was couched in language clearly indicating that
what was intended was to reduce the voting age only, retain-
ing the age formerly required for holding office.7
The court noted that for it to assume that the article 7, section
7, age requirement did not apply to state representatives would
require it to find from the failure of the 1970 amendment to
deal explicitly with article 4, section 25, that the legislature and
the voters had intended to set a special age requirement for state
4. MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 25 provides that state
Senators and representatives shall be qualified voters of the
state, and shall have resided one year in the State and six
months immediately preceding the election in the district from
which they are elected.
5. 207 N.W.2d at 719.
6. The "except as otherwise provided by this Constitution" clause
was part of article 7, section 7, before the 1970 amendment. The re-
strictive interpretation adopted by the court would seem to read out of
the constitution such diverse requirements for holding public office as
the residency requirements expressly set out in article 4, section 25.
This argument was forcefully made by the dissent which felt that article
7, section 7, was intended to incorporate all of article 4, section 25, in-
cluding the lower age requirement that could be implied from that sec-
tion's "qualified voter" provision.
7. 207 N.W.2d at 119, quoting Opatz v. City of St. Cloud, 293 Minn.
379, 381, 196 N.W.2d 298, 300 (1972). In Opatz the court held that ar-
ticle 7, section 7, required a candidate for city alderman to be 21 years
of age. The court in the instant case noted that it could see no reason
to distinguish between a city alderman and a state representative.
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representatives at variance with all other public offices.8
Although the dissent argued that the haste with which the
amendment was passed foreclosed any conclusion as to legisla-
tive or voter intent,9 it is clear that the majority's view is pref-
erable. The question which presented the amendment to the
voters expressly stated that the effect of the amendment would
be limited to lowering the voting age and that it would not af-
fect the minimum age for holding public office.' 0 In the absence
of an explicit statement of intent, the court properly refused
to hold that the amendment provided by implication a special
age requirement for the office of state representative.
C. FAm y LAW
1. Constitutionality of One Year Residence Requirement for
Divorce.-In June, 1971, plaintiff Rosalie Davis moved from Mis-
souri to Minneapolis with her five children, established residence
in Minnesota and instituted divorce proceedings against her hus-
band, from whom she was separated and who had remained in
Missouri. The complaint and summons were served on him in
August, and in October a complaint challenging the constitu-
tionality of Minnesota's one year durational residency require-
ment was filed with the district court. A default hearing was
held in January, 1972, and in May the complaint was dismissed
because plaintiff had not met the residency requirement of MIN-
NESOTA STATUTES § 518.07.1 Ackmowledging that plaintiff was
a bona fide state resident, the Minnesota Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding that the statute's one year divorce residency
requirement did not violate either the equal protection or the
due process clause.2  Davis v. Davis, 210 N.W.2d 221 (Minn.
1973).
8. 207 N.W.2d at 719.
9. 207 N.W.2d at 720. The dissent gave a brief description of the
legislative history of the 1970 amendment and concluded that the legis-
lature never considered the effect that the amendment would have on
age requirements for holding public office.
10. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
1. The statute provides: "No divorce shall be granted unless the
plaintiff has resided in this state one year immediately preceding the
filing of the complaint, except for adultery committed while the plaintiff
was a resident of this state."
2. Other cases which have upheld durational residency require-
ments for divorce actions include: Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182
(E.D. Iowa 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 1405 (1974) (one year); Shill-
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Two tests are employed by courts to determine whether a
statute deprives a person of equal protection. If the statutory
classification affects either a suspect class3 or a fundamental
right,4 it is subjected to strict scrutiny; the classification must
be shown to be necessary to achieve a compelling state inter-
est.5 If such classes or rights are not involved, the classification
is subjected to restrained review; it must merely be rationally
related to a legitimate state objective.;
In response to the plaintiff's contention that the one year
residency requirement interfered with her fundamental right of
interstate travel, the court granted that any statute which penal-
izes the exercise of that right should be subjected to strict scru-
tiny. Citing Dunn v. Blumnstein7 as support for that proposi-
tion, the court reasoned that whether a statute infringes upon
a fundamental right depends upon the nature of the individual
interest which is burdened by the exercise of that right. Since
the court did not find access to divorce court as important an
interest as the right to vote at issue in Dunn, it concluded that
section 518.07 did not infringe upon the plaintiff's right of travel
and was therefore subject only to restrained review. The court
then held that since section 518.07 was reasonably related to
the legitimate governmental objective of confining access to di-
vorce proceedings to bona fide state residents, it did not deny
the plaintiff equal protection of the law. Responding to the
plaintiff's argument that the due process standard of Boddie v.
man v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (six months); Cole-
man v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St. 2d 155, 291 N.E.2d 530 (1972) (one year);
Place v. Place, 129 Vt. 326, 278 A.2d 710 (1971) (six months). Cases
holding such residency requirements invalid include: Larsen v. Gal-
logly, 361 F. Supp. 305 (D. R.I. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3321
(U.S. Nov. 27, 1973) (two years); Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp.
1353 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (two years). Hawaii's one year residence require-
ment was upheld by the Hawaii Supreme Court, Whitehead v. White-
head, 94 Hawaii 302, 492 P.2d 939 (1972), but subsequently invalidated
by the federal district court, Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp.
219 (D. Hawaii, 1973).
3. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 185 (1964) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (national origin).
4. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital intimacy); Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 315 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation).
5. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
6. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
7. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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Connecticuts permits a state to deny access to divorce proceed-
ings only if it can show a "countervailing interest of overriding
significance,"9 the court distinguished Boddie by pointing out
that a one year waiting period does not permanently deny court
access as did the Connecticut statute.
The propriety of the court's decision depends both upon
whether it properly interpreted Dunn's equal protection direc-
tive to look to "the character of the classification in question;
the individual interests affected by the classification; and the
governmental interests in support of the classification"10 and
upon whether it gave, due weight to Boddie's interpretation of
due process requirements.
The court recognized some strong arguments against its in-
terpretation of the equal protection mandate in Dunn. The
Dunn opinion seems to imply that any burdening of the right
to travel demands strict scrutiny:
In Shapiro we explicitly stated that the compelling state inter-
est test would be triggered by "any classification which serves
to penalize the exercise of that right [to travel] . . ."I'
The right to travel is an "unconditional personal right," a right
whose exercise may not be conditioned. . . . Durational resi-
dence laws impermissibly condition and penalize the right to
travel by imposing their prohibitions on only those persons who
have recently exercised that right. 12
Under such an interpretation, to determine whether the govern-
mental objective is "compelling" in light of the individual in-
terest, the court should consider the nature of these two factors
only after strict scrutiny has been invoked. Nevertheless, there
is some support for the court's position in a footnote to Shapiro
v. Thompson,'" the leading case in which the burdening of the
right to travel was found to constitute a denial of equal protec-
tion:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence
requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tui-
tion-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession,
to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may promote
compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other may
not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right
to travel.14
8. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
9. Id. at 377.
10. 405 U.S. at 335.
11. Id. at 340.
12. Id. at 341-42.
13. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
14. Id. at 638 n.21 (emphasis added).
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Even granting the court's interpretation of the requirements
for strict scrutiny, however, it is doubtful that its conclusion
was justified. The court cited as authority for its conclusion
Vlandis v. Kline' 5 in which the United States Supreme Court
spoke approvingly of Starns v. Malkerson,'0 a decision upholding
Minnesota's one year residency requirement for in-state tuition
at state universities. But there is no right to higher education, 7
the interest at stake in Starns. Marriage and the unhappy
spouse's desire or need' 8 to terminate it are not such insignifi-
cant interests that a forced choice between divorce and interstate
travel does not infringe upon the latter right. On the contrary,
in discussing the right of indigent citizens to institute divorce
proceedings, the Supreme Court in Boddie spoke of marriage as
involving "interests of basic importance in our society,"' 19 as a
"fundamental human relationship,' '20 and as occupying a "basic
position" in "this society's hierarchy of values."'2' Other United
15. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
16. 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
The Vlandis Court held violative of due process a Connecticut statute
which conclusively presumed a state university student to be a nonresi-
dent if he was unmarried and his legal address was outside the state
for any time during the one year period preceding his application for
admission or if he was married and his address was outside the state
at the time of his application. The Court distinguished the Starns case
in the following manner:
Under the regulation involved in Starns, a student who applied
to the University from out of State could rebut the presumption
of nonresidency, after having lived in the State for one year,
by presenting sufficient other evidence to show bona fide domi-
cile within Minnesota. In other words, residence within the
State for one year, whether or not in student status, was merely
one element which Minnesota required to demonstrate bona fide
domicile. By contrast, the Connecticut statute prevents a stu-
dent who applied to the University from out of State, or within
a year of living out of State, from ever rebutting the presump-
tion of nonresidence during the entire time that he remains a
student, no matter how long he has been a bona fide resident
of the State for other purposes.
412 U.S. at 452-53 n.9.
17. Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973).
18. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
The instant classification affects only the filing for a divorce
within 1 year after immigration to Minnesota. . . . No eco-
nomic prejudice results since an action for support and mainte-
nance in Minnesota does not have to satisfy the 1-year dura-
tional-residency requirement.
Davis v. Davis, 210 N.W.2d 221, 225 (Minn. 1973). The court ignores
the possibility that the plaintiff may wish to remarry.
19. 401 U.S. at 376.
20. Id. at 383.
21. Id. at 374.
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States Supreme Court opinions have employed similar terms.22
Indeed, even those other state courts which have upheld dura-
tional residency requirements for divorce actions have found di-
vorce so important as to make necessary the finding of a com-
pelling state interest.23
Had the court followed this clear judicial trend, it is doubt-
ful that section 518.07 would have passed constitutional muster.
Even had the court found bona fide residency to be a compelling
state interest, there are certainly other objective tests better
adapted to determining such residency than the one year re-
quirement.24 Moreover, once the importance of an individual's
interest in his marital status is admitted, Vlandis seems to pro-
vide authority for the plaintiff's due process challenge to the
conclusive presumption of nonresidency represented by Minne-
sota's one year residency requirement. A one year conclusive
presumption burdening the important individual interest in mar-
ital status seems equivalent to the permanent conclusive pre-
sumption burdening the lesser interest in resident tuition which
the Vlandis Court struck down as violative of due process. Just
as the Vlandis Court required individual factfinding as a reason-
able alternative to the presumptive nonresidence of Connecticut
students, so the Minnesota court might have required a case-
by-case residency determination for plaintiffs in Minnesota di-
vorce proceedings.
Finally, the court's attempt to avoid the due process issue
by distinguishing Boddie is equally unconvincing. In Boddie the
Supreme Court emphasized that for plaintiffs in divorce actions
state courts are "the only avenue to dissolution of their mar-
riages"2 5 and held in regard to such proceedings that "absent
a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons
forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judi-
cial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.' 20 The Minnesota Supreme Court's limitation of this
holding to a permanent deprivation of access overlooks the fact
22. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
23. Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Iowa 1973), cert.
granted, 94 S. Ct. 1405 (1974); Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225
(M.D. Fla. 1973); Whitehead v. Whitehead, 94 Hawaii 302, 492 P.2d 939
(1972); Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St. 2d 155, 291 N.E.2d 530 (1972);
Place v. Place, 129 Vt. 326, 278 A.2d 710 (1971).
24. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 349-54 (1972).
25. 401 U.S. at 376.
26. Id. at 377.
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that even temporary denials of state-controlled benefits are dep-
rivations subject to due process guarantees 27 and the fact that,
'"except for extraordinary situations where some valid govern-
mental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing
until after the event, '28 the plaintiff must be granted a hearing.
Since the court made no finding of a countervailing state inter-
est of overriding significance, an interest comparable to the
"compelling state interest" of strict equal protection review, it
was obligated at least to require findings of fact as to whether
the plaintiff's situation rendered the one year postponement of
her divorce hearing meaningless. Moreover, had the court cho-
sen to expand these findings to a determination as to whether
plaintiff was a bona fide resident and then applied the law in
the light of its purpose, the result would have been the same
as that which might have been reached under strict equal pro-
tection review. Similarly, under the fusion of due process and
strict equal protection represented by Vlandis, the court could
have interpreted section 518.07 as a conclusive presumption em-
ployed in preference to "reasonable alternative means." Under
any one of these approaches the court would have properly sub-
ordinated administrative speed and efficiency to the plaintiff's
fundamental interest in her marital status.
2. Adoption of a Mother by Her Son.-Petitioner, a 29 year
old single male, petitioned to adopt his 53 year old mother in
order to bring her, as his heir, under the terms of a trust estab-
lished by his father.29  The corpus of the trust was to be dis-
tributed to petitioner when he reached the age of 45 or to his
issue if he died before reaching 45 years of age. However, if
petitioner died without issue before he was entitled to receive
the trust property, it was to be distributed to an educational
institution. Petitioner admitted that the sole purpose for his
attempt to adopt his mother was to make her his issue so that
she would be entitled to the trust property if he died before
reaching age 45. The trial court denied the petition on the
ground that an adoption designed to frustrate the intentions of
the settlor of a trust was contrary -to public policy. On appeal,
the supreme court reversed, holding that MixmSOTA STATUTE
§ 259.22 authorized the adoption of an adult by any other person,
27. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
28. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
29. Petitioner's mother had been divorced by his father. The trust
made no provision for the mother.
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including the adult's natural son. However, the court expressly
declined to determine whether the adopted mother would be en-
titled to take under the terms of the trust. In re Adoption of
Bertson, 206 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1973).
Although the Minnesota adoption statutes"0 are not entirely
consistent in their terminology, they appear to distinguish be-
tween the adoption of a child and the adoption of an adult. For
example, section 259.22 provides that "[a] ny person who has re-
sided in the state for one year or more may petition to adopt
a child or an adult. '31 Section 259.24(4) stipulates that "[i]n
the adoption of an adult, his written consent only shall be re-
quired. '3 2 The remainder of the adoption provisions, which are
concerned with such diverse matters as notice,33 investigation 4
and the effect of adoption,35 refer by their own terms only to
the adoption of children and not to the adoption of adults. These
sections arguably do not apply to adoptions of adults because
a definitional provision defines a "child" as "a person under the
age of 18 years."3
In the instant case, a majority of the court refused to con-
sider whether the adoption provisions which referred only to
children were also applicable to the adoption of an adult. It
relied solely on MmNEOTA STATUTES § 259.22 and held that the
adoption of a mother by her son was clearly proper under a
statute which allowed an "adult" to be adopted by "any per-
son.1 3 7
The majority's holding is fully consistent with the prior
Minnesota case law which suggests that the adoption statutes
should be liberally construed.38  The question of whether an
adopted mother could receive the benefits of a trust designed
to provide for her son's issue was not properly before the court.
Although distribution to the mother may call for an unwar-
ranted extension of MIN-NESOTA STATUTES § 259.29, which provides
30. Mnmx. STAT. § 259.21-.32 (1971).
31. Id. § 259.22.
32. Id. § 259.24(4).
33. Id. § 259.26.
34. Id. § 259.27.
35. Id. § 259.29.
36. MmN. STAT. § 259.21(2) (Supp. 1973).
37. A dissent agreed with the trial court that an adoption designed
to frustrate the intentions of the settlor of a trust was contrary to public
policy.
38. See, e.g., Inre Fleming, 271 Minn. 337, 136 N.W.2d 109 (1965);
In re Adoption of Anderson, 235 Minn. 192, 50 N.W.2d 278 (1951). See
also Note, Adoption in Minnesota, 36 MNx. L. Rsv. 383 (1952).
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that an adopted child inherits through its adoptive parents as
if they were its natural parents, it is difficult to conceive how
the adoption itself could be contrary to public policy as ex-
pressed by section 259.22 which simply provides that "any per-
son" may properly adopt an adult.
3. Finality of Divorce Decree.-In August of 1970, husband
and wife were divorced pursuant to a decree which provided,
inter alia, that the wife would have possession of the marital
homestead, which had been held in joint tenancy, until it could
be sold. The proceeds of the sale were to be divided equally.
The decree also stipulated that the husband would pay alimony
of $350 per month. Fifteen months later, the trial court
amended the original decree, awarding the wife absolute own-
ership of the homestead and ordering the husband to reimburse
the wife for medical expenses she had incurred since the entry
of the original divorce decree.39 On appeal, the supreme court
reversed, holding that the original decree was a final distribu-
tion which could not be altered, and that the award of medical
expenses was not proper under Minnesota case law. 40  Snyder
v. Snyder, 212 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. 1973).
Prior to 1951, Minnesota case law had held that where the
issue of the right to real estate was litigated in a divorce action,
a judgment and decree was conclusive and could not be modi-
fied after the time for appeal had expired.4 1 MINNESOTA STAT-
UTES § 518.64 now codifies this rule and provides that
Except for an award of the right of occupancy of the home-
stead, all divisions of real and personal property . . . shall be
final ....
In the instant case, the trial court apparently 42 assumed that
the joint tenancy in which the homestead had been held sur-
vived the original divorce decree. The court reasoned that be-
cause at common law a joint tenant had an undivided interest
in the entire property, its decree with regard to the homestead
39. The trial court also ordered the husband to provide for any
future medical expenses that the wife might incur and increased the
husband's liability for alimony from $350 to $400 per month.
40. The court also held that the trial court should not have in-
creased the husband's liability for alimony and suggested that the hus-
band should not be made liable for any future medical expenses in-
curred by the wife unless the issue of medical care had not been raised
during the original divorce proceeding. The court remanded the case
for a determination on this issue.
41. See, e.g., Anich v. Anich, 217 Minn. 259, 14 N.W.2d 289 (1944);
In re Petition of Wipper, 176 Minn. 206, 222 N.W. 922 (1929).
42. The supreme court's opinion does not disclose the reasons ad-
vanced by the trial court in support of its amended decree.
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was not a "division" of property as contemplated by section
518.64. Therefore, the decree was not a final distribution and
could be modified.
In -reversing, the supreme court noted that joint tenancies
have never been favored in Minnesota.43  In fact, MNNEsoTA
STATUTES § 500.19 (2) provides that
All grants and devises of lands, made to two or more persons,
shall be construed to create estates in common, and not in joint
tenancy, unless expressly declared to be in joint tenancy.
The court declared that although a trial court could conceivably
have reason to issue a decree of divorce which left the parties
with undivided interests in property, a distribution of this kind
would be proper only in exceptional circumstances. 4 It held
that in light of the policy expressed by section 500.19(2), a di-
vorce decree severed a joint tenancy unless it explicitly stated
otherwise.
The court's ruling on this issue properly assumes that it is
best if the division of property following a divorce is final. The.
purpose of the divorce proceeding is to sever all legal ties be-
tween a husband and wife as completely as possible. This can
best be accomplished if all property acquired during the mar-
riage is finally divided in one proceeding. The right of appeal
from the original decree, rather than a right to later seek amend-
ment, will protect the interests of any dissatisfied party.
The supreme court's ruling that the trial court should not
have ordered the husband to reimburse his former wife for med-
ical expenses she incurred after the original decree is consistent
with this philosophy of divorce. Where the issue of support has
been fairly and completely litigated in the original proceeding,
the support provisions of the original decree should not be dis-
turbed in the absence of exceptional circumstances.
D. GoVENiiTAL SUBDIVISIONS
Proper Service of Notice Under the Minnesota Notice-
of-Tort-Claim Statute.-Plaintiff was injured when she tripped
on an allegedly defective public sidewalk located in downtown
Minneapolis. In an attempt to comply with the Minnesota no-
tice-of-tort-claim statute, plaintiff served notice of her claim on
43. 212 N.W.2d at 872.
44. 212 N.W.2d at 873. See, e.g., Wos v. Wos, 291 Minn. 404, 406,
191 N.W.2d 829, 830 (1971).
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the President of the Minneapolis City Council. The trial court
dismissed plaintiff's subsequent damage action on the ground
that the President of the City Council was not a proper party
to be served with the statutory notice. On appeal, the supreme
court reversed, holding that a member of the city council is a
person likely to place the notice before the governing body of
the municipality at its next meeting and that service of notice
upon a city council member therefore meets the requirements
of the notice-of-tort-claim statute. Seifert v. Minneapolis, 213
N.W.2d 605 (Minn. 1973).
The principal purpose of the Minnesota notice-of-tort-claim
statute is "to protect against dissipation of public funds by re-
quiring that the municipality be promptly furnished with infor-
mation concerning a claim against it."' To achieve this end, the
statute provides:
Every person who claims damages from any municipality for
or on account of any loss or injury . . . shall cause to be pre-
sented to the governing body of the municipality within 30 days
after the alleged loss or injury a written notice stating the time,
place and circumstances thereof, and the amount of compensa-
tion or other relief demanded. 2
Although earlier cases had not suggested that the statute re-
quired service on any particular municipal emloyee,3 the su-
preme court implied in Aronson v. St. Pau 4 that only service
on the clerk of the city council would suffice. In holding that
service on a mayor who also sat as chairman of the city council
was not sufficient, the court noted that the statutory notice may
"be directed to the council, and left with the clerk or officer
who has charge of the records and files of the council, with a
request annexed that it be laid before the council at its next
meeting." 5
In the instant case the court repudiated the harsh effect of
1. Seifert v. Minneapolis, 213 N.W.2d at 606 (1973), quoting Hirth
v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 79, 143 N.W.2d 205, 207 (1966).
2. MAIxT. STAT. § 466.05(1) (1971).
3. For example, in Roberts v. Village of St. James, 76 Minn. 456,
457, 79 N.W. 519, 520 (1899), the court observed that a predecessor to
the current notice-of-tort-claim statute did not direct service on any par-
ticular person. It concluded that service "must be done in some prac-
tical and effective way, and in determining the sufficiency of the method
adopted in any particular case, technical strictness will not be required;
a substantial compliance is all that is necessary." See also Lyons v.
City of Red Wing, 76 Minn. 20, 78 N.W. 868 (1899); Doyle v. Duluth,
74 Minn. 157, 76 N.W. 1029 (1898).
4. 193 Minn. 34, 257 N.W. 662 (1934).
5. Id. at 36, 257 N.W. at 663, quoting Lyons v. City of Red Wing,
76 Minn. 20, 22, 78 N.W. 868 (1899).
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Aronson, properly pointing out that a municipality can be given
adequate notice of a pending claim even if the claimant serves
notice of his injury on a municipal employee other than the clerk
of the city council. The court explicitly expanded the class of
persons who can be served to include members of the city coun-
cil and any other responsible official reasonably likely to bring
the notice to the attention of the municipality's governing body
at its next meeting.6
The result reached in the instant case is certainly prefer-
able to that which would have obtained had the Aronson deci-
sion been followed. However, the court should have provided
a more comprehensive definition of the class of persons who can
now be properly served. For example, one recent Minnesota
case ruled that service on a city attorney was not sufficient un-
der the statute because a "city attorney is not a part of the
[municipal] governing body."7 Although a city attorney can
probably be trusted to place the notice of a claim before the
municipality's governing body at its next meeting, it is not clear
whether this and similar cases" have survived the court's new
decision. Hopefully, the court will specifically overrule these
cases and set out guidelines which will insure that the defini-
tion of a "responsible official" is not limited to members of
a municipality's governing body and its administrative and cleri-
cal staff.
E. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Constitutionality of the Minnesota Replevin Statute.-Pur-
suant to a security agreement with the defendant, plaintiff ini-
tiated a replevin action in district court under MINNESOTA
STATUTES § 565.01-.11 for the summary seizure of goods in the
defendant's possession. Although defendant thwarted the at-
tempted seizure with a rebonding arrangement, he suffered a
default judgment by failing to appear at trial. After the hearing
but before the judgment was entered, the United States Supreme
Court delivered its decision in Fuentes v. Shevin.1 That de-
cision held unconstitutional the replevin statutes of Florida and
6. 213 N.W.2d at 609.
7. McGuire v. Hennessy, 292 Minn. 429, 431, 193 N.W.2d 313, 314
(1971).
8. See, e.g., Doyle v. Duluth, 74 Minn. 157, 76 N.W. 1029 (1898).
1. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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Pennsylvania. Though the defendant tried to raise the consti-
tutional issue on appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota af-
firmed, holding that defendant's failure to notify the Attorney
General of his challenge to the statute, to raise the issue at trial
and to take steps to correct the default judgment barred his
raising the challenge on appeal. Automobile Merchandise, Inc.
v. Smith, 212 N.W.2d 678 (Minn. 1973).
The significance of the case lies not so much in the court's
holding as in its dictum that "[w] e are inclined to observe that
the replevin procedures provided by statute in Minnesota do not
meet the tests required by the Fuentes case.'"2 Chapter 565 pro-
vides that a plaintiff may claim possession and immediate de-
livery 3 of personal property in defendant's possession by filing
an affidavit to the effect that he owns such property and that
defendant wrongfully detains it 4 and by posting a bond with
the sheriff for double the property's value.0 By endorsing the
affidavit, plaintiff can require the sheriff to seize the property
from the defendant immediately and deliver it to him, unless
the defendant, within three days of the seizure, excepts to the
sufficiency of the sureties or makes arrangements for a rebond-
ing.7
Both the Pennsylvania and the Florida statutes at issue in
Fuentes contained similar provisions for the summary seizure
of goods upon an ex parte application by a private person. The
Court held that both were violative of due process because they
denied the defendant proper notice and hearing before the sei-
zure took place. Emphasizing that the fourteenth amendment's
protection of property extends to any significant property in-
terest and not merely to the necessities of life, the Court in
Fuentes held that even a temporary taking of such property con-
stitutes a violation of the due process clause. Absent extraordi-
nary circumstances to justify such a summary seizure, the pre-
vention of an arbitrary encroachment upon the defendant's in-
terests requires that he be informed of the proceeding and
granted an opportunity to be heard before the deprivation oc-
curs. While the Court allowed that the form and extent of such
a hearing might be colored by the nature of the property interest
2. 212 N.W.2d at 680.
3. Mnm. STAT. § 565.91 (1971).
4. Id. § 565.02.
5. Id. § 565.03.
6. Id. § 565.04.
7. Id. § 565.05.
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at stake, the necessity of prior notice and hearing is not obviated
unless the interest can be characterized as de minimis. More-
over, the Court reasoned, the ability of the defendant to reclaim
the goods by posting a second bond within three days was im-
material. In view of these rather explicit criteria established
by the Court and in view of the Minnesota supreme court's jus-
tifiable conclusion that chapter 565 is accordingly unconsti-
tutional, the statute must be amended to provide preseizure no-
tice and hearing and, perhaps, to define precisely those extra-
ordinary circumstances in which the notice and hearing require-
ments may be disregarded.
F. SECuRITIES REGULATION
Investment Contracts.-In January, 1971, defendants began
to sell to Minnesota residents contracts for deed, notes secured
by contracts for deed and notes secured by mortgages pertain-
ing to undeveloped Arizona land. Although the form of the
transactions which led to the purchase of the instruments by
Minnesota residents varied, the following example was typical.
An Arizona land developer sold unimproved real estate to an
individual, receiving in return either a contract for deed or a
note secured by a mortgage on the land. The contract for deed
or note was then endorsed in blank and given to defendant for
resale in Minnesota at a discount from face value sufficient for
the Minnesota resident to receive an annual yield of 10 to 12
percent assuming that the purchaser of the land made his pay-
ments as promised. Most of the instruments included a recourse
agreement whereby the investor had the right to require the
developer to substitute a new note and mortgage or contract
for deed if the purchaser of the land defaulted on his payments.
Defendant consistently advised the Minnesota investors to look
to the developer or to itself for payment if the purchaser de-
faulted and not to pursue any foreclosure remedies that the in-
vestor might have under the instruments. The defendant made
no effort to investigate the title or value of the land underlying
the instruments and no information as to the credit ratings of
the purchasers of the land was made available to the Minnesota
investors. The defendant contacted potential investors by plac-
ing advertisements in newspapers which asked individuals to
place their savings with the defendant in order to earn 10 to
12 percent interest on insured first mortgages. Upon receipt of
an inquiry from a potential investor, the defendant mailed the
1974]
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investor literature which described the instruments as "title in-
sured real estate mortgages and contracts" and stated that "[a] 11
mortgages [are] subject to recourse from the developer for your
additional security."'
Pursuant to the Minnesota Securities Act,2 the Minnesota
Attorney General brought an action seeking to enjoin the sale
of the instruments as unregistered securities. Although the de-
fendant acknowledged that the instruments were "securities"
within the meaning of the Minnesota Securities Act, it argued
that the instruments were "notes" and not "investment con-
tracts". As notes, they came within the "single purchaser-single
sale" exemption of MINNESOTA STATUTES § 80.06 (3).3 The trial
court granted the injunction. On appeal, the supreme court af-
firmed, holding that the instruments were investment contracts
within the meaning of the Minnesota Securities Act and as such,
their sale was properly enjoined as the sale of unregistered se-
curities. State v. Investors Security Corp., 209 N.W.2d 405
(Minn. 1973).
Although MINNESOTA STATUTES § 80.01(4) includes both
"notes" and "investment contracts" in its definition of a secu-
rity,4 the sales of notes under certain conditions are exempted
from the registration requirements of the Minnesota Securities
Act.5 Since the exemption never applies to investment con-
tracts, the litigation in the instant case involved the question
1. 209 N.W.2d at 408.
2. The case arose under the old Minnesota Securities Act, MINN.
STAT. § 80 et seq. (1971). In 1973, however, that chapter was repealed
and replaced by a new chapter, 80A. See Minn. Laws 1973, ch. 451. The
sections on which this case turned, while rewritten, still involve the
problems discussed in Investors Security. Thus for the sake of clarity
the old statute will be cited in the text but accompanied by a cross-
reference to the new statute in a footnote.
3. MINN. STAT. § 80.06(3) (1971) was repealed in 1973 and re-
placed by MINN. STAT. § 80A.15 (2) (d) (Supp. 1973).
4. MINN. STAT. § 80.01 (4) (1971) defines a security as:
any stock, share, bond, note, debenture, commercial paper evi-
dence of indebtedness, investment contract, interest in or under
a profit-sharing or participating agreement or scheme, or bene-
ficial interest in a trust or pretended trust. Any interest in any
security shall be deemed a security. "Security" does not in-
clude any insurance or endowment policy, annuity contract or
contract on a variable basis issued by a life insurance company
holding a current certificate of authority authorizing it to do
an insurance business in this state.
This statute was repealed in 1973 and replaced by MINN. STAT. § 80A.14
(n) (Supp. 1973), which also includes the term "investment contract."
5. See MINN. STAT. § 80.06(3) (1971), repealed and replaced by
MINN. STAT. § 80A.15 (2) (d) (Supp. 1973).
(Vol. 58:773
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
of whether, despite their commercial status as "notes", the in-
struments sold by the defendant were investment contracts
within the meaning of the Act.
Although all three statutes include "investment contracts"
within their respective definitions of a security, neither the Min-
nesota Securities Act nor the federal Securities Act of 19330 and
Securities and Exchange Act of 19347 define the term. How-
ever, in State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co.,8 the Minnesota
Supreme Court defined "investment" in the context of the term
investment contract in the following manner:
[t]he placing of capital or laying out of money in a way in-
tended to secure income or profit for its employment is an in-
vestment as that word is commonly used and understood. If
defendant issued and sold its certificates to purchasers who paid
their money, justly expecting to receive an income or profit
from the investment, it would seem that the [term investment
contract and therefore the Securities Act] should apply.9
The extremely broad definition of investment contract advanced
by the Minnesota court in Gopher Tire was adopted by the
United States Supreme Court which, in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leas-
ing Corp.,10 held that whether an instrument is an investment
contract depends upon "the terms of the offer, the plan of dis-
tribution, and the economic inducements held out to the pros-
pect[ive investor]. ' ' The reason for this broad interpretation
of investment contract is that the term has historically been
used as a "catch-all" to include unusual instruments whose pur-
chasers require the protection of the state and federal securities
acts.12
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).
8. 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920).
9. Id. at 56, 177 N.W. at 938.
10. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
11. Id. at 353. In Joiner, the Court held that a scheme in which
a speculator sold assignments of oil leases by advertising that their
value was about to increase because of exploratory drilling in the area
involved the sale of investment contracts.
12. For example, in State v. Lorentz, 221 Minn. 366, 22 N.W.2d 313
(1946), a case very similar to the instant case, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the sale of contracts for deed and deeds to burial lots
in a new cemetery constituted the sale of investment contracts because
the defendant had told prospective purchasers that a good profit could
be made on the resale of the plots. The court noted that since the
plots were sold for speculative purposes and not primarily for burial
use, and since the value of the plots depended on the future develop-
ment of the cemetery rather than on its current assets, the sale of the
plots constituted the sale of investment contracts within the meaning
of the Minnesota Securities Act. See also note 18 infra.
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In SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,13 the United States Supreme
Court set out the three elements that an instrument must have
in order to be classified as an investment contract. There must
be the investment of money, a common enterprise, and the ex-
pectation of profits or return on the investment which are to
be generated solely by the efforts of the promoter or third par-
ties. 14  Although the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized in
the instant case that the Howey test was useful in identifying
most investment contracts, it expressly refused to adopt it as
the exclusive test under the Minnesota statute. The court noted
that it had traditionally "viewed securities acts as remedial or
'paternalistic"' and that it had always interpreted them liberally
in light of the abuses which had led to their enactment. 15 Thus,
although the court was convinced that the instruments sold by
the defendant fell within both the Howey definition and the
Gopher Tire definition of an investment contract, it saw no rea-
son to set out a "fixed, comprehensive definition" of the term.10
Rather, the court implied that its role was to simply decide
whether "[the trading in [the instruments] had all the evils
inherent in the securities transactions which it was the aim of
the Securities Act to end."'
The court's refusal to attempt to set out a fixed definition
of an investment contract is clearly proper in the light of the
traditional use of the term as a "catch-all" designed to include
new and unusual instruments under the coverage of the Secu-
rities Act.'8 However, the instant case does little to suggest how
13. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). In Howey, the developer of a Florida cit-
rus grove offered to sell parcels of his land to individual investors. The
parcels sold were much too small to support an independent citrus oper-
ation; however, the developer also offered a management service which
for a percentage of the annual crop would manage the individual own-
er's trees and remit the proceeds from each year's harvest. The Su-
preme Court determined that the developer was actually selling a
chance to invest in his own ability as the manager of a large scale
citrus operation.
14. 328 U.S. at 298-99.
15. 209 N.W.2d at 410.
16. Id.
17. Id., quoting S.E.C. v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,
349 (1943).
18. Although the court suggested that the definition of investment
contract used in Howey was less flexible than that used in Gopher Tire,
it is possible that it gave Howey too limited a reading. The Howey
court believed that its definition of investment contract permitted "the
fulfillment of the statutory purpose of compelling full and fair disclo-
sure relative to the issuance of 'the many types of instruments that in
our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.'
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the definition of investment contract under the Minnesota Act
may differ from the definition used by federal courts when in-
terpreting the Securities Act of 1933. As the court pointed out,
there is little doubt that the instruments sold by the defendants
were investment contracts even under the Howey definition. The
court noted that the defendant's "customers" clearly invested
their money in a common enterprise with the expectation of re-
ceiving profits derived solely through the efforts of the defend-
ant and the developers. It thought that it was obvious from
the lack of disclosure concerning the value of the land and the
credit rating of the land purchaser that the instrument was un-
like a note. It was "the developer's recourse and servicing com-
mitments, along with [the defendant's] 'guaranteed' 10 to 12
percent interest rate and implied investigating service which
[gave] the investments 'most of their value and all of their
lure.' "19
G. TEACHERS
Teachers' Rights to Continuing Contract Status.-Plaintiff,
a married woman, was a qualified elementary school teacher cer-
tified to teach in the state of Minnesota. Pursuant to defendant
school board's policy of not hiring married women for fuli time
teaching positions, she taught for defendant as a substitute
teacher from December, 1965, through June, 1969. Her contracts
for the 1966-67 and 1967-68 school years were identical to those
of full time teachers except that the word "SUBSTITUTE" was
typed at the top of the contract and a clause was inserted which
provided that the contract expired at the end of the school year.
In 1968-69, an additional provision was added to her contract
which stipulated that the contract could be terminated before
the eild of the school year if a suitable permanent staff member
could be found. When the plaintiff was not rehired for the 1969-
70 school year, she sought a declaratory judgment that the de-
fendant was required by law to grant her continuing contract
(tenured) status. Alternatively, she alleged that the school
board's policy of not hiring married women as full time teachers
was a denial of her right to equal protection as guaranteed by
H. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11. It embodies a flexible rather
than a static principle, one that is capable of adaption to meet the count-
less and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the
money of others on the promise of profits." 328 U.S. at 299.
19. 209 N.W.2d at 411.
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the fourteenth amendment. The trial court dismissed her action
with prejudice. On appeal, the supreme court reversed, holding
that the plaintiff was entitled to a continuing contract because
defendant's requirement that she sign a limited contract in the
year that her right to tenured status accrued was contrary to
law. Perry v. Independent School District No. 696, 210 N.W.2d
283 (Minn. 1973).
Minnesota's teacher tenure statute' provides that a teacher
who has completed the statutory two year probation period'
"shall have a continuing contract" which remains in effect un-
less terminated for cause. 3 The court has historically inter-
preted the statute as being designed to "protect the educational
interests of the state by preventing arbitrary demotions and
discharges of teachers which are unrelated to their ability. '4 The
instant case demonstrates that the court will hold any attempt
by a school board to circumvent the tenure statute to be inef-
fective.
Examination of the court's reasoning in the instant case il-
lustrates the manner in which it will look behind the language
of a contract to protect a teacher's right to tenure. First, the
court focused on MINNESOTA STATUTES § 123.35 (5) which pro-
vides that the classification "substitute" is applicable only to
teachers hired to replace permanent faculty members for a pe-
riod of less than one full school year. Since plaintiff taught
for three consecutive school years, she did not fit the statutory
definition of a substitute, and therefore, was entitled to the
rights of a full time teacher. Second, the court found that the
clause in plaintiff's contract which provided that the contract
would terminate at the end of the 1967-68 school year was in-
effective because plaintiff was in fact hired for the next year.
Thus, since plaintiff was not terminated at the end of her two
year probationary period, she was entitled to continuing contract
status. Finally, the court found that plaintiff had not waived
her right to tenure by signing a limited contract at the begin-
ning of her third year. In noting that the school board had
1. Alum. STAT. § 125.12(4) (1971).
2. The probationary period is set out in M Iz. STAT. § 125.12(3)
(1971).
3. The grounds constituting cause are delineated in MinN. STAT.
§ 125.12(6) (1971).
4. 210 N.W.2d at 287. See also McSherry v. St. Paul, 202 Minn.
102, 277 N.W. 541 (1938); Oxman v. Independent School Dist. of
Duluth, 178 Minn. 422, 227 N.W. 351 (1929).
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utilized the limited contract solely as a device to circumvent the
Minnesota tenure statute, the court held that
[a] contract designed to waive a teacher's substantive right to
a continuing contract frustrates the purpose of [MINxEOTA
STATuTEs § 125.121 and is therefore against public policy.5
Although the court in the instant case has forcefully as-
serted its intention to protect teachers' rights to continuing con-
tract status, its decision did not discuss the propriety of a school
board's refusal to hire married women for permanent teaching
positions.6 A school board may still avoid giving tenure to mar-
ried women by terminating their contracts before the end of
their two year probationary periods. Because of this danger,
it might have been preferable for the court to have reached
plaintiff's constitutional argument that the school board's policy
denied married women equal protection of the laws.7
H. UNEmiPLOyMnT CO1TPENSATION
1. Disqualification of Striking Employees.-On April 1,
1970, the operations of 26 highway construction contractors were
shut down by a strike involving several classifications of con-
struction workers. The strike continued until an agreement
with the unions was reached on May 28. Over the objections
of the contractors, the Department of Manpower Services ap-
proved payment of unemployment compensation benefits to
workers who were on lay-off status when the strike began but
who in the absence of the strike would have been recalled to
work before May 28.1 The Department also allowed benefits
5. 210 N.W. at 290.
6. A favorable holding on the constitutional ground would have
required the court to overrule an early case which held that a school
board could discharge a woman teacher upon her marriage. Backie v.
Cromwell Consolidated School District No. 13, 186 Minn. 38, 242 N.W.
389 (1932). However, the plaintiff in Backie did not raise the equal
protection issue.
7. The school board's hiring policy may also violate the Minnesola
Human Rights Act, M=N. STAT. § 363 et seq. (1971), as amended (Supp.
1973). In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), the
United States Supreme Court held that an employer policy which barred
the employment of married women with young children violated title 7
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970), because
the same policy did not prevent the hiring of married men with young
children. Although title 7 is inapplicable to municipal employees, the
Minnesota Human Rights Act is arguably capable of the same construc-
tion given title 7 in Phillips.
1. Highway contractors in Minnesota normally lay off their entire
work forces in the early winter and then rehire the same employees
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to workers who had been recalled before the strike began but
who had not actually returned to work at the time operations
were shut down. Reviewing on certiorari, the supreme court
affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that in order for
a worker on lay-off status to be denied unemployment benefits
as a striking employee, his employer must officially recall him
to work. However, once an employee is recalled to work, he
will be considered to be on strike if he does not actually report.
Tripp v. Alley Construction Co., 210 N.W.2d 668 (Minn. 1973).
Before it was amended in 1973, Minnesota law provided
that:
An individual shall be disqualified for [unemployment] ben-
efits:
(5) . .. If such individual has left or partially or totally lost
his employment with an employer because of a strike or other
labor dispute.2
Although an employee who is on lay-off status when a strike
begins cannot leave his employment because of the strike, the
strike causes him to lose his employment if he would have been
recalled to work but for the existence of the strike. Thus, the
result reached by the court in the instant case was the only
rational result under the statute. Even though the formal recall
of laid-off employees may be a futile gesture while a strike is
in progress, it is necessary in order to determine when the em-
ployees would have returned to work if the strike had not taken
place. The contrary result, which was urged by the contractors,
is unfair to the employees because it would have terminated un-
employment compensation benefits to all workers that had been
previously laid-off on the assumption that they were participat-
ing in the strike.3
The 1973 amendments to section 268.09 make the require-
ment of a formal recall to work even more compelling. As
amended, the statute limits the period of disqualification of em-
ployees who lose their employment because of a strike in which
as soon as weather conditions in the spring permit work on the roads
to resume.
2. MINN. STAT. § 268.09 (1971).
3. The result reached in the instant case would appear to encour-
age employers to recall all laid-off employees on the first day of a
strike, whether or not there is work available for the employees if they
choose to report. Under the 1973 amendments to section 268.09, how-
ever, an employee who is recalled and reports but who is unable to
work because there is no work available is not considered to be a par-
ticipant in the strike. Therefore, the period of his disqualification from
benefits is limited to one week. See text accompanying notes 4-5 infra.
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they do not participate to one week.4 The statute defines "par-
ticipation" as the failure or refusal of the employee to "accept
and perform" his "customary" work.5 Thus, a formal recall of
laid-off employees is necessary in order to determine whether
they will accept work when it is offered to them. In the ab-
sence of a formal recall, it is impossible to tell whether the laid-
off employees are participating in the strike.
2. Definition of Employee Misconduct.-In Tilseth v. Mid-
west Lumber Co., 295 Minn. 372, 204 N.W.2d 644 (1973), the su-
preme court defined the term "misconduct" which appears in
MIuNEOTA STATUTES § 268.09 (1).
Section 268.09(1) provides that an individual shall be tem-
porarily disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance
benefits if he was discharged from his last job for "misconduct
* . . connected with his work or for misconduct which interferes
with and adversely effects his employment .... .,, In the in-
stant case, the court expressly adopted the definition of miscon-
duct applied by the Wisconsin Supreme Court under a similar
statute and widely accepted throughout the United States. As
defined by the Wisconsin court in Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck,7
misconduct means
conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an em-
ployer's interests as is found in deliberate violations or disre-
gard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right
to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of
such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability,
wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and
substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the em-
ployee's duties and obligations to his employer.8
The Wisconsin court noted, however, that "mere inefficiency, un-
satisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result
of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence
in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment" do not
constitute misconduct.9
Applying this definition to the facts before it, the Minnesota
Supreme Court agreed with the Department of Manpower Serv-
ices that the discharge of a truck driver because the odor of
alcohol was frequently on his breath was a discharge for mis-
4. Mum. STAT. § 268.09 (Supp. 1973).
5. Id.
6. The employee may lose his benefits for a period of '"not less
than five nor more than eight weeks." Mnqx. STAT. § 268.09 (1) (1971).
7. 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941).




conduct even though the driver never displayed any overt signs
of intoxication. The court noted that although there was Wis-
consin case law which suggested that it was not misconduct for
a service station attendant to consume intoxicating beverages
while at work,10 a different standard was applicable to a truck
driver who used the public streets."
L UsURY
Use of the 365/360 Method of Interest Computation.-Plain-
tiff brought separate actions against the Northwestern National
Bank of St. Paul and the First National Bank of St. Paul al-
leging that their use of the 365/360 method of interest computa-
tion' violated the Minnesota usury statute.2  Both actions were
dismissed by the trial courts which found that MINNESOTA STAT-
UTES § 334.03 authorized the use of an artificial year of 360 days
in the computation of interest on bank loans. Consolidating the
two cases on appeal, the supreme court affirmed, holding that
the use of the 365/360 method of interest computation was proper
under Minnesota law. Holisak v. Northwestern National Bank
of St. Paul, 210 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1973).
MINNESOTA STATUTES § 334.01 provides that the amount of
interest charged for any legal indebtedness shall not exceed
$8 on $100 for one year. If section 334.01 were the sole usury
provision in Minnesota, the 365/360 method of interest computa-
tion, which assumes that a year has only 360 days divided into
12 equal months of 30 days each, would clearly be illegal. How-
ever, MINNESOTA STATUTES § 334.03, which has antecedents back
to 1877 and which was adopted solely to authorize use of the
365/360 method, modifies section 334.01 by providing:
10. See, e.g., Transport Oil, Inc. v. Cummings, 54 Wis. 2d 256, 195
N.W.2d 649 (1972).
11. 295 Minn. at 375, 204 N.W.2d at 646.
1. Under the 365/360 method, the following formula is used to
calculate the amount of interest due in one month:
Annual rate (8%)
Interest = x Unpaid x Exact no. of days of
due 360 balance the month that the
loan was outstanding
210 N.W.2d 413, 414 (Minn. 1973).
2. MINN. STAT. § 334 (1971).
3. The court noted that if section 334.01 was the sole controlling
statute, the fact that use of the 365/360 method was a universal custom
in Minnesota and in other states would not affect its legality.
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[i]nterest at the rate of one-twelfth of eight percent for every
30 days shall not be construed to exceed eight percent per an-
num ....
Thus, section 334.01 as modified by section 334.03 clearly author-
izes banks to use the 365/360 method of interest computation.
J. WoRKM 's COMENSATION
1. Intervention in Compensation Proceedings by a Third
Party After a Final Award.-In 1960 an employee entered into
a settlement with his employer concerning a work related in-
jury which he had suffered in 1958. Ten years later he filed
a second claim alleging that the injury had caused him addi-
tional temporary total disability. In a stipulated settlement the
employer and its insurer agreed to make certain payments to
the employee but denied that he had suffered additional tempo-
rary total disability and denied that the alleged additional dis-
ability had been caused by the 1958 injury. The Workmen's
Compensation Commission approved the settlement on March 22,
1971, and entered an award in favor of the employee on March
24. On March 29, 1971, the employee's health and accident insur-
ers, who had just learned of the award, filed applications to in-
tervene before the commission. They alleged that they had
made medical payments to the employee under policies which
excluded from coverage illnesses covered by workmen's compen-
sation. The applications to intervene were denied by the com-
mission. Reviewing on certiorari, the Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that although the insurers could have inter-
vened before the award had been filed, intervention after the
award was properly denied because prejudice to the employee's
interests might otherwise result. Tatro v. Hartnann's Store, 204
N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 1973).
mN OTA STATUTES § 176.361 provides:
Where a person has an interest in any matter before the com-
mission... of such a character that he may either gain or lose
by an order or decision, he may intervene in the proceeding
by filing an application in writing stating the facts which show
such interest.
In Lemmer v. Batzli Electric Co.1 the supreme court con-
cluded that in the absence of prejudice to the employee, section
176.361 authorized intervention by an accident and health in-
surer after the commission had entered an award in the em-
ployee's favor. The court noted that
1. 267 Minn. 8, 125 N.W.2d 434 (1963).
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[t]he insurer against accident and sickness not arising out of
employment will . . . have less reason to withhold payment of
benefits until a determination [is made] by the commission
when he knows that he will be entitled to reimbursement from
the compensation insurer if he has made payments under a mis-
take of fact.2
In the instant case the court severely limited the effect of
Lemmer. Although it did not confront the issue directly, the
court implied that intervention under section 176.361 is not a
matter of right after an award has been filed, but rather a privi-
lege to be granted or denied at the discretion of the commis-
sion. Since the purpose of the Minnesota system of workmen's
compensation is to protect employees from the loss of earnings
caused by work related injuries, the court held that interven-
tion should be denied if the employee's interests could be prej-
udiced by a reexamination of the propriety of his compensation
award.3
Although the court was probably correct in its assumption
that section 176.361 was not intended to allow an interested
party to force reconsideration of an award after it had been filed,
the result in the instant case is not entirely satisfactory. As
the court noted, it is unfair to place an accident and health in-
surer in a position where it forfeits rights provided by the Work-
men's Compensation Act simply because it is unaware of a pro-
ceeding pending before the commission. Moreover, the result
contravenes a basic principle of workmen's compensation in that
it shifts the burden of work related injuries from the employee's
industry to the subscribers of private health programs.4 Finally,
the decision in the instant case undermines the effect that the
court sought to achieve in Lemmer. An accident and health
insurer will now be more likely to withhold payment of bene-
fits until after a determination has been made as to whether
an employee is eligible for workmen's compensation because it
knows that it may not be able to recover its payments if it has
made a mistake as to the employee's eligibility.
However, despite these problems, the court's decision was
probably correct. No evidence had been introduced which sug-
2. Id. at 19, 125 N.W.2d at 441.
3. Since the employer and its insurer, although agreeing to make
certain payments, denied that the employee had suffered an earnings
loss caused by a work related injury, a rehearing could have shown
that the employee was not in fact eligible for workmen's compensation
benefits. The employer and its insurer could have then maintained an
action to recover the payments.
4. 204 N.W.2d at 128.
[Vol. 58:773
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
gested that the employee received a double recovery for his hos-
pital and medical expenses. 5 In the absence of double recovery,
it would be anamolous for the Workmen's Compensation Act,
which was designed to shift the burden of earnings lost due to
work related injuries from the employee to his industry, to be
interpreted so as to then shift the burden back to the employee
in order to avoid unfairness to a private insurer. As the court
pointed out, the only real solution is for the commission to es-
tablish procedures to insure that interested third parties are
given adequate notice of pending proceedings.8
2. Simultaneous Payment of Permanent Partial and Per-
manent Total Disability Benefits.-Plaintiff underwent surgery
for a work related knee injury in August of 1968. He received
temporary total disability benefits until May 1970 and thereafter
received permanent partial disability payments for 33 weeks. In
April of 1971 plaintiff filed a claim with the Workmen's Com-
pensation Commission for permanent partial and permanent to-
tal disability benefits in excess of the amounts previously paid.
The compensation judge denied plaintiff's claim for permanent
total disability benefits, but on appeal the commission found
that plaintiff had been permanently and totally disabled since
his operation. Over plaintiff's objections, however, it credited
the permanent partial disability payments made by the employer
against its liability for plaintiff's permanent total disability. Af-
ter granting certiorari, the supreme court affirmed, holding that
simultaneous payment of permanent partial and permanent total
disability resulted in an impermissible double payment to the
injured employee. Boquist v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 209 N.W.2d
783 (Minn. 1973).
The theory advanced by the plaintiff was that permanent
partial disability benefits were general damages paid as compen-
sation for the employee's injury and not as compensation for
his lost wages. 7 Although this argument is superficially appeal-
ing in that permanent partial disability benefits are awarded
as a lump sum payment regardless of whether the injured em-
ployee suffers an earning loss, it was quite properly rejected
by the court. The court pointed out that because it would be
unfair to measure the long term loss of earnings resulting from
the employee's disability by his short term work experience, it
5. The employer and its insurer had agreed to pay medical ex-
pen.nes not covered by the employee's private health plan. Id. at 127.
6. Id. at 128.
7. 209 1S.W.2d at 784.
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was necessary to presume loss of earnings from the fact of the
employee's permanent partial disability itself. The only alter-
native would be to
hold every compensation case involving any degree of perma-
nent impairment open for a lifetime, making specific calcula-
tions of the effect of the impairment on the claimant's earnings
each time claimant contends that his earnings are being ad-
versely affected. To avoid this protracted administrative task,
the apparently cold-blooded system of putting average-price
tags on arms, legs, eyes, and fingers has been devised.8
As the court pointed out, "[i]t is obvious that an employee
can be no more than totally disabled." Once it is understood
that permanent partial and permanent total disability benefits
are both intended to compensate an injured employee for lost
earnings, it becomes clear that the court's holding is the only
rational result. Simultaneous payment of the benefits would
result in an unjust double recovery by the injured employee.
3. Simultaneous Payment of Permanent Partial and Tem-
porary Total Disability Benefits.-Testimony as to plaintiff's
work related injuries resulted in a finding by the compensation
judge that she had suffered a 10 percent permanent partial dis-
ability to her left wrist and hand and a 20 percent permanent
partial disability to her back. The compensation judge also
found that on the date of the hearing, plaintiff was temporarily
totally disabled. He ordered the employer to begin paying tem-
porary total disability benefits immediately, but reserved the
question of permanent partial disability benefits until such time
as plaintiff could return to work. The Workmen's Compensation
Commission concurred as to the judge's findings of disability
but ordered the immediate lump sum payment of the permanent
partial disability benefits. After granting certiorari, the su-
preme court held that permanent partial disability benefits could
be paid before the cessation of temporary total disability pay-
ments only if there was good cause for the earlier payment. The
court remanded the case to the commission for a determination
as to whether plaintiff had shown good cause. Pramschiefer
v. Windom Hospital, 211 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1973).
Unlike Boquist v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,10 the instant case
did not present the possibility of a double recovery by the plain-
tiff. Temporary total disability payments are intended to re-
8. Id. at 785, quoting 2 A. LARSON, WORKIMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAw § 58.10 (1970).
9. 209 N.W.2d at 784.
10. 209 N.W.2d 783 (1973). See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
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imburse the injured employee only for earnings lost while he
recovers from a temporarily disabling work related injury. Per-
manent partial disability benefits are intended to compensate
the employee for the earnings he will lose after his recovery
period because, although he is able to return to work, his re-
covery will never be complete. Since each benefit is to serve
as compensation for earnings lost at a different time, simultane-
ous payment of permanent partial and temporary total disability
benefits does not result in unjust enrichment of the injured em-
p'loyee. Thus, the only question before the court in the instant
case was whether the Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Stat-
ute 1 authorized the commission to order simultaneous pay-
ment.'2
MiNNEOTA STATUTFS § 176.021 (3), stipulates that
payments for permanent partial disability shall be made ...
upon cessation of payments for the healing period, or as soon
thereafter as such disability can be ascertained, unless, upon
good cause shown, it is otherwise ordered by the division.
The court concluded that the quoted language authorized the
commission to order the payment of permanent partial disability
benefits while temporary total disability benefits were still being
paid. However, a plausible argument can be made that the next
sentence of the statute, which was not quoted by the court, sug-
gests that the quoted provision was intended only to permit de-
lay in the payment of benefits and not to authorize early pay-
ment:
If doubt exists at such time as to the eventual permanent par-
tial disability, payment shall be then made for the minimum
permanent partial disability ascertainable in lump sum, and
further lump sum payment shall be made upon any later ascer-
tainment of greater permanent partial disability.13
The court's decision to avoid a narrow and limiting inter-
pretation of section 176.021(3) is, however, fully in keeping with
the remedial and humane origins of the Minnesota system of
workmen's compensation. Although the early payment of per-
manent partial disability benefits would be credited against the
employer's liability if it were later determined that the employee
11. Mn-N. STAT. § 176 et seq. (1971).
12. In Mechling v. Jaspar Stone Co., 293 Minn. 309, 198 N.W.2d
561 (1972), the court held that a convalescent employee could recover
temporary total. disability benefits for the full period allowed by statute
even though it had been determined that he was permanently partially
disabled. Thus, this question was not at issue in the instant case.
13. Mu. STAT. § 176.021(3) (1971).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
was permanently and totally disabled,14 the availability of the
early payment could be of great importance to the injured em-
ployee. Although he receives periodic payments throughout his
recovery period, the lump sum permanent partial disability pay-
ment may allow him to undergo the therapy necessary for him
to overcome his permanent, albeit partial, disability.
4. Denial of Benefits to a Suicide's Dependents.-On Sep-
tember 1, 1967, MINNESOTA STATUTES § 176.021 (1) was amended",
to render suicides noncompensable under the Minnesota Work-
men's Compensation Act.16 The compensation judge found an
employee's suicide on May 3, 1968, to be a direct and proximate
result of a personal injury sustained by the employee in the
course of his employment on September 12, 1966. The judge
held, however, that the 1967 amendment precluded the award
of death benefits to the deceased employee's dependents. The
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute as
amended was applicable to determine dependents' rights and
that the amendment was neither a deprivation of due process
nor a denial of equal protection under the law. Schwartz v.
Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 205 N.W.2d 318 (1973).
The court's holding that the law in effect at the time of
an employee's death governs the rights of dependents is consis-
tent with its previous interpretation in this area of the Work-
men's Compensation Act.17 Its position, however, is inconsistent
with the prevailing rule in most jurisdictions that an employee's
right to compensation survives his death for the benefit of his
dependents.' This rule is premised upon the theory that a de-
pendent's right of action is derived from the contractual rela-
tionship existing between employee and employer at the time
of the injury and is determined by any statute then in force.
In contrast, the Minnesota Supreme Court construes the Work-
men's Compensation Act as creating an independent right of ac-
tion in the dependents; this distinct right is triggered by the
14. The court warned that the danger of the employee missing per-
manent total disability payments because he had been prematurely al-
lowed permanent partial disability benefits should be taken into consid-
eration before the early payment was authorized. 211 N.W.2d at 369.
See also Boquist v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 209 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. 1973).
15. Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1967, ch. 40, §§ 3, 5. The phrase "suici-
cides are not compensable" was subsequently deleted. Minn. Laws 1973,
ch. 623.
16. MfNN. STAT. § 176.011-.669 (1971).
17. State ex rel. Carlson v. District Court, 131 Minn. 96, 154 N.W.
661 (1915).
18. See Annot., 82 A.L.R. 1244 (1932).
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employee's death and is subject to the statutes in force at that
time.
The court followed its minority rule despite the relator-
widow's claim that the 1967 amendment violated due process by
destroying existing rights. As a dependent's right to recover
is not fixed until the date of the employee's death, the court
reasoned, there had arisen no such right at the time the amend-
ment was enacted. Notwithstanding this reasoning, one could
argue that by the elimination of compensation for suicide the
legislature had effectively deprived the affected dependent of
the right to sue for the wrongful death of the employee. Mr.
Justice Kelly concluded in his dissent that such deprivation
could not be justified by any particular legislative purpose and
was therefore a denial of due process. 19 Quite reasonably, Jus-
tice Kelly's approach to due process was not followed by the
other justices. The statute in question would seem to be the
kind of economic regulation which both the federal and the Min-
nesota courts have left to legislative discretion. Presumably,
such discretion includes the destruction of a cause of action as
long as the legislature has a rational basis for its action.
On the other hand, the majority's treatment of the relator-
widow's equal protection challenge to the amendment is want-
ing. The majority opinion cites traditional equal protection
principles, emphasizes the presumption favoring constitutional-
ity -and concludes that the statute is not a denial of equal protec-
tion. But the opinion is devoid of substantive analysis. The
court does not apply its enunciated standards to the legislative
classification. It does not specifically state what legitimate state
purpose is being served by the statute nor does it examine the
reasonableness of the classification in light of the legislative pur-
pose.
Perhaps more disappointing than its lack of analysis, how-
ever, is the court's initial formulation of the equal protection
test. Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court sug-
gest the evolution of a new standard in evaluating legislation
on equal protection grounds. -° Without explicit articulation, the
United States Supreme Court has adjusted the severity of its
review according to the importance of the interest at stake.
19. 205 Minn. at 371, 205 N.W.2d at 327.
20. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rsv. 1 (1972).
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While the Talmo majority acknowledged this movement toward
a more flexible scrutiny of legislative classifications, it neverthe-
less failed to use such scrutiny in reaching its decision.
Arguably, the 1967 amendment could withstand a rational
basis scrutiny under the equal protection test and its traditional
presumption of constitutionality. However, the purpose of the
Workmen's Compensation Act is to provide compensation to the
surviving spouse and children of a worker who dies as a result
of a work-related injury. Given that an employee's death arose
in the course of employment, it is difficult to see how the Act's
purpose is served by denying benefits to a class of dependents
merely because of the particular manner in which the death oc-
curred. Evidently the Minnesota Legislature has reached a simi-
lar conclusion since during the 1973 session it reinstated suicide
to compensable status under the Minnesota Workmen's Compen-
sation Act.21
5. Other Cases.-In Patnode v. Richard Osier Construction
Co., 206 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. 1973), the supreme court held that
the Workmen's Compensation Commission did not have jurisdic-
tion to order an employee to repay temporary disability benefits
for which it was later determined that he was not eligible. The
court noted, however, that the parties still retained their reme-
dies at law.
In Koski v. State Treasurer, Custodian of the Special Com-
pensation Fund, - N.W.2d - (Minn. 1973), the supreme court
held that an employer was entitled to reimbursement for the total
amount in excess of the statutory deduction that it paid to an
injured employee whose disability was substantially caused by
a pre-existing physical impairment.
The Minnesota second and successive injury statute pro-
vides:
If an employee incurs personal injury and suffers disability
that is substantially greater, because of a pre-existing physical
impairment, than what would have resulted from the personal
injury alone, the employer shall pay all [compensation benefits],
but he shall be reimbursed from the special compensation fund
for all compensation paid in excess [of the statutory deduc-
tion].22
In the instant case, the custodian of the special compensation
fund argued that an employer should be reimbursed under the
21. Minn. Laws 1973, ch. 623, amending MINN. STAT. § 176.021 (1)
(1971) (codified atMINN. STAT. § 176.021 (1) (Supp. 1973)).
22. MiNN. STAT. § 176.131(1) (1969). Although the 1969 statute
was amended in 1971, the amendments do not affect the result reached
by the court. IVMnM. STAT. § 176.131(1) (1971).
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statute only for a percentage of the amount of compensation
it paid to the employee equal to the percentage of the employee's
disability that was caused by the pre-existing physical impair-
ment.23 In rejecting this interpretation of the statute, the court
noted that the purpose of the statute was to induce employers
to hire the partially disabled. It suggested that this purpose
could be better served by totally reimbursing an employer for
the benefits it paid to an employee whose disability was sub-
stantially worsened by his pre-existing physical condition.24
X. TORTS
1. New Species of Bailment Sounding in Tort.-In Ekholm
v. Wilkins Dodge, Inc., 212 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1973), the Minne-
sota Supreme Court, faced with an unusual fact situation, based
its decision upon a new quasi-tort theory which may confuse
the law of bailments in this state.
Some time after plaintiff had purchased a used car from
defendant for $164 in cash, plaintiff received by mail a copy of
a letter which the state motor vehicle division had sent to de-
fendant stating that it had received a bill of sale showing that
defendant had sold the car to plaintiff but that the division did
not have a bill of sale showing that the prior owner had sold
it to defendant.' Plaintiff immediately called defendant and
spoke with a secretary who promised to look into the matter.
An employee of defendant checked with the motor vehicle divi-
sion and learned that the division had made a mistake but had
found the missing bill of sale. However, defendant did not in-
form plaintiff of the mistake. A month later, plaintiff parked
the automobile on defendant's lot, told the salesman that he
wanted his money back and that even if he did not get a refund,
23. Other jurisdictions have interpreted similar statutes in this
fashion. See, e.g., Zacamelski v. Rosco Mfg. Co., 34 App. Div. 2d 847,
310 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1970).
24. - N.W.2d at -.
1. Under Minnesota law, owners of motor vehicles are required
to register their vehicles with the motor vehicle division. MINN. STAT.
§ 168.09 (1971). Registration in one's name is considered prima facie
but not conclusive evidence of title. Flaugh v. Egan Chevrolet, Inc.,
202 Minn, 615, 279 N.W. 582 (1938).
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he was going to leave the automobile there until he received
his title card. After being told that defendant would neither
refund the purchase price nor permit him to leave the auto-
mobile on the lot, plaintiff put his keys on the desk and left.
Defendant removed the automobile from the lot and parked it
on the street. A few days later, a towing company removed
the automobile because of illegal parking. By the time plaintiff
received the title card, the towing company had disposed of the
automobile. Plaintiff brought an action and obtained judgment
for $152. On defendant's appeal from the denial of its motion
for new trial, the supreme court affirmed, holding:
We are persuaded that these peculiar facts-defendant's
forced possession of the automobile and its knowledge of the
true facts concerning title, and plaintiff's ignorance thereof and
not unreasonable return of the automobile-give rise under
broad principles of bailment to at least a duty on defendant's
part to inform plaintiff concerning the title or, failing that, to
protect against the hazards of illegally parking the automobile
on the street. Having breached its duty arising from what may
be characterized as a border-type bailment claim sounding in
tort, defendant should be responsible for the resulting loss.2
As noted by the majority and stressed by the dissent, the
case could not be nicely decided on a straightforward bailment
theory because at least one of the essential elements of a bail-
ment was missing. Under prior Minnesota law, at least three
elements were necessary to create a bailment relationship: (1)
delivery of the auto without transfer of ownership; (2) implied
or express acceptance; and (3) an express or implied agreement
that the auto would be returned. 3 As pointed out by the dis-
sent,4 the facts do not support an acceptance by the defendant
or an agreement to return the car. Defendant unequivocally
stated that it would not permit plaintiff to leave the automobile
on its lot. In terms of simple tort theory, it could equally be
argued that plaintiff was trespassing upon defendant's lot by
leaving the auto there without defendant's permission5 and that
defendant was entitled to remove the trespassing object from
his land.6 Nor does the exercise of control in removing the auto
from the lot necessarily amount to an acceptance.7 From the
2. 212 N.W.2d at 892-93 (emphasis added).
3. See, e.g., National Fire Ins. Co. v. Commodore Hotel, Inc., 259
Minn. 349, 351, 107 N.W.2d 708, 709 (1961).
4. 212 N.W.2d at 893.
5. See W. PRossER, LAw OF ToRTs § 13, 69-75 (4th ed. 1971).
6. Cf. 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 145 (1954).
7. See Cowen v. Presspich, 117 Misc. 663, 192 N.Y.S. 242 (App.




perspective of the law of bailments, it could thus be argued that
plaintiff had made an egregious attempt to foist a bailment rela-
tionship upon defendant, which should have failed.8
Instead, the court characterized the situation as a "border-
type bailment claim sounding in tort."' ) The court obviously be-
lieved that the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff
but seemed uncertain about the nature and source of the
breached duty. The court mentioned two aspects of the defend-
ant's conduct which it found objectionable;10 defendant failed
to inform the plaintiff that the title question had been resolved
and defendant removed the auto from its lot and parked it on
the street. The court did not extensively analyze this conduct
in terms of any single legal theory but instead arrived at a vague
hybrid conclusion. The defendant's failure to inform hardly
seems to constitute a breach of any duty arising under the law
of bailment; indeed this conduct preceded the creation of the
bailment relationship. However, the court was unwilling to
state explicitly that this conduct breached a duty arising in tort.
Hence, a bailment sounding in tort.
A more satisfactory analysis might have proceeded from the
realization that the case essentially involved a contract for the
sale of a used car and a subsequent insecurity which arose con-
cerning the validity of the vendor's title. Article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code" is a comprehensive attempt to protect
and foster sales contracts and encourage the reasonable negotia-
tion of differences that may arise during the course of perform-
ance of the contract. In the context of the law of sales, it may
well be questioned whether plaintiff's conduct was reasonable
under all the circumstances. When plaintiff received the copy
of the letter from the motor vehicle division, he certainly had
reasonable grounds to doubt the validity of his title. However,
plaintiff had already paid the full purchase price and therefore
had to make no immediate decision to discontinue his own
performance under the contract. Moreover, if plaintiff's title
had proved to be defective, he would have been able to claim
that defendant had breached the implied warranty of good title,
revoke his acceptance and recover the purchase price.12 Hence
8. See Weinstein v. Modem Silk Co., 170 N.Y.S. 529 (Sup. Ct.
1918).
9. 212 N.W.2d at 893.
10. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
11. AUNN. STAT. § 336.2-101 et seq. (1971).
12. See MiNN. STAT. §§ 336.2-312, -608, -711 (1971); see generally
P.. NolmsTmOm_ LAw or SALEs § 61 (1970).
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there was no reason for plaintiff to take precipitous action. In
response to his initial attempt to resolve matters with a tele-
phone call, defendant checked with the motor vehicle division
and was told that the record of the sale had been found. At
this point, defendant might not unreasonably have concluded
that plaintiff would soon be receiving his title card and consid-
ered the whole matter settled.
A month later, plaintiff drove his car to defendant's prem-
ises and left it there. In evaluating the reasonableness of this
act, it should be remembered that plaintiff at this point still had
the use of the auto and the protection afforded by the implied
warranty of title and therefore was still under no compulsion
to take immediate action. Plaintiff could himself have addressed
a direct inquiry to the motor vehicle division. Furthermore,
plaintiff's demand for a refund looks very much like an attempt
to revoke the contract, and plaintiff apparently had no proper
grounds for making such a demand.
The Code contains adequate provisions which the buyer and
seller in the present case could have used to protect their inter-
ests and remedies. The plaintiff could have made a written de-
mand for adequate assurance of performance, 18 thus placing an
unequivocal duty upon the defendant to inform plaintiff of the
status of the title, and could have treated a failure by the de-
fendant to provide such adequate assurance as a repudiation of
the contract. 1 4 However, the plaintiff failed to submit a request
in writing as required by the Code. Nevertheless, where the
uncontradicted evidence shows that a non-merchant buyer made
a clear demand for assurance as to the title, the court could
have stretched the Code provision, held the buyer's attempted
revocation effective 5 and thereby grounded its decision in the
law of sales. For his part, the defendant admittedly could have
protected himself by assuring plaintiff that a check with the
motor vehicle division had shown plaintiff's insecurity to be
groundless.
By ignoring the Code, the court missed at least two oppor-
tunities. First, it could have found a commercial law basis for
13. "A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that
the other's expectations of receiving due performance will not be im-
paired." MINN. STAT. § 336.2-609(1) (1971).
14. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-609(4) (1971), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-
609 (4) Comment 3 (1966) (discussing reasonable grounds for insecurity).
15. The seller's improper repudiation by failure to give adequate
assurance entitles the buyer to revoke his acceptance and recover the
purchase price. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-711(1) (1971).
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the defendant's duty to inform. Failing this, it could have eval-
uated plaintiff's conduct more suitably in light of the protection
and alternatives available to him under the Code. Nonetheless,
the court's approach is not totally novel. The court cited a com-
mentator who has forcefully argued that even the involuntary
bailee has a duty to use reasonable care under the circumstances
to return the goods to their true owner even though the bail-
ment has been literally forced upon the bailee against his pro-
testations.' 6 Such a rule is a slight departure from the duty
of the normal bailee who is usually absolutely liable for mis-
delivery regardless of a lack of any negligence on his part."
The duty of the unwilling bailee has been articulated most
clearly by a New York court:
If in making an attempt to return the goods, which was lawful
and proper in itself the defendants used means which were not
reasonable and proper, and as a result thereof the goods were
lost or misdelivered, then the defendants would be liable for
negligence or possibly for conversion, for every man is respon-
sible for his own acts .... 18
In the present case, the defendant's act may be said to be un-
reasonable because it completely failed to make any effort to
return the auto to the known owner and because it removed
the auto to a location where it might be towed.19 Ironically,
if the defendant had kept the auto on his lot, he probably could
have demanded reimbursement for expenses incurred and as-
serted a lien20 in order to collect. If the facts had developed
along these lines, the court would have been forced to rely on
the defendant's duty to inform as the sole grou-nd for its finding
for the plaintiff.
In summary, the court, by ignoring article 2, became en-
tangled in insufficiently articulated hybrid theories to reach the
result it believed to be just. As a result, there is now precedent
in Minnesota for the creation of a bailment relationship which
is manifestly against the bailee's will, at least under certain lim-
ited circumstances.
16. Laidlaw, Principles of Bailment, in W. FRYEE, READINGS ON PR-
soNAL PRoPERTY 165, 181-82 (3rd ed. 1938).
17. See 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 38 (a) (1962).
18. Cowen v. Presspich, 117 Misc. 663, 682, 192 N.Y.S. 242, 252
(App. T.) (Lehman, J., dissenting), rev'd per curiam, 202 App. Div.
796, 194 N.Y.S. 926 (1922).
19. It is not clear from the opinion whether the auto was towed
because it had been parked in one location for too long or because it
was initially parked illegally.
20. MINN. STAT. §§ 514.18-.19 (1971).
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2. Proper Test of Vicarious Liability for Intentional Torts
of Employees.-Plaintiff was the manager of a small grocery
store which did business with defendant. Defendant's salesman,
Lynch, had been covering the territory including plaintiff's store
during the period from March to May, 1969. Defendant had re-
ceived numerous complaints from grocers indicating that Lynch
was overly aggressive and that he took shelf space reserved for
competing cookie companies. On May 1, 1969, a dispute devel-
oped between Lynch and plaintiff over the manner in which
Lynch was placing his cookies on plaintiff's shelves. After
plaintiff refused to fight with Lynch, Lynch assaulted him. In
a tort action for damages, the jury found that defendant was
not vicariously liable in respondeat superior because Lynch had
not been acting within the scope of his employment but found
that defendant was liable in negligence for the hiring and re-
tention of Lynch. The trial court granted defendant's motion
for judgement n.o.v. and plaintiff appealed. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that defendant was liable on the
basis of respondeat superior because the assault by Lynch grew
out of and was related to his duties as defendant's employee
and occurred within work-related limits of time and place. The
court thus overruled the "motivation" test previously applied
in Minnesota to determine vicarious liability of employers for
the intentional torts of their employees and formulated a new
"relatedness" test. Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d
783 (Minn. 1973).
Under the general rule of respondeat superior, an employer
is held vicariously liable for any conduct of his employee which
is within the scope of employment. Prior Minnesota law held
that the employee's conduct was "within the scope of employ-
ment" only where it was shown that the employee's conduct
was motivated at least in part by a desire to further the em-
ployer's business. 21 This "motivation" test required the trier of
fact to determine difficult questions of motive and led to artifi-
cial factual disputes as to whether the employee's motivation
had crossed the line separating business from personal pur-
21. Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Minn. 487, 166 N.W.2d 70 (1969); Boland
v. Morrill, 270 Minn. 86, 132 N.W.2d 711 (1965); Laurie v. Mueller, 248
Minn. 1, 78 N.W.2d 434 (1956); Porter v. Grennan Bakeries, Inc., 219
Minn. 14, 16 N.W.2d 906 (1944); Plotkin v. Northland Transp. Co., 204
Minn. 422, 283 N.W. 758 (1939); Guyer v. Smullen, 160 Minn. 114, 199
N.W. 465 (1924); Sunderland v. Northern Express Co., 133 Minn. 158,
157 N.W. 1085 (1916); Johanson v. Pioneer Fuel Co., 72 Minn. 405, 75




In repudiating the "motivation" rule, the court relied on the
policies which underly the doctrine of respondeat superior. Un-
der the "entrepreneur theory," the employer should consider his
liability for the torts of employees to be a cost of doing business.
Although he is not at all times in control of his employees' con-
duct, he benefits by the general course of employment. Further-
more, as implied by the original verdict of the jury, the employer
has discretion to retain only those employees who he believes
will control their conduct. However, the court characterized
this last factor as a "secondary consideration."23  The primary
consideration was the ability of the modern employer to absorb
the liability as a cost of doing business. By the purchase of
insurance and the adjustment of prices the modem employer
is able to shift and disperse the loss imposed by his liability.
Applying these policies to the formulation of a new "scope of
employment" test for intentional torts, the court held that the
employer should be liable when the source of the attack is re-
lated to the duties of the employee and the assault occurs within
work-related limits of time and place. The major advantage of
this test is that it eliminates attempts to divine the employee's
motivation and instead concentrates upon circumstances which
may be satisfactorily examined by the trier of fact.2 4
The new test may lead to a somewhat wider rule of liability,
but its effect should not be overestimated. For example, the
situation in Porter v. G'rennan Bakeries, Inc.,2 might be decided
in favor of the employer even under the new rule. In that case,
a bakery salesman for the defendant assaulted plaintiff, a rival
salesman, over the identical issue involved in Lange: rack space
in a customer store for their competing products. However, the
employee in Porter was not within his appointed route when
he assaulted the plaintiff. Under the new rule, the court might
well find that the employee was outside of the work-related lim-
22. See, e.g., Porter v. Grennan Bakeries, Inc., 219 Minn. 14, 16
N.W.2d 906 (1944).
23. 211 N.W.2d at 785.
24. It is interesting to note that after rebuking the "motivation"
test, the court in applying its new test to the facts of this case stated:
"In addition, the employee originally was motivated to become argu-
mentative in furtherance of his employer's business." 211 N.W.2d at
786 (emphasis added). Rather than letting the motivation test in by
the back door after having thrown it out the front, the court seems
to imply that it disagrees with the jury's finding that the employee
was outside the scope of employment under the old test.
25. 219 Minn. 14, 16 N.W.2d 906 (1944).
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its of time and place within which the new rule operates. Hence
the new rule eliminates difficult factual inquiries into employee
motivation without unduly widening the scope of employer li-
ability.
3. Duty to Mitigate Damages Through Surgery.-Plainitff
sustained a knee injury in a collision with defendant. The trial
court instructed the jury that the defendant driver was negli-
gent as a matter of law but denied defendant's request for an
instruction concerning plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages by
undergoing surgery. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed, holding that a tort victim has a duty to mitigate dam-
ages by undergoing such surgical operations as would a reason-
ably prudent person in the same circumstances. Couture v. No-
votney, 211 N.W.2d 172 (Minn. 1973).
Defendant had requested the following instruction:
"In determining the amount of damages the [claimant] may
recover for his injuries, you should consider that one who is
injured has a duty to act reasonably in obtaining treatment in
caring for his injury. He is limited to those damages which
he would have suffered if he had acted reasonably in obtaining
treatment and care."26
This instruction was identical to Minnesota Jury Instruction
Guide, Instruction 164, except that defendant did not request
the final sentence which states that "[tihere is no duty to sub-
mit to a major surgical operation."
Between the date of the accident and the date of trial, plain-
tiff had been to four different doctors, three of whom had diag-
nosed the knee injury as an injury to the cartilage and two
of whom had recommended corrective surgery. Prior to the ac-
cident, plaintiff had undergone apparently successful surgery to
remove torn cartilage from his other knee. At the trial, an
orthopedic surgeon, the last of the doctors to examine plaintiff's
injured knee and recommend corrective surgery, testified that
any operation around a major joint is serious and entails poten-
tial complications and even a slight possibility of death. How-
ever, he also testified that the vast majority of patients who
undergo the specifically recommended knee surgery obtain a
successful result without complications and that the cartilage
would not heal by itself. On this record, the court concluded
that as a matter of law the recommended knee operation was
not a "major operation" as that term is used in Instruction
26. 211 N.W.2d at 174.
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164.27 However, the court thought the term "major surgery"
to be too indefinite and proposed an alternative instruction to
be used on remand:
If you find that the injuries suffered by Couture can be
alleviated by a surgical operation and that a reasonably prudent
person would undergo such an operation, under all of the cir-
cumstances in this case, then such a finding should be taken
into consideration by you as a factor which would reduce the
amount of damages to which Couture would otherwise be en-
titled.28
A person injured by the wrongful act or omission of another
has a duty to mitigate damages by exercising reasonable precau-
tion in the care and treatment of his injuries.2 9 However, prior
to Couture, this doctrine was limited by the rule that a plain-
tiff had no duty to submit to a major surgical operation.30 Un-
der these rules, whenever a surgical operation which might re-
sult in the mitigation of an injured plaintiff's damages was
available, the jury was faced with the task of deciding whether
the plaintiff had a duty to undergo the operation. If the plain-
tiff had such a duty, the damages were to be adjusted accord-
ingly. The Couture court noted that when the jury made this
decision, it had to consider such factors as the pain, expense
and effort involved, the possibility of success and the need for
anesthesia. It is stating the obvious to add to this list the prob-
ability and the gravity of the harm that could result from the
contemplated operation.
In deemphasizing the term "major surgical operation" and
urging the jury to consider instead whether "a reasonably pru-
dent person would undergo such an operation,"3 1 the court was
27. The court cited Jenkins v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 111 So. 2d
837 (La. App. 1959) (defendant not required to pay substantial damages
which could be mitigated by knee surgery). 211 N.W.2d at 175.
28. 211 N.W.2d at 176 (emphasis added). This language is almost
identical to an instruction approved by the Pennsylvania court in Bar-
tunek v. Koch, 404 Pa. 1, 170 A.2d 563 (1961).
29. Kesich v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 188 Minn. 173, 246 N.W. 672
(1933); Patterson v. Blatti, 133 Minn. 23, 157 N.W. 717 (1916). This
duty of mitigation is related to the concept of contributory negligence.
See W. PRossER, LAw or TORTS § 65, 422-23 (4th ed. 1971).
30. Perry v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 152 Minn. 398, 188 N.W.
1002 (1922); Maroney v. Minneapolis & St. L. R.R., 123 Minn. 480, 144
N.W. 149 (1913). Indeed, the court once stated in absolute terms,
[a]lthough an injured person is required to exercise reasonable
precaution to mitigate damages, he is not bound to submit to
an operation.
Butler v. Whitman, 193 Minn. 150, 152, 258 N.W. 165, 166 (1934).
31. See text of the court's suggested instruction accompanying note
3 supra.
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wisely adding flexibility and substance to the instruction. To
state that the plaintiff is not required to undergo a "major sur-
gical operation" is to state the problem in conclusory terms since
the jury must determine, at least in the first instance, whether
the specific operation is "major." The substance of the problem
is to determine when a plaintiff should not be allowed to recover
damages for a subsisting disability which the reasonably prudent
person would take steps to correct. The new instruotion focuses
upon this question. Like all other jury determinations of rea-
sonable prudence, this one must be carefully circumscribed by
judicial boundaries. As the court stated:
Medical science has made many advances since we last con-
sidered this question. Operations and treatments which for-
merly involved grave risks are now relatively free from hazards
and enjoy great success. There remain instances where the
hazards may be so evident that there would be no duty as a
matter of law to submit to such surgery. Similarly, there may
be other treatments or operations which are so free from danger
that as a matter of law a person would be under a duty to
submit to them or have his damages limited.8 2
However, there is one puzzling aspect of the case. It is un-
certain whether the issue of this specific plaintiff's duty to un-
dergo the knee operation had been determined by the court. The
court stated that it had concluded "as a matter of law" that
this operation was not a "major surgical operation" as that term
was used in Instruction 164. 33 The implication of this state-
ment is that the court has determined as a matter of law that
this is one of those instances where the plaintiff has a duty to
submit to the operation. Yet the instruction suggested for use
in the case on remand clearly contemplates that the new jury
should decide the duty issue. Hopefully, the respective roles
of judge and jury in this determination will be clarified in fu-
ture cases.
4. Common Law Dram Shop Liability for Sale of 3.2 Beer.
-Defendant sold 3.2 beer to one Ridlon, who was both intoxi-
cated and a minor. After departing from defendant's tavern,
Ridlon drove his automobile at high speeds, ultimately colliding
with the rear of an automobile in which plaintiff was a passen-
ger. Plaintiff, 21 years of age, suffered a severed spine, thereby
32. 211 N.W.2d at 176. It is likely that operations in the vicinity
of the vital internal organs will continue to be optional as a matter
of law. See, e.g., Perry v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 152 Minn. 398,
188 N.W. 1002 (1922); Maroney v. Minneapolis & St. L. R.R., 123 Minn.
480, 144 N.W. 149 (1913).
33. 211 N.W.2d at 176.
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rendering her an invalid for the remainder of her life. Under
Minnesota law, it is unlawful to sell 3.2 beer to a minor s4 or
an intoxicated person.8 5 However, the state's Civil Damages
Act,31 commonly called the Dram Shop Act, does not impose
civil liability for the sale of 3.2 beer.37 As a result, the plaintiff
was forced to seek a reversal of the common law rule that a
vendor is not liable in negligence to a plaintiff injured when
the vendor makes an unlawful sale of intoxicating beverages to
a minor or intoxicated person whose subsequent conduct results
in plaintiff's injury. The trial court dismissed the complaint on
the ground that it failed to state a cause of action under the
common law rule. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed,
holding that a vendor is now liable at common law for an un-
lawful sale of 3.2 beer to a minor or intoxicated person which
results in injury to a third party. The court also stated, in an-
swer to defendant's arguments, that the legislature did not by
its enactment of the Dram Shop Act preempt the subject of civil
liability to third parties for the unlawful sale of intoxicants and
that the defenses of comparative negligence, contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk are not available to such vendors.
Trail v. Christian, 213 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 1973).
The common law rule of no vendor liability 8 was based pri-
marily upon the theory that the voluntary consumption of the
liquor by the vendee, and not the sale by the vendor, was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.39 Even if the vendor's
conduct was somewhat reprehensible, it was felt that the vendor
owed no duty to the general public to refrain from the sale be-
cause the harm was too remote. In reversing the rule, the court
cited two Minnesota cases which imposed liability on tavern
owners for assaults by intoxicated persons on other patrons of
34. NlNm. STAT. § 340.035(1) (1971).
35. Mmni. STAT. § 340.73(1) (1971).
36. MnuN. STAT. § 340.95 (1971). The Act is a legislatively cre-
ated remedy for a plaintiff injured by the conduct of an intoxicated
person against any person who supplied "intoxicating liquors" which
contributed to the tortfeasor's intoxication.
37. Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955). The stat-
ute was construed in this manner because 3.2 beer is included in the
separate definition of "non-intoxicating malt liquor." MnN. STAT.
§ 340.001(2) (1971). The Dram Shop Act applies only to the sale of
"intoxicating liquors." Mnw. STAT. § 340.95 (1971).
38. See Swinfin v. Lowry, 37 Minn. 345, 34 N.W. 22 (1887); Note,
The Common Law Liability of Minnesota Liquor Vendors for Injuries
Arising from Negligent Sales, 49 MmN. L. REv. 1154, 1155 (1965).
39. See M-N. L. REv., supra note 38, at 1156.
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the tavern.40 However, this liability might be created as much
by the common law business invitee rule 4' as by any duty to
the general public to refrain from selling alcoholic beverages
to intoxicated persons. 42 The court did not clarify matters by
quoting with approval the early Minnesota case of Christianson
v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry.,48 since the rule
of proximate cause set forth in that opinion 44 contains language
which arguably refers to both of the major contending tests of
proximate cause.45 The "direct causation" test4" led to the com-
mon law dram shop rule of no liability since the voluntary con-
sumption of alcohol was viewed by the courts as an intervening
cause. However, as Chief Justice Hallows of Wisconsin recently
stated, "the basis upon which these cases were decided is sadly
eroded by the shift from commingling alcohol and horses to com-
mingling alcohol and horsepower. '47 The Minnesota court, tak-
ing judicial notice of the fact that 3.2 beer is capable of inducing
intoxication,4 now agrees that the consequences of furnishing
beer to minors or intoxicated persons49 are foreseeable. Thus
the adoption of a "foreseeable consequences" test of proxi-
mate cause5" surmounted the former hurdle to common law
vendor liability.
To the defendant's argument that the legislature had pre-
empted the regulation of alcoholic beverages, the court replied:
40. Klingbeil v. Truesdell, 256 Minn. 360, 98 N.W.2d 134 (1959);
Windorski v. Doyle, 219 Minn. 402, 18 N.W.2d 142 (1945).
41. See W. PRoSsER, LAW OF ToaTs § 61 (4th ed. 1971).
42. But see MINN. L. REv., supra note 38, at 1160-61.
43. 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896).
44. Id. at 97, 69 N.W. at 641.
45. The court seems to believe that the Christianson case applies
the "foreseeable consequences" test of proximate cause; see Overseas
Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r Co., [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.)
(N.S.W.) ("The Wagon Mound"). This would seem to be the only way
that the court could both approve Christianson and agree with Vesely
v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 163-64, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 630-31, 486 P.2d 151,
158-59 (1971), since language in the latter case unmistakably indicates
a "foreseeable consequences" test.
46. Polemis v. Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.).
47. Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 737, 176 N.W.2d 566, 572
(1970) (dissenting opinion). See also 213 N.W.2d at 623 n.10, citing
other jurisdictions which have reversed the common law dram shop
rule.
48. 213 N.W.2d at 621. See Trail v. Village of Elk River, 286 Minn.
380, 388, 175 N.W.2d 916, 921 (1970).
49. In the present case, Ridlon was allegedly both a minor and
intoxicated. However, the court firmly indicated that either condition
would support the action. 213 N.W.2d at 620.
50. See note 45 supra.
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We will not promote legislative silence to legislative preemp-
tion. To do so would immunize a certain segment of the liquor
industry, namely, dispensers of 3.2 beer, from liability for negli-
gent conduct which causes serious injury to innocent third per-
sons.51
Presumably, the "legislative silence" to which the court referred
was the longstanding legislative abstinence from modification of
the Dram Shop Act,52 particularly in light of Beck v. Groe,5 3
which held that because 3.2 beer was not within the definition
of intoxicating liquor, its sale did not give rise to a cause of
action under the Act. In giving such short shrift to the legis-
lative preemption argument, the court wisely avoided the type
of shadowboxing in which it had engaged in the Beck case5"
to arrive at the original conclusion that 3.2 beer was not included
in the Act. Instead, the court concentrated on the logical consis-
tency of its present reading with the policy of the Act. So-
called "non-intoxicating" liquors do in fact have intoxicating ef-
fects which may lead to the same harms as those for which the
legislature has attempted to provide a remedy via the Dram
Shop Act.
Finally, the court held that violation of the two criminal
statutes5 5 constituted "negligence per se."' 0 On the facts al-
leged, defendant's conduct was a clear violation of statutes
which were intended for the protection of the general public
from the type of risk (negligent conduct of minors and intoxi-
cated persons) and the type of harm (personal injury) experi-
enced by this particular plaintiff.51 Under the "negligence per
se" rule, such a violation constitutes conclusive evidence of negli-
gence. The jury need not decide what specific standard of con-
duct to apply to defendant's action because the legislature has
already made that decision."8 However, the court seemed to
confuse the issue of whether the statutory violation should con-
stitute negligence per se with the issue of whether the statutory
51. 213 N.W.2d at 625.
52. The Act was enacted in substantially its present form by Minm.
Laws 1911, ch. 175, § 1.
53. 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955).
54. See 245 Minn. at 36-44, 70 N.W.2d at 893-97, wherein the court
attempted to discern legislative intent as to the coverage of the Act
by a reading in pari materia with all of chapter 340 and in light of
the history of prohibition.
55. AlMx. STAT. § 340.035(1), .73(1) (1971).
56. 213 N.W.2d at 626.
57. See PnsmATmnn= (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 286 (1965).




violation in and of itself should strip the defendant of the usual
secondary defenses of comparative negligence, contributory neg-
ligence and assumption of risk. The first issue is concerned with
determining the applicable standard of conduct; the second issue,
completely distinct, is concerned with factors that mitigate de-
fendant's liability even though he has been negligent. A statu-
tory violation which strips the defendant of these defenses is
an exception and generally must involve a statute designed pre-
cisely to protect a child or other relatively incompetent person
from his own lack of discretion. Such a statute creates an ab-
solute duty to the class of incompetents for whose protection
it was enacted. 59
Thus, a logical inconsistency lurks in the court's holding.
In order to find that the statutory violation breached a duty
owed to the plaintiff, the court had to hold that the statute
was enacted for the protection of the general public. However,
the court simultaneously had to find that the statute was for
the protection of a special class of incompetent persons (minors
and intoxicated persons), or the statutory violation would not
have eliminated the usual secondary defenses. Curiously, the
result reached by the court is exactly the same as if the court
had directly overruled Beck v. Groe ° and held that 3.2 beer
falls within the scope of the Dram Shop Act which has been
held to eliminate at least the defense of contributory neg-
ligence. 61
5. Other cases.-In two other cases this term, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court dealt with the question of defenses avail-
able in tort actions grounded upon statutory violations. In Mar-
tinson v. Monticello Municipal Liquors, 209 N.W.2d 902 (Minn.
59. See Zerby v. Warren, 210 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 1973). The
misapplication in Trail can be most clearly seen from the court's brack-
eted addition to a quote from Zerby:
Types of statutes which would be exceptions to the general rule
[and thus give rise to negligence per se in the event such stat-
utes are violated] include * * * statutes for the protection of
intoxicated persons; * * *
213 N.W.2d at 625 (bracketed material added by the Trail court). To
the contrary, the general rule to which the Zerby court referred is neg-
ligence per se; the exception is the stripping of secondary defenses from
the defendant.
60. 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955). See note 4 supra and ac-
companying text.
61. Kvanli v. Village of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 485, 139 N.W.2d




1973), the court held that the Dram Shop Act 2 protects only
innocent victims and that plaintiff's complicity in purchasing
drinks for the driver, an adult, would constitute a valid defense
for the vendor.6 3
In Zerby v. Warren, 210 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1973), however,
the court held that even a statutory violation by plaintiff would
not constitute a defense in some circumstances. Defendant had
sold glue to two minors in violation of a statute, 4 resulting in
one minor's death. The court allowed no defenses even though
possession and use of the glue by a minor is a statutory viola-
tion.65 The court found that the statute prohibiting sale of glue
to a minor was intended to protect a limited class of persons
who are unable to protect themselves and therefore neither a
statutory violation nor ordinary negligence of the injured person
could be a defense.66 Zerby and Martinson are apparently dis-
tinguished by the injured party's compounding of the vendor's
violation in Martinson.
62. AMnm. STAT. § 340.95 (1971).
63. Cf. Heveron v. Village of Belgrade, 288 Minn. 395, 181 N.W2d
692 (1970); Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 103 N.W.2d
131 (1960); Cavin v. Smith, 228 Minn. 322, 37 N.W.2d 368 (1949).
64. MlNw. STAT. § 145.38 (1971).
65. Mm. STAT. § 145.39 (1971) makes it a misdemeanor for per-
sons under age 19 to use or possess the type of glue involved in Zerby.
66. See also Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 555
(1947).
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